FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QVARTERLY REVIEW

APRIL

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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THE REAL REVOLUTION IN SOUTH VIET NAM

By George A. Carver, Jr.

SOUTH Viet Nam, as is obvious to anyone with the most cursory interest in world affairs, is in the midst of a war, and equally obvious is the fact that this war is being waged by a Communist-controlled insurgent movement supported and directed from Hanoi. Less obvious, but equally important in determining its political complexion and future (including, ultimately, the outcome of the Communist-instigated war) is the fact that South Viet Nam is also in the midst of a social revolution.

When South Viet Nam was created in 1954, political authority was initially assumed by a predominantly mandarinal class, largely French-educated and foreign-oriented in culture even though politically nationalistic. Of that class, Ngo Dinh Diem was both symbol and archetype. Today political power is in the process of passing to a more militantly "Vietnamese" group, at least latently xenophobic and, in some ways, more culturally autochthonous, far less prone to think about politics in a foreign idiom. Of this group, the students, the bonzes (monks) who lead the "Buddhist" movement and the military "Young Turks" are prime examples. This shift in the locus of political power explains much of the otherwise baffling turbulence on the South Vietnamese political scene and constitutes the real revolution in South Viet Nam. The Communist insurgency has contributed to the climate and circumstances which produced it, but the two are not the same. The insurgency is and always has been a contrived and consciously directed politico-military campaign. South Viet Nam's social revolution is something much more formless, much less the result of deliberate intent and much less amenable to anyone's control.

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This revolution is a thing of manifold complexity in which nationalist sentiments, for example, are complicated by cross-currents of regionalism and in which contending factions bear religious labels even though no issue of religious doctrine or practice is really involved. So far, it has been largely confined to urban centers and as yet has had relatively little effect on the lives of the peasantry who constitute the bulk of South Viet Nam's population. This fact may condition its outcome and ultimate impact but does not alter its present importance. Though a small minority in terms of numbers, the literate and vocal urban populace has a predominant influence over South Vietnamese politics—a situation which, so far, has kept the peasantry from feeling a sense of direct identification with the fortunes of any Saigon régime and has been one of the Communists' principal assets. To understand the revolution now taking place and the emotions it involves, to assess its import and its relationship to the Communist insurgency, one must appreciate the historical context in which it developed. It was this context which made Diem's Catholicism a catalytic factor, caused his opponents to rally under the banner of "Buddhism" and gave the bonzes who direct the "Buddhist" movement the political influence they exercise today.

II

Contemporary religious animosities in South Viet Nam have deep historical roots. During the past three centuries, the close and often causal relationship between Catholic missionary activity and French political encroachment created strong emotional tensions and not always latent hostility between Catholic and non-Catholic Vietnamese, emotions similar in many regards to the feelings between Catholic and non-Catholic Englishmen in the days of Elizabeth I and her Stuart successors.

If we discount an occasional earlier traveler and a few sixteenth-century Portuguese traders, the Jesuits were really the first Europeans to become systematically and permanently interested in Viet Nam.[1] The attention of the Jesuit Superior in Macao was

[1] The territory denoted by "Viet Nam" in any historical discourse varies with the time period under consideration. At the beginning of the Christian era the ethnic Vietnamese were largely confined to the Red River delta. The coastal plains between the Red River and Mekong deltas were dominated by the kingdom of Champa, whose seat was originally north of Hué. South of the Chams lay the shadowy kingdom of Fu Nan, of which little is known save that it disappeared around the sixth century A.D. under pressure from the precursors of the Khmers who were, in turn, the ancestors of the modern Cambodians. The gradual southward push of the ethnic Viets down the coastal plain and into the Mekong delta constitutes the *leitmotif* of recorded Vietnamese history. It took eighteen centuries to complete. During its course, the

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directed to Viet Nam after the priests under his charge were expelled from Japan in 1614. A mission was established the following year at the port of Fai Fo (near modern Da Nang) in the Nguyen principality. Its success encouraged the Macao Fathers to expand their work into Trinh-ruled Tongking, and in 1627 Father Alexandre de Rhodes went to Hanoi. The efforts of this remarkable man (who helped to perfect *quoc-ngu,* the diacritically marked roman script in which Vietnamese is now written) materially influenced subsequent Vietnamese history. In 1645 he went to Rome to seek assistance for Catholic mission endeavors in Indochina and suggested that the work be carried on by local priests ordained and supervised by European bishops directly responsible to the Pope. While Innocent X pondered this ingenious suggestion (politically delicate because it ignored Portuguese claims on ecclesiastical patronage), Father Alexandre, a Frenchman by birth, went to Paris to recruit personnel and raise funds to execute his eventually adopted proposal.

His appeals fell on receptive ears, partly because influential nobles and merchants were already casting covetous eyes at the Portuguese-Spanish monopoly of Indochinese trade. They ultimately resulted in the consecration of two French priests as Bishops and Vicars Apostolic, one of Tongking, the other of Cochin China (*i.e.* Nguyen-held Annam), as well as the founding of what became the powerful and politically influential Société des Missions Etrangères. While pursuing his religious objectives, in short, Father Alexandre initiated French interest in and association with Indochina.

Chams were virtually exterminated (the last vestige of an organized Cham court vanished in 1720) and the Mekong delta wrested from the Khmer/Cambodians. The latter, however, was a fairly recent development. Vietnamese colonization of the Mekong region did not really begin until the seventeenth century, Vietnamese suzerainty over the area was not seriously essayed until the eighteenth century, and not until the early ninenteenth century (1802) did a single Vietnamese ruler's writ really run from the Camau peninsula to the China border.

At the beginning of the seventeenth century, Vietnamese rule extended to the present province of Quang Nam in South Viet Nam. Though there was a Le dynasty king of what purported to be a single throne, Nguyen lords actually held sway south of a line approximately equivalent to the 17th parallel, while north of that line Trinh Nobles exercised de facto control. Contemporary writers referred to the Trinh principality as Tongking (Tonkin) and the Nguyen realm as Cochin China. However, later usage, including French administrative nomenclature, employed "Cochin China" as the name for the most southerly region of modern Viet Nam, including the Mekong delta and the provinces immediately north and east of Saigon. The central portion of modern Viet Nam came to be known as Annam. The remainder of North Viet Nam retained the name of Tongking. Tongking, Annam and Cochin China became the three great *ky* or regions into which the ethnic Vietnamese were administratively and, in French years, politically divided. Despite a large measure of cultural homogeneity among all ethnic Viets, each of these regions has a distinctive dialect, some unique customs and strong local loyalties.

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During the latter part of the eighteenth century, both Vietnamese principalities were racked by a series of insurrections and civil wars known as the Tay Son revolt. In these troubled times, the pretender to the southern throne—Nguyen Anh—had to flee for his life. During his wanderings as a fugitive in Camau, he met and was sheltered by another remarkable Frenchman, Msgr. Pigneau de Behaine, Apostolic Vicar of Cochin China. The energetic bishop became the pretender's adviser and champion. In 1787 Msgr. Pigneau went to Paris, accompanied by the pretender's young son, to enlist official support for the Nguyen cause. With the somewhat reluctant blessing of Louis XVI (who had mounting problems of his own), a treaty was signed promising French aid in return for certain territorial and trade concessions. With the treaty and funds obtained in Paris, the bishop eventually raised a mercenary contingent which tipped the tide of battle in Nguyen Anh's favor.

With this aid provided through the efforts of a French bishop, and with the support of Vietnamese Catholics who rallied to his cause, Nguyen Anh ultimately conquered virtually all of modern Viet Nam. At Hué, in 1802, he proclaimed himself the Emperor Gia Long—founding a dynasty which reigned until its last member, Bao Dai, was deposed in 1955.

Gia Long himself was grateful for the foreign assistance which brought him to power and at his death in 1820 ordered that there was to be no persecution of the three religions then established in his empire—*i.e.* Confucianism, Buddhism and Christianity. His virulently anti-foreign successors, however, ignored this edict. From time to time they permitted or initiated repressive actions against French missionary priests and pogroms against Vietnamese Catholics. These actions, in turn, provoked ever sharper responses from the French Government. Matters came to a head during the reign of the xenophobic Emperor Tu Duc (1848–1883). After an initial period of hesitation, he made the political blunder of launching a particularly brutal campaign against Vietnamese Catholics and foreign missionaries at a time when France was itching for an excuse to seize territory in Viet Nam. The murder of a Spanish bishop in 1857 prompted a Franco-Spanish reaction which suffered numerous reverses but finally (in 1862) forced Tu Duc to cede Cochin China's three eastern provinces to France. During this period, a French bishop's relations with Prince Norodom caused Cambodia to become a French

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protectorate in 1864. In 1866, France occupied the remainder of Cochin China by advancing to the now French-protected Cambodian border. (Further French territorial expansion was not undertaken until after the Franco-Prussian war, and when it was, less stress was laid on the *raison d'être* of protecting foreign missionaries and their Vietnamese flocks.)

This whole complex and bloody story developed animosities which still plague Vietnamese political life. Among Vietnamese Catholics it engendered a sense of clannishness, alienation from their non-Catholic compatriots and an understandable fear of persecution. Among non-Catholic Vietnamese, however, it engendered a sentiment epitomized by the saying attributed to one of Tu Duc's most powerful mandarins, *viz.* that Vietnamese Catholics served as the claws which enabled the French crab to crawl across the land.

French political control over all of Indochina was finally established in the last decade of the nineteenth century and was institutionalized as a five-part whole under the supervisory aegis of a Governor General. Cochin China remained an avowed colony, Annam and Tongking were separate "protectorates" (as were Laos and Cambodia, which we shall henceforth ignore). The Emperor and Court were maintained at Hué for the sake of form but without any substantial power and under close French supervision. France ruled her Indochinese domains through a complicated combination of direct and indirect controls, the details of which varied from region to region. In Viet Nam, particularly Annam, much ostensible authority at the local level—along with the attendant onus of enforcing unpopular decrees—was left in the hands of trusted Vietnamese guided by French "advisers." Lip service was paid to the principle of "association," but since France never had any intention of preparing her colonial protégés for self-government, the operative form of association proved to be "assimilation"—a process whereby certain favored Vietnamese could become French citizens. (Not surprisingly, "assimilés" were more common in Cochin China than in Annam or Tongking.) Educational opportunities were limited, particularly in the higher ranges, and as carefully controlled as possible. Higher education was French education (the traditional Vietnamese competitive examinations for the mandarinate were abolished) and hence required a fluency in the French language as well as an intensive exposure to French cultural concepts. None of this,

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of course, prevented the rise of anti-French nationalist political sentiments (virtually all twentieth-century Vietnamese revolutionary leaders have spoken impeccable French). However, it did produce one easily overlooked but very important result: the political thoughts of the products of this educational system were unconsciously cast in a foreign idiom often ill-adapted to the realities of Vietnamese political life.

The upshot of the various factors outlined above was that during the period of French rule, actual experience in even the forms of exercising political power was limited to members of landed or mandarinal families (*e.g.* Diem) and the education needed to articulate and manipulate political concepts was largely confined, if not to children of mandarins, than at least to scions of the wealthy or aristocratic bourgeoisie (*e.g.* Ho Chi Minh). The Vietnamese political leaders who emerged during the colonial era —whatever their individual doctrines or programs—tended by and large to come from the same segment of Vietnamese urban society. Not that the French encouraged the development of Vietnamese political leadership. Indeed, they actively discouraged it. Known or suspected opponents of French rule were kept under surveillance and often summarily imprisoned. More subtly, but with greater lasting damage, the French employed the control tactic of "divide and rule" by encouraging localism, particularism and squabbling disunity—attitudes to which the Vietnamese have been inherently addicted throughout their history, often to the detriment of their political fortunes.

World War II stimulated a surge of nationalism throughout Southeast Asia. The combination of metropolitan defeat and Japanese humiliation of the pro-Vichy colonial government did irreparable damage to French prestige in Indochina. Allied confusion and lack of foresight helped the Communists seize control of the Vietnamese nationalist movement and profit from the near anarchy resulting from the precipitate Japanese surrender by installing themselves at least temporarily in power. De Gaulle might have had the perceptivity to assess the force of Vietnamese nationalism and the acumen to cope with it. His successors, who acted as if nothing had happened in Indochina between May 1940 and August 1945, were not equal to the task. French intransigence on the question of even considering eventual independence helped assure a Viet Minh victory. The French attitude also stifled the growth and development of genuinely

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nationalist but anti-Communist political leadership and left anti-Communist nationalists with the unhappy choices of exile, the Viet Minh or sterile *attentisme*.

In the aftermath of French defeat, foreign fiat at Geneva created the state of South Viet Nam, drawing its borders to include Cochin China and the southern half of Annam. Ngo Dinh Diem became South Viet Nam's first Premier, and, in 1955, its Chief of State. Diem's personal ethos was a blend of traditional Vietnamese values and devout Catholicism. Although a member of the class of Vietnamese Catholic mandarins who had prospered under French rule, he himself was an intense nationalist and lifelong opponent of French political domination. (His nationalist sentiments had led him to resign from Bao Dai's cabinet in 1933 and refuse the Premiership when it was offered him in 1948 with what he considered unacceptable French restrictions.) When he came to power he had a general reputation for patriotism and personal integrity, but his active, organized supporters were primarily Catholics from Central Viet Nam. This group remained one of Diem's two principal sources of support. The other consisted of militantly anti-Communist—though, again, predominantly Catholic—refugees from North Viet Nam. Diem's early years in office were full of promise and marked by significant accomplishments achieved in the face of innumerable difficulties. The course of his later years evolved in the manner and eventually with the inexorability of a Greek tragedy, only one aspect of which need be dealt with here.

In non-Catholic Vietnamese eyes, the Catholic cast of Diem's régime increased rather than diminished with the passage of time. Its quasi-covert political organization, the Can Lao Party, was controlled by Catholics; its official philosophy of "personalism" (developed by Diem's brother Ngo Dinh Nhu) owed obvious extensive debts to French Catholic thinkers and was expounded to government officials at an institute presided over by another brother, Archbishop Thuc. In 1958, a law actively sponsored by Diem's sister-in-law Mme. Ngo Dinh Nhu imposed on marriage, divorce and family relationships strictures consonant with Catholic doctrine but very much against the grain of Vietnamese tradition in these emotionally charged areas. (The adverse political impact of this "Family Bill" was augmented by a widespread suspicion that its primary object was to stop Nguyen Huu Chau from divorcing Mme. Nhu's sister.) In 1962, a similar "Law for

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the Protection of Morality," also sponsored by Mme. Nhu, generated additional resentment over what was widely construed as governmental imposition of narrow and puritanical "Catholic morality" on non-Catholics who constituted the overwhelming majority of South Viet Nam's population. (This resentment was heightened by subsequent edicts banning such things as traditional, and popular, "sentimental songs.") In 1959, the Diem government sponsored a country-wide series of elaborate Marian Year celebrations culminating in a solemn ceremony in front of the Saigon Cathedral at which South Viet Nam was formally consecrated to the Immaculate Heart of Mary. The extent to which Catholics appeared to obtain preferment in civil and military life —something actually due to many causes, frequently including better education—generated the widespread belief that at least nominal conversion to Catholicism was a requirement for advancement. There was very little actual religious persecution, but the religious sensibilities of non-Catholics were often slighted, sometimes as a result of excessive zeal on the part of subordinate officials, more often as a result of thoughtlessness rather than deliberate official intent to harass. Furthermore, though non-Catholics were not persecuted, there were many signs that could be construed or misconstrued as evidence of disproportionate official partiality for Catholics and Catholicism.

Bit by bit a plethora of incidents, events, practices and policies —many of them almost certainly unintentional or accidental— laid the groundwork for a "religious issue" on which non-Communist but also non-Catholic opposition to Diem could, and eventually did, focus. This was not something that suddenly happened in the spring of 1963. Instead, it was something that had been gradually building up almost from the day Diem took office.

The historical context sketched above may help explain why anti-Catholicism, once surfaced, can arouse such strong emotions in non-Catholic Vietnamese. It does not explain why Diem's opponents rallied behind the standard "Buddhism," particularly since the number of devout, actively practicing Buddhists in South Viet Nam probably does not greatly exceed the number of practicing Catholics. To understand this phenomenon, and the present political strength of South Viet Nam's "Buddhist" movement, we must briefly trace another current in Vietnamese history.

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III

Though there is some dispute over the precise dates, Mahayana Buddhism appears to have come to Viet Nam from China during the middle of the period of Chinese domination which lasted from 111 B.C. to 939 A.D.[2] Along with Buddhism, the Chinese introduced other religious doctrines including Confucianism and Taoism. All of these imported beliefs underwent considerable modification in Viet Nam, however, and all were in large measure compounded with animism and primitive spirit worship, particularly among the rural population. The future religious structure of Viet Nam was significantly influenced by the fact that the rulers of the first stable and independent Vietnamese dynasty—that of the Ly (1009–1225)—were ardent Buddhists. Under their reign, official sponsorship of Buddhism and coöperation between Viet Nam's rulers and the Buddhist clergy reached a high point never subsequently equalled. The identification of the Ly with Vietnamese Buddhism is not without current political significance, for the Ly were among the greatest nationalists in Vietnamese history. They successfully fended off the Chinese to the north, pushed back the Chams to the south and curbed foreign (*i.e.* Chinese) political influence. Even in modern Vietnamese eyes they have a legendary aura, some of which extends to the Buddhist faith with which they were so intimately identified.

The downfall of the Ly initiated a long period of decline in Buddhism's political fortunes. During the ensuing centuries there were occasional revivals of Buddhist influence, though these were generally followed by repression. One of the strongest such revivals occurred during the seventeenth century when Catholicism was rapidly winning converts as a result of energetic Jesuit activity, and, for a time, Buddhism was more or less officially encouraged as a "nationalist" counter to this foreign doctrine. From the fifteenth century onward, however, a form of Confucianism was the official state or court cult—a fact which inhibited the institutional development of Buddhism. In principalities such as Ceylon, Burma, Siam and Cambodia, where Therevada Buddhism enjoyed centuries of status as a state religion, it evolved an effective and fairly disciplined hierarchical structure. For both doctrinal and political reasons, Mahayana Buddhism in Viet Nam

[2] Virtually all ethnic Vietnamese Buddhists adhere to some Mahayana sect. The Khmer, however, were converted to Therevada (Hinayana) Buddhism in the early thirteenth century. There are Therevada Buddhist sects in present-day South Viet Nam, but the overwhelming majority of their followers are ethnic Cambodians, know as Khmer Krom.

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followed the opposite course and became increasingly marked by organizational weakness and doctrinal diversity.

At various times, particularly during the second decade of this century, attempts were made to form regional and national Buddhist associations, but these never became much more than the loosest of affiliations between essentially autonomous local pagodas. The surge of nationalism throughout Asia after World War II produced, among other things, a revived interest in Buddhist unity and coöperation which contributed significantly to the founding of the World Buddhist Federation in 1951. In that same year, a General Association of Vietnamese Buddhists was organized in Viet Nam. This organization provided an institutional mechanism for a reciprocal exchange of Buddhist views and at least adumbrated the idea of religious unity among the various Buddhist sects, though it was far more impressive on paper than it ever became in fact.

The doctrinal diversity and weakness of organizational structure in Vietnamese Buddhism, however, both contributed to and obscured certain latent strengths and potential emotional appeal. When Buddhism was banished from the court it subsided into the ranks of the people and, over passing centuries, there developed an autochthonous character and aura. Furthermore, having been rejected by the court, it was not involved in, nor were its fortunes adversely affected by, the court's eventual decline and dissipation. Buddhism, in short, became something uniquely Vietnamese, adapted to local situations and free of foreign political taint. Despite the relatively small number of Vietnamese actively engaged in Buddhist affairs, "Buddhism" developed into a religious idea with which the overwhelming majority of the Vietnamese populace had at least some vague sense of emotional identification. The rise and activities of the Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao sects gave some indication of the potential political strength of religious ideas in tune with local attitudes and aspirations. Buddhism, with its much broader base, was an even stronger latent political force.

As indicated above, certain historical factors, combined with the character and practices of the Diem régime, laid the groundwork for a "religious" issue over which political opposition to the Ngo family could swiftly coalesce. The spark which ignited the powder was struck in Hué on May 8, 1963, under circumstances whose details will probably always remain matters of controversy

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but whose general outlines are sufficiently well known to require no rehearsal here. In the ensuing months of political struggle, the Buddhists displayed hitherto unsuspected organizational and political talents. Using the shell of the aforementioned General Association, an "Inter-Sect Committee" was swiftly formed, partly to negotiate with the government but primarily to coordinate anti-government political activities. The name of Thich Tinh Kiet[3]—a revered octogenarian bonze and president of the General Association—was invoked as the "leader" of the movement, but it soon became apparent that the real leadership was in the hands of militant younger bonzes including Thich Duc Nghiep, Thich Tam Chau and, above all, Thich Tri Quang, the bonze from Hué who had been intimately involved in precipitating the May 8 incident. The Buddhist leadership was never free from discord or cross-currents of personal rivalry, but it proved sufficiently cohesive to contribute significantly to the downfall of the Diem régime.

The "Buddhist" movement was and remains considerably more concerned with political issues than matters of religious doctrine. Its leaders have displayed an instinctive touch for public relations, and in the anti-Diem campaign took full advantage of their generally favorable foreign press. Sure theatrical hands have almost certainly stage-managed much ostensibly spontaneous protest and agitation. The breadth of the Buddhist leaders' actual political mandate is open to question. (The political aspirations of the participants in any mass movement are often at variance with the articulated opinions of their self-appointed leaders.) Granting all this and more, however, the fact remains that the "Buddhist" movement has become one of the most potent political forces in South Viet Nam. Accidents of history and circumstance have made "Buddhism" the focus and rallying symbol not only of political opposition to Catholic dominance but, more importantly, of inchoate nationalist aspirations, including a desire to be rid of alien doctrine and to find a "Vietnamese" solution to South Viet Nam's political problems.

IV

The mounting pressures which, in November 1963, had their by then inevitable result did far more than depose Diem, his family and régime. They also brushed aside the frail constitu-

[3] Thich means literally "the Venerable"—a religious title roughly equivalent to "Reverend."

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tional edifice established by that régime to institutionalize its rule, and, further, broke the monopoly of political influence to which the class whence Diem came had fallen heir in the aftermath of the French departure. In so doing, they threw South Viet Nam into a still continuing state of political ferment and precipitated a social revolution in which new figures and factions have emerged to contend for power; the position of formerly predominant groups has been radically altered.

The most complex and enigmatic of the emergent new forces is the group of militant bonzes who lead the "Buddhist" movement. Their formidable present political power—whose exercise they have found so heady and habit-forming—has derived from a masterful skill in directing the articulation of emotionally charged protest. It has yet to be tested in the more difficult field of constructive advocacy. These bonzes will certainly remain hypersensitive to any real or fancied recrudescence of "neo-Diemist" or "Catholic" political authority and to any potential threat to "Buddhism," which they are prone to identify with their own prestige and wishes. They seem anxious to avoid the responsibilities of political office but determined to have a veto over government policies and choices of personnel. Factionalism and personal rivalries among the Buddhist leaders make their positive goals harder to ascertain, particularly since, as in most protest movements, no contender for primacy will let a rival appear more "militant" than he.

At the moment, Thich Tri Quang seems to have outmanœuvred his colleagues and become at least *primus inter pares* within the Buddhist movement. His many enemies call him a Communist or, at best, pro-neutralist; he himself denies these charges and claims to recognize that Buddhism would get short shrift under any Communist régime. He is obviously ambitious and nationalistic to the point of xenophobia. Significantly, he is the first major Vietnamese political figure to emerge in 50 years who makes a point of professing not to speak any foreign language. There is little question that over the long run he would like to see Viet Nam free of all foreign influence. How this long-range aspiration will affect his short-term tactics and attitudes remains to be seen.

November 1963 left many Catholics dismayed at their sudden loss of governmental protection and patronage. A few were unwilling to accept the fact that the old order had changed; many more were understandably nervous at their now exposed position

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amidst a non-Catholic majority that in some instances proved more than potentially hostile. Though not a monolithic bloc, by and large the Catholics are apprehensive, distrust the Buddhist leadership—particularly Tri Quang—and fear a neutralist settlement that would deliver them into Communist hands. Most of their leaders recognize the delicacy of their present position, but some militants are undoubtedly considering preëmptive moves and will become increasingly inclined to think in such terms if they see the Catholic position deteriorating or become personally desperate. (Militant Catholics, particularly Army officers unable to reconcile themselves to the Diem régime's ouster, played a prominent role in the abortive coups of September 1964 and February 1965.) The other religious groups generally welcomed Diem's downfall. The Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao have emerged from nearly a decade of political insignificance to play influential roles, particularly in the provinces where their adherents are concentrated. Neither group has very much influence at the national level, though Chief of State Pham Khac Suu is a Cao Dai.

The now volatile and intensely nationalistic students (relatively docile and quiescent until the summer of 1963) have continued to experiment with the pleasures of political agitation. In weighing their aspirations we must recognize that 11 years have passed since the spring of 1954, hence the present student generation has spent at least its adolescence in a Vietnamese, not a French-dominated, educational system. By and large they tend to identify themselves emotionally with the "Buddhist" cause, but they are subject to manipulation from many quarters. Most of all, they seem to be potential followers searching for new leaders with Vietnamese answers to Viet Nam's difficulties.

Diem's erstwhile civilian political opponents—at least those not too openly tainted with Communist or French associations—have emerged from jail, exile and obscurity to plunge into the political mêlée. Old party and factional labels have been dusted off and quarrels shelved during the Diem era enthusiastically renewed—though these labels and quarrels now have an archaic aura and bear little relevance to current political realities. A few civilian politicians have served honorably—albeit sometimes briefly—in high office. Many have displayed the unfortunate effects of early habits patterned after the examples of Third- and Fourth-Republic French politicians and have been unable to dissipate the miasma of opposition or émigré salons. The old political personali-

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ties vary widely in ability, popular appeal and the esteem of their peers. None has yet sparked any real mass enthusiasm and when new leadership emerges it will probably not come from this quarter.

The political influence of the groups mentioned above derives in no small measure from the fact that they are articulate and visibly active. Urban society also includes other elements, however, whose sentiments and aspirations are less well known, especially to foreign observers, but who can easily play key roles at critical junctures in political life, particularly in the present fluid situation. Beyond the limits of the towns are other significant groups—the montagnards and, above all, the ethnic Vietnamese peasantry—who have not been directly involved in urban ferment but whose loyalties and actions, over the long run, will probably determine South Viet Nam's political future.

The military establishment actually executed the 1963 coup and has since retained ultimate political power, a fact which has conditioned all subsequent civilian political activity. The military establishment itself, however, has not been free from the revolutionary ferment that its actions set in train. In civilian life, the ex-aristocrats, wealthy landowners and French-educated intelligentsia have suffered a loss of status. In military circles, the past year has been marked by rising tension between "older" officers (meaning those past their thirties), who received their training and early command experience in French Union forces, and younger officers whose careers have been almost entirely spent in the U.S.-advised South Vietnamese military establishment.

Most of the senior officers who deposed Diem were, in turn, themselves ousted by General Khanh. For a time, military factionalism seemed to polarize around Generals Khanh, Khiem and Duong Van Minh. The events of August and September 1964 put Khanh out of political office but left him firmly established as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, with Khiem and Duong Van Minh out of the country. During 1964, however, a new and younger military group began to emerge, unfortunately if inevitably labeled the "Young Turks." In the spring and summer they seemed to be one of General Khanh's main sources of support; in September, they proved his salvation. After that, however, they became—collectively—his most potent rivals. Though they prevented the February 1965 coup from succeeding, in its wake they led the move to strip Khanh of his military authority.

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Below the Young Turks an even more junior group may well be forming. This restlessness within the military establishment is of course not the product of any single or simple cause. Personal ambitions play a role; so, too, do religious beliefs, concern over—or emotional identification with—the activities of various civilian groups, irritation at the lack of political progress and frustration over the course of the war. As yet this restlessness does not seem to have produced any element of defeatism or desire for accommodation with the enemy. Instead, an ardent and truculent nationalism and touchy sense of national pride seem to be traits common to all significant military factions.

V

The attitudes and politics of the military and civil groups mentioned above are all complicated by sentiments of regionalism, which are easy for a foreign observer to overlook but almost impossible for a Vietnamese to escape. With one brief exception, the Vietnamese people have never really been united since Nguyen Hoang left Trinh-ruled Tongking in 1600 to found a principality that subsequently became Annam. (The exception is the 60-year interval between Nguyen Anh's accession as Emperor in 1802 and Tu Duc's secession of Cochin China's three eastern provinces to France.) Even when the Annamite Nguyens reigned in Hué, Viet Nam was divided into its three great *ky*, with separate and powerful viceroys governing Tongking and Cochin China.

History and geography have interacted among the Vietnamese people to produce what in effect are three regionally oriented subcultures. It was in the Red River delta of Tongking that the ethnic Viets emerged as an identifiably separate people; and the Tongkinese are still inclined to think of themselves as the natural leaders of all Viet Nam, an attitude resented by both Annamites and Cochin Chinese. Annam had the least amount of direct French governance and has remained the most traditionalist of the three regions, as well as the area in which religious emotions—both Buddhist and Catholic—are probably strongest. Cochin China is unique in several respects. The ethnic Viets who began settling there and wresting its possession from the Khmers in the seventeenth century bore a relationship to their northern kinsmen similar in many respects to the relationship between homeland Europeans and the colonists who were settling the eastern seaboard of the United States at about the same period. Cochin

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China was the first region to come under French control and it became the area most culturally influenced by direct French rule.

The influences of regionalism have had and still have a profound effect on Vietnamese political allegiances and programs. Often they provide a rationale for developments that foreigners, unaware of their importance, find inexplicable. The energetic, industrious and predominantly Catholic Tongkinese refugees who came south in 1954 are still regarded by their Annamite and, particularly, Cochin Chinese cousins much as seventeenth century Englishmen regarded the Scots who came south with James I. Rivalry within the Buddhist movement, for example, is sharpened by the fact that Thich Tam Chau's supporters are primarily Tongkinese refugees, whereas Thich Tri Quang's followers are predominantly Annamite (though Tri Quang himself is from Tongking). Cochin Chinese, Annamite and Tongkinese cliques exist in every politically significant group: the Buddhists, the Catholics, the students, the civilian politicians and the military establishment. Everywhere they produce a jealous watchfulness over the regional balances struck with regard to advantage, preferment and influence.

Vietnamese politics are further complicated by the lack of any unifying traditional symbols or accepted institutions capable of channeling disagreement and containing tests of relative strength. There is, to begin with, no tradition of loyalty to *a* government in Saigon in the sense that there was some tradition of loyalty to *an* Emperor in Hué. Diem's constitutional edifice was patently patterned on a French model and had no roots in Vietnamese soil. The various patchwork façades constructed for the sake of appearances since his demise have been equally artificial and no more substantial. Nor are there really any organized political parties in the Western sense of the word. Party names abound, including ones of honorable lineage, but what are claimed to be parties can be described more accurately as the relatively small personal factions of rival politicians, none of whom seems to have any extensive following. Indeed, though Tran Quoc Buu's trade-union confederation (the C.T.V.) may be an exception, only the Buddhists now seem to have any effective mass organization.

A myriad of emotions, ambitions and loyalties swirl through the currents of conflict we have sketchily charted. Many Vietnamese are undoubtedly secret Communist sympathizers, others probably mourn the departure of the French, and yet others certainly

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still resent the toppling of Diem and all that he symbolized. Frustration, fatigue and weariness of unending civil war are obviously abroad in the land. So, too, is some neutralist sentiment, though this is hard to measure and easy to exaggerate. (Foreign observers in any country must avoid confusing the articulate with the representative.) Much more pervasive, probably, is the caution developed through a lifetime of turmoil which inhibits too strong a commitment to any side and, for self-preservation, reinsures against all contingencies. Yet resolution is present too, along with direct awareness of what the Communists are actually like, what life under their control can be, and what their version of "neutralism" or "negotiation" really means. Fear and the fanaticism it can breed are also in evidence, particularly among refugees who have already fled from Communist rule and know what a Communist victory will hold for them.

In all of the groups we have mentioned—particularly the Buddhists, the students and the younger military officers—politically portentous and potentially explosive nationalist emotions are rapidly rising: inchoate, complicated by regional perspectives, but none the less intense, and at least latently xenophobic. Basically these emotions derive from a desire to find and assert a *Vietnamese* identity. They are impelling a confused but profoundly significant quest for a set of political arrangements tempered to Vietnamese needs, adapted to Vietnamese realities and consonant with Vietnamese traditions. To date, this rising nationalism has not been focused as anti-Americanism, though the danger of such a development will always be present and will probably be heightened from time to time (as it has been already) by short-sighted tactical manœuvres on the part of sometimes recklessly ambitious contenders for power. As in the past, the Communists will endeavor without surcease to transmute nationalist emotions into anti-American feeling and will do everything possible to foment and exacerbate tensions between South Viet Nam and her principal ally. Yet the Communists must know what we should never forget: it is they who have the most to fear from genuine nationalism which develops in a manner they cannot contain and control.

Since November 1963, South Viet Nam has witnessed a succession of coups, demi-coups, demonstrations and governmental changes bewildering to the casual observer and suggestive of an inherent incapacity for self-government. This surface turmoil has not been entirely aimless or feckless, however, and the kaleido-

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scopic sequence of recent events does have a certain inner logic. What we are witnessing is a fundamental shift in the locus of urban political power and a basic realignment of political forces—in short, a revolution. The development of this revolution has involved a testing of relative strengths and tentative trials of new balances amidst the pressures of civil war and in a context where no traditional symbols or institutions can channel or contain political disagreement. This process has been chaotic and untidy, and will probably so continue, since the revolution responsible for it has probably not yet been completed. This revolution is not presently subject to any group's conscious control and is probably beyond anyone's power to stop. Its eventual outcome will determine South Viet Nam's political future for decades to come.

VI

The revolution we are witnessing in South Viet Nam should not be confused with the Hanoi-directed Communist insurgency, though the Communists will labor mightily to ensure that it is so confused (particularly in foreign eyes), will take credit for it and will try to turn it to their advantage. The insurgency contributed to the climate which precipitated this revolution, has complicated its issues and heightened its pressures—but the two are not the same.

The present insurgency is but the latest phase in the 40-year campaign which the leadership of the Indochinese Communist Party[4] has waged to acquire complete political control over all of Viet Nam, hegemony over Laos and some form of suzerainty over Cambodia. This campaign has been carried on relentlessly, ruthlessly and with great tactical flexibility. It has been waged through a protean variety of organizational forms and has made extensive, effective use of successive "front" devices—the Viet Minh League, the Lien Viet, the Fatherland Front and, currently, the "National Front for the Liberation of South Viet Nam"—each of which has been successful in deceiving Vietnamese and, especially, foreign observers.

During the 1930s the Communists were weak and their organi-

[4] Over the years, this leadership has (so far) been remarkably stable. The Indochinese Communist Party was virtually the personal creation of one man and has always faltered when his guiding hand was not at its helm. That man, of course, was born with the name of Nguyen Van Thanh (or, possibly, Nguyen Van Cung), took the pen name of Nguyen Ai Quoc ("Nguyen the Patriot") while in Paris at the time of the Versailles Conference, and in 1942, while under arrest in Nationalist China, adopted his present pseudonym of Ho Chi Minh ("the one who enlightens").

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zation small, but they were the unintended beneficiaries of savage French repression against their most potent nationalist rivals, the V.N.Q.D.D. With the witting if short-sighted assistance of the Nationalist Governor of Kwangsi, the Communists took over the Vietnamese independence and resistance movement which the Chinese Nationalists were sponsoring during World War II in order to harass the Japanese (who moved into Indochina in 1940). This movement, which became the Viet Minh, even received some American assistance and support on the strength of its supposed intelligence-collecting activities and guerrilla operations against the Japanese. Actually, efforts of the Communists during this period were devoted primarily to readying themselves for postwar contingencies and they were very careful not to provoke Japanese action which might interfere with these longer-term preparations. Most of such Communist military activity as was then undertaken was directed against bands of Vietnamese nationalist rivals.

In the confused aftermath of the Japanese surrender, the Communists temporarily assumed power and for about a year conducted stalling negotiations with the returning French. During this interval, the Communists relentlessly carried on their efforts to liquidate all nationalist rivals, betraying many to the French police, murdering others themselves (*e.g.* Huynh Phu So, founder of the Hoa Hao, and Diem's brother Ngo Dinh Khoi), and, with tacit French blessing, mounting military operations against anti-French resistance groups not under absolute Communist control. By the time country-wide hostilities broke out in December 1946, the Communists had usurped the nationalist cause and acquired complete domination over the independence movement. In a textbook example of Lenin's two-stage theory, they led this movement to victory by stressing the theme of national independence, then established a Communist régime in that portion of Viet Nam given over to their control by the 1954 Geneva settlement.

In mid-1954, the leaders of the Indochinese Communist Party (now called the Lao Dong) had installed themselves in Hanoi as the rulers of the "Democratic Republic of North Viet Nam." Like most observers, they expected South Viet Nam to disintegrate politically and fall inevitably under Communist domination via the Geneva-directed elections scheduled for 1956. They were in no hurry and had other immediate claims on their attention, *e.g.* the problems of consolidating control over the North and restructuring North Vietnamese society along Communist lines.

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Diem, however, accomplished the impossible, successfully defied the election deadline and made it obvious that South Viet Nam had a chance to survive. Accordingly, in 1957 Hanoi instigated a small-scale program of insurrectionary subversion in South Viet Nam in order to give the inevitable course of history a helping hand. This campaign built up slowly but steadily until the fall of 1960, when Hanoi apparently decided that something more would be required. In September 1960 at a Lao Dong party congress in Hanoi, First Secretary Le Duan called for the creation of a "broad united front" to achieve Communist objectives in South Viet Nam, though he did not put it quite that candidly. Soon thereafter the National Liberation Front appeared on the scene, with a manifesto which embodied a virtual paraphrase of Le Duan's speech. At that point, the scale and intensity of the Communist subversive campaign began to increase by quantum jumps, and within a year became what it is today—a full-fledged civil war supported and directed by the Communist leaders in Hanoi in order to further their political ambitions.

The Communists, naturally, have never admitted that this was the real sequence of events. Instead, they have tried to portray the insurgency in South Viet Nam as a spontaneous and indigenous (*i.e.* South Vietnamese) continuation of the nationalist revolution which ousted the French but could not be completed because the French were replaced by the American "imperialist aggressors." Communist tactics, military and, especially, political, have been skillful and successful.

The Communists took full advantage of the disorder in South Viet Nam and the shortcomings of the Diem régime. To date they have had relatively little success in selling the line that the Americans are successor imperialists to the French, but they have made headway by concentrating on the peasantry and stressing the not entirely inexact theme that all Saigon governments have been urban-oriented instruments of the rich and landed. Regionalism is particularly powerful among the Vietnamese peasantry, where in fact it appears in the even more restricted form of localism. The average peasant's horizons are bounded by his village, his ricefields and the tombs of his ancestors. Wherever possible, the Communists have made this deep-rooted emotion work to their advantage by employing cadre and troops native to the areas in which they operate. This sentiment, by and large, has worked against Saigon régimes—particularly Diem's—which have usu-

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ally assigned provincial administrators with regional backgrounds different from those of the peasants under their charge.

The turmoil of the past year engendered by South Viet Nam's urban revolution and its attendant governmental instability has obviously been to the Communists' short-term advantage and has been exploited by them on every possible occasion. Furthermore, the Communists have almost certainly penetrated at least some of the contending groups and factions. Nevertheless, the Communists did not start this revolution, nor do they yet control it. It is also a development of which they have every reason to be mortally afraid.

This revolution involves a quest for Vietnamese answers to Viet Nam's political problems. No answers could be less Vietnamese, none could be more alien to everything basic and deep-rooted in Vietnamese tradition, than those offered by Communist doctrine. Vietnamese mores and values evolved over the centuries in a culture based on the cultivation of rice—a seasonal thing, requiring many hands at certain times of the year, though at other times these essential workers have little to do and represent mouths that someone must feed. In response to these needs, the Vietnamese developed a society whose strongest institutions are the extended family and private property. The latter is a reflection of the peasant's immemorial attachment to the land he tills. The former provides a social institution to support otherwise idle hands which are needed at seedtime and harvest.

Communism is doctrinally committed to the abolition of both of these institutions and hence runs directly against the grain of the most elemental and basic of all Vietnamese traditions. Hanoi's Communism, furthermore, is under Chinese patronage, and opposition to Chinese domination is one of the great, continuing themes of Vietnamese history. In short, if those involved in Viet Nam's present revolution should or could ever look clearly at the real issues involved, they would realize what some, indeed, seem to have already realized: that Communism and a Communist-controlled government involve the negation of everything for which they are consciously and unconsciously striving.

VII

Predictions are rash, particularly when the subject is contemporary South Viet Nam, and may be proved wrong tomorrow. The fragility of the present situation would be hard to overstate.

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There are real dangers that the revolution now in process will tear South Viet Nam apart or be halted, if not ended, by a Communist victory materially aided by the turmoil it has generated. The participants in this revolution are impelled by a variety of motives, not all of them idealistic or ingenuous. Some may be actively working for a Communist victory even though they loudly profess otherwise. Others may make the error many have made, and endeavor to form an alliance with the Communists with the intent of outwitting them or using them "temporarily." Political division and strife may enable the Communists to gain a military advantage virtually impossible to overcome. Viet Nam could be on the verge of repeating the Chinese experience of 1948 and 1949.

Yet despite all these undeniable and persuasive arguments for pessimism, the fact remains that Viet Nam has always had a way of confounding both domestic and foreign prophets. If the revolutionary process now in train should somehow work itself out and, in so doing, produce a political balance arrived at by the Vietnamese themselves—a balance embodied in an institutional framework adapted to Vietnamese needs and realities and supported by the rising emotions of Vietnamese nationalism—then this revolution could eventually hold hope for more genuine stability and strength than any South Vietnamese government has ever known. If regeneration of the urban center could then somehow be carried outward to the provinces by a Saigon government able to enlist the support of rising nationalist sentiments—one with which the peasantry could identify its fortunes—the counter-insurgency program would be well launched on the road to genuine progress. In sum, if South Viet Nam's real revolution does not destroy the country first, over the longer term it may prove the eventual undoing of Communist ambitions and produce a real national entity where none has heretofore existed.

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BRITAIN LOOKS FORWARD

By Quintin Hogg

A CHANGE of Government is as good a time as any other for a national stocktaking—especially when, as now, the change takes place after 13 years of leadership by one party. The new Ministers are busy learning the facts of life which for all that time they have been ignoring in opposition. After a preliminary bout of Paradise Lost, Book One, the fallen Ministers are stiffly climbing out of the strait jackets imposed by collective responsibility and beginning to air personal opinions, so far as they can do so without breaking their Privy Councillor's oath.

In the meantime Britannia, that exquisite Queen Anne figure, still rules the waves on one side of our pennies—serene, confident, aloof and utterly alone. About two years ago, *Time* guyed this masterpiece, portraying the new Britain as a bothered and painted matron with a middle-aged spread, clearly worried about her housekeeping, unable to employ domestic staff and harassed by her grown-up children. A witty and unkind but penetrating criticism of our present situation.

It is possible, however, and even tempting, to overstate the contrast between pre-1914 Britannia and the perplexed Mrs. Britain of the 'sixties, proud of her past but eager to keep up with the present.

Our gold currency is paper. Our empire is no more. No more are we the leading—in some continental markets almost the only—industrial nation. The two-power navy which sailed to Jutland belching smoke from her coal—or, latest innovation, oil-fired boiler rooms—is as remote as the fleets of Nelson or of Drake, one, in under half a century, "with Nineveh and Tyre." Our aristocratic class system is a memory, the middle class basemented, and now flat-converted houses of Belgravia and South Kensington its only visible memorial, apart from a few noble families perched precariously on the bachelor wings of stately castles which, open to the public, remain stuffed with the hoarded treasures of the past.

On second thoughts, the lack of continuity is less convincing, as de Gaulle reminded us in the extraordinary speech he delivered—how short a time ago—in Westminster Hall. Almost alone

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of European countries, we have retained the continuity of our political institutions, and, by a miracle, our immunity from invasion and foreign conquest. Queen, Lords and Commons, now in their eighth century of partnership, continue to provide the framework of our constitution, in form still medieval, in essence still contemporary, and even though our relative importance has diminished (as has that of all European states except Russia) our absolute wealth and even, in absolute terms, our military strength have never advanced so quickly. Although the contrast is considerable, and, to some, painful, we probably continue to enjoy, despite our difficulties, a relative importance and influence in the world greater than our numbers, strength or riches would seem to justify.

At a deeper level, the continuity of our position is even more obvious. Our adherence to the basic philosophy of the West, liberty under law, is all the stronger because the extent and danger of the Communist threat is deeply realized by all the main groupings of opinion and all classes of the nation. Despite the liquidation of the Empire, our interest—economic and political—in what goes on in Asia and Africa is hardly less direct than before, and, whilst attempts are made to decry this as neocolonialism, it is difficult to see why the identification of our own interest with the peace, security and prosperity of the developing world, and its ultimate absorption into the community of Western peoples, is less creditable than the attempts at subornation, subversion, propaganda and sheer mischief adopted by the other side. Our relations with Europe are closer than ever; our links with the Old Commonwealth and India—even South Africa—not less numerous. Our multilateral trading interests make us convinced believers, to whatever temporary expedients we may be driven, in our traditional policy of the progressive removal of trade barriers. In other words, given the shift in world power, the development of military weapons, the awakening of former colonial peoples, and Communism of all three brands (Russian, Chinese and Titoist), Britain's interests and policies remain very much what could have been predicted of Edwardian Britain.

II

Wherein, then, lies our concern about the future, our anxiety about our role in the world, and, what is more disconcerting, our friends' concern about our present? Have the British suddenly

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lost their political flair? Has the Britain of the 'sixties suddenly ceased to be a viable human community? In an age when Ghana and Iceland proclaim their sovereignty, have the British Islands lost their ability to live? Have the national characteristics of phlegm, humor and endurance suddenly deserted us?

The secret, of course, lies in our vulnerability. From being the most secure, we have become among the most vulnerable of human societies, fatally dependent on imports and foreign trade, our extremely prosperous economy poised precariously on the knife-edge of the balance of payments, our population dangerously concentrated in a few urban areas, easily accessible to potential enemies, and almost the ideal target for modern weapons of which the nuclear range constitutes only the most dramatic. The material factors which gave ease, grace and prosperity to Edwardian Britain have disappeared in the mists of time and will never come back.

Militarily speaking, when I was a boy, our frontier lay on the Straits of Dover, and, with our supremacy at sea, was completely invulnerable. The piston-engined bombers of the Baldwin era pushed it back to the Rhine. Jet aircraft and nuclear weapons poise it precariously at the Iron Curtain. But the missile age is upon us and puts it still further east. Soon, with the satellite weapon, it will be above the stratosphere.

But the precariousness of our economy in peace is perhaps a more immediate though less fundamental cause of concern than our vulnerability in war—and, unlike our vulnerability in war, it is a concern about which we ask ourselves from time to time whether it is to some extent our own fault. It is of course possible to exaggerate our troubles. Except for the upper and upper-middle class, we are quite certainly better off than we have ever been in our lives before. We are manufacturing and exporting more than ever in our history. Our precariousness, although probably greater than most Labor voters and many Conservatives know, is a matter of margins and adjustment rather than fundamental instability. Still, it is painful to bear such a high level of taxation. It is annoying to be told by Government to make rapid, if minor, changes of speed and direction. It is humiliating in the extreme—not enough people feel this passionately enough—to have to be bailed out by the Central Banks to the tune of $3 billion of overdraft facility and to have to defer payment on the interest of the American loan.

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Economically speaking, we have learned that the national base is quite insufficient as the basis of a national plan—except perhaps in internal transport (from which, however, we are reaching out at last for a channel tunnel) and the construction industries (where, however, we are toying with the idea of adopting the metric system and prefabricated building). Investment in innovation on a scale necessary to keep up with the American Joneses requires a market on a continental, probably a global, scale. To Conservatives, it sometimes seems that the Labor Party has yet to come to grips with this fact of life and is still trumpeting the merits of a national plan, and pointing to Sweden (with seven million inhabitants) as an example to copy.

We are talking constantly therefore in terms of the sickroom and crisis, of Britain "lagging behind," of standing at the "bottom of the league," of being inefficient, out-dated and materialistic. This does us a great deal of harm with our friends, and it encourages our enemies no end. It is also, as I shall show, far from the truth. But the truth is that, after the loss of Empire and immunity from attack, we have not yet reached complete equilibrium—economic, political or military—and a certain number of swings of the pendulum will be necessary before we do.

We need not feel guilty about a great deal of this. The outside world is changing very fast in a number of extremely exciting directions toward a number of quite unpredictable ends, and even if our own society and economy were relatively static we should in any case be having to adjust it rapidly and often. As it happens that external change coincides with a period of rapid internal changes, we can, I think, flatter ourselves without complacency that we are handling a very difficult period in our history with courage, dignity and skill. (Labor Ministers should not take comfort from this claim. It applies to national achievements and not party differences.)

Policy is most conveniently divided into external affairs and defense, economic policy and social policy. Clearly all this, and much else, comes into a discussion of national role and personality.

The first point is, of course, the state of the alliance, and this depends as much upon the posture of our enemies as of our allies. One hopes that the advent of a Labor Government will make no fundamental difference to this. Neutralist opinion is not really a serious factor in public opinion, and outside the able, ingenious

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and devious fellow-travelling minority in the Labor Party (which appears reasonably under control) no one outside the lunatic fringe would wish to join the other side.

It is for this reason (among many) that the various economic policies based on a supposed analogy with Sweden (with a relatively small population and no great conurbanization)—an *ignis fatuus* with some commentators—makes no kind of sense at all. The analogy could be made to stick only with a greatly reduced population, a much more stable economy, a greatly reduced foreign trade and a foreign policy of dedicated neutralism.

But, looking at it through a British pair of spectacles, the Western Alliance appears to be in some disrepair by reason of an inadequate appreciation of the changed tactics of our opponents. The ultimate objectives of the Communists may be the same as in 1947 when the cold war started. Their whole approach is manifestly differently orientated, and has resulted in a greatly reduced military importance in the purely European theater.

In 1945, the Stalinists, having gobbled up the Eastern marches of the old Concert of Europe, and beaten, like the Turks, on the gates of Vienna, clearly fixed their beady eyes on a quick Communist victory in Western Europe. Without American help this might easily have taken place, and Britain would have found herself once more an isolated outpost of freedom under law on the fringe of a continental despotism.

But, since then, Europe has recovered her equilibrium, confidence and poise. Through British spectacles, this reduces rather than enhances the military importance of the European theater, increases rather than diminishes the political importance of an outward looking diplomacy, but accentuates the need of economic integration. The Communists appear to have drawn the obvious moral. From the death of Stalin onwards, the main political effort of international Communism seems to have shifted away from Europe to the Middle East, to Africa, to Southeast Asia, to Cuba. This is in keeping with the classical Marxist doctrine that the Russian Revolution was achieved by an alliance of the proletariat led by the Bolshevik Party (here represented analogically by the Russo-Chinese axis and the satellites) with the peasants (of whom the analogues are the developing peoples of Asia, Africa and South America). This is not to mean that the European theater is not in the last resort decisive or that a direct assault would not be attempted if it became worth while,

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only that this is not being attempted and that it is not thought worth while, at any rate at present.

Unfortunately this development has not—at least in the opinion of some of us in Britain—been matched by a comparable development in Western thinking or organization. There are too few who share our belief that the relaxation in European tension, even though it be contingent or temporary, can be made the occasion of a dialogue of some sort between East and West. There is a counterpart in the West to the Chinese attitude to the cold war in the Communist camp. As Russia becomes more and more industrialized, the increasing sophistication of her economy may force her to realize the implications of a measure of consumer choice. As the Western nations invest more and more in the social and educational equipment involved in a modern industrial society, and have to insure more and more against social unrest, a good deal will have to be done—as it has been in Britain under Conservative governments—which would seem rank socialism to conventional political theory.

But, more important than this and, in the political and military fields, more serious has been the as yet insufficient effort to reshape the strategy of the Atlantic Alliance in global as distinct from European terms. The need for the alliance is certainly not less than before. But it is less and less satisfactory for the Atlantic partners to divide their strategies and resources between a NATO still based on the European theater and other regional alliances and loyalties whose membership is not common and whose policies are not coördinated.

It is this view which has been forced on successive British Ministers by the very precariousness of our economic situation and the heavy pressure on our military manpower. It is this problem rather than the difficulties of the multilateral force which, some of us feel, should be occupying the ingenuity of British, American and European statesmen. Until this happens, NATO thinking will almost certainly concentrate disproportionately on European problems (which by that very fact it may well render insoluble) and incidentally impose on the West a divided strategy, a rigid and unsuitable military framework, a possibly unusable armament, and, on those members of NATO who have to discharge a world role as well as make a European contribution, an excessive economic burden.

The first problem in defense and foreign policy is therefore to

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induce the Western partners to re-think NATO strategy in terms of the threat currently posed by Communism rather than that of the Stalin era. No doubt, if we were to relax our efforts in the West, or sacrifice the interests of Europe, the old danger would reappear, perhaps in a more sinister form. But there is every reason why we should coördinate all our endeavors together—and with our Western contribution. France, Holland and Belgium, as well as the United States (even if we cannot immediately concert with Portugal) have all a varying degree of involvement in parts of the world outside Europe. No doubt each of these questions, as they arise, is seen as individual to the NATO members concerned. But they are all very much part of a global picture. It is ultimately intolerable that the Chinese threat to India, the problems of Viet Nam and Indonesian aggression against Malaysia should be viewed through separate pairs of spectacles, or that France, Britain and America should pursue divergent policies in the Middle East, or that the Congo, Rhodesia, Kenya, Cyprus, Aden and Somalia should not be considered by us all in relation to one another.

III

It is against this background that Britain must face her own foreign and military policy. The first political need is to define our attitude to the newly restored European continent. This brings us face to face with the Common Market. My own view has always been that the worst, and possibly fatal, step was our failure in 1950, under Mr. Attlee's Government, to join the Coal and Steel Community. This would have brought us in as a founder member of the Economic Community. We were frustrated at the time by the inability of the then Labor Government to see the inadequacy of economic planning on a purely national scale. There also were many Conservatives who, for very different reasons, were unwilling to take the step.

But the problem is now far more intractable. We began the 'fifties with about half traditional Europe behind the Iron Curtain. We begin the 'sixties with a Western Europe further subdivided against itself. Sweden and Switzerland are voluntarily, and Austria compulsorily, neutral. Spain is still isolated. Germany, though revived, is still divided and preoccupied with her love-hate relationship with the so-called D.D.R. Most tragic of all, the economic life of the Continent is roughly divided between

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the Market and EFTA, and, although this division almost certainly owes its existence to the single veto of de Gaulle on the proposed British entry, there is no particular reason to believe, if the Community continues to develop on its own lines, that it will be easier, after de Gaulle's disappearance, to effect a fusion.

In these circumstances, there is a good deal of pessimism, confusion and lack of realism in the British camp.

The other day, *The Times* of London featured as a principal letter a plea that we should make up our minds and choose between what were described as three alternative choices—the alignment of our economy with the United States "like Australia and New Zealand," in order (like them?) to become eventually part of the "same free-trade area;" an unequivocal attempt to circumvent General de Gaulle's veto into the Common Market; and a Sweden-like policy of diminished commitment and responsibility, with a view, I suppose, of ultimate neutrality. I have heard many Conservative critics of the present Labor Government credit them, consciously or unconsciously, with the third option.

But the point is that these policies are not in any rational sense alternatives. Not one of them is open to us in the sense that it could be achieved unilaterally by any British Government. Each, if openly pursued, would split the alliance wide open, and each therefore is only another name for a counsel of despair. None of them can offer trade opportunities equal to our need, even in the long run, and none has the smallest hope of solving the problems of Commonwealth or other developing countries. Incidentally, each would lead to the triumph of Communism over a great part of the world within a measurable time.

The fact is, of course, that successive Conservative Governments have been right to go banco for the lot. We need both reduced commitments, alignment with the United States and full partnership in Europe; and to choose or to have to choose would be ruinous. Nothing short of a greatly integrated West determined to go all out to win the battle of ideas by a single coördinated and global strategy—without a nuclear war—can even in principle solve our own problems, far less those of America and Europe. The fact that we have so far failed to achieve this is no criticism of those who have tried, and attempts to create out of the situation a series of purely imaginary and oversimplified options between which we are supposed to have to choose, and

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consisting of nothing better than component elements of an existing policy which has so far not succeeded, only demonstrates the intellectual barrenness underlying any possible alternative.

The *Times* letter was, however, interesting in that it contained no reference to the Commonwealth. This, in that it implied that the Commonwealth is not a viable alternative to either the American or the European relationship, is clearly a valid position. But in that it ignores one of the most important variables in the equation it is clearly an absurdity. For the future relations of the Commonwealth members to Britain and to one another continue to be among the most important factors in the British calculation. That the Commonwealth—old and new—has a present reality of great importance, whether or not it has a future, is shown by the closeness of economic ties, the reality of some cultural bonds, by the scale of British investment in India, and aid to former African territories, and to name only one example, by our military and diplomatic support of Malaysia. But all attempts to formalize Commonwealth organization, to make its economic policy cohere, to turn its sentimental ties into a political reality, have gone the way of the federal dreams of an earlier imperial thinking. Whatever the value of the Commonwealth, it is not now and it surely never will be any of these things. That it adds a certain importance to British diplomacy is clear. That its varied membership finds in it, each for themselves, something sufficiently valuable to continue the association can also be assumed. It is equally certain that it can never provide, now or at any time in the future, a substitute for the realities of a balanced economic, military, social or diplomatic policy based solidly on the position of Britain in the world independent of her role as center of the Commonwealth. That role is dependent upon Britain's eminence and prestige in her own right, and would not, I think, long survive their loss.

I have often wondered at the failure of our defense policy to base itself adequately on our maritime tradition. It is fashionable to say that our military plans are based on a peace-keeping role in various parts of the world, and to argue how these commitments can be balanced. To my mind it has always been the commitment of 55,000 men to a land-based task in Germany which is most open to question. If France, Germany, Italy, Benelux, Norway and Denmark cannot provide a credible resistance to Communism when supported by the United States and Britain,

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without calling on a British component to be actually stationed on the Continent (as distinct from being kept available in a strategic reserve in the United Kingdom), it is a pretty poor lookout.

I consider that we have consistently undervalued the role of the Navy since 1945. It is, of course, argued with a good deal of truth that apart from the nuclear submarine the Navy would not be much good to us in a nuclear war—or any war between great powers. But it took the failure of Skybolt, after the inglorious end of Blue Streak as a military project, even to commit us to a nuclear submarine armed with a second-strike missile. In the conventional field, despite the examples of the Sixth and Seventh Fleets, we have also consistently undervalued the advantages of a sea-based conventional force with carriers and strike aircraft for our peace-keeping operations, and we have never really summoned the courage to attempt to base this on a supply train of fleet auxiliaries constantly at sea, as distinct from the traditional naval bases in imperial harbors. Yet we have had warnings enough and to spare as we have been pried by the anti-colonialists out of first one expensive land and air base after another—Palestine, Egypt, Kenya, Trincomalee, Malta, Cyrenaica and possibly others. If we had invested all the money we have virtually thrown away on bases, airfields and overflying rights which we have been unable to keep—or when the time came, to use—and invested it all in a combined force of ships, naval aircraft and marines, with a train of fleet auxiliaries, and if, for good measure, we had kept, and trained, our Army and Air Force in Scotland instead of in Germany, we might be a more formidable conventional power whatever we had done with our nuclear forces.

The question of our nuclear deterrent is, of course, a matter of major dispute between the political parties. I was never able to understand why we did not go in for a Polaris-type missile earlier —either by developing one of our own or buying or manufacturing under license the American version. When I first agreed, in 1956, to become First Lord of the Admiralty, I went to see the most famous Former Naval Person of all time, in the hope, perhaps, that some part of the mantle of Elijah might descend upon me.

That Former Naval Person eyed me benignly over a whisky and soda. After congratulating me warmly, and advising me to

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"get yourself a sloop" (which I was never able to do during my four and a half months of office), he proceeded to discuss nuclear strategy. "Indestructible retaliation," he thundered, "that is what you want. Indestructible retaliation. Never forget that." He meant, I am sure, a second-strike weapon fired from under the sea. I was always sorry that the shortness of my stay at the Admiralty prevented me from pressing these ideas in opposition to the Blue Streak and Skybolt, and the chain of useless bases subsequently abandoned under pressure of the local inhabitants. But, even now, I do not believe it is too late. A Britain armed with combined forces, based on a navy capable of being permanently seaborne, and defended by a small number of missile-carrying nuclear submarines capable of operating in any potential theater, would indeed be a friend to court and an enemy to fear. Incidentally, to save the cost of the troops in Germany would practically wipe out our balance-of-payments deficit.

IV

It is impossible, I believe, to discuss the role of a nation simply in diplomatic and military terms. Economic and social policy, like cheerfulness, constantly insists on breaking in. I have already mentioned the balance of payments and the insufficiency of our national base as a unit of planning. These two considerations must clearly influence our international and political outlook, our relations with the United States and the Iron Curtain countries, our European policy and our military commitments.

The short point is that our trading position cannot be met in simple terms by a concentration on any one of our markets. Whilst they were in Opposition, the Labor Party appeared, at least to Conservative critics, to be insufficiently aware of this. It is too early as yet to say how far this will remedy itself by contact with the realities of power.

The insufficiency of the national base is not simply a question of the economic growth rate. It is seen in the whole range of science and technology, from the most recondite research into elementary particles to the most practical commercial applications. As our traditional industries are overtaken more and more by new centers of industrial production elsewhere, our science-based industries—aircraft, chemicals, electronics and the like—represent an ever-growing share of our production and trade. Hence all our talk about modernization and automation. But whether

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in traditional industries like iron and steel, or the newer industries, or in the great nationalized corporations dominating power and communications, investment in innovation, to be commercially justifiable, demands a potential market on at least a continental and occasionally a global rather than a national scale. This is true, no less, in pure science, and in military and political planning.

This is the true explanation of the successive initiatives of recent Conservative Governments in the formation of EFTA and the application to join the Common Market. This, too, is the explanation of the Concorde project with the French, and, in its very different way, the Channel Tunnel negotiations. In the scientific field, this is the explanation of the formation of CERN (Centre Européen de recherches nucleaires) for nuclear physics, and ELDO (European Launcher Development Organization) and ESRO (European Space Research Organization). Hence, too, British interest in the Kennedy Round, and in American proposals for a world (or at least a free world) organization for communication satellites. More and more of us are beginning to feel that, whatever the merits or demerits of planning on a national scale, the realization of a common market of some sort for the products of the free world, and an industrial organization to match, is really a prerequisite of modernization, and any scheme based simply on national needs and national means of production is likely to prove a failure for purely technical reasons.

Ever since 1961, the expression "modernization" has been with us in the governing circles of both political parties. As I think I may have been the first Minister to use it, it might not be out of place if I pointed out the real sense in which it ought to be used.

The need for modernization is essentially the industrial challenge presented to us by the change in our relative position. This is not primarily a question of growth rate, or even of the balance of payments, to both of which it is closely allied. Again, to Conservative critics, Labor spokesmen in Opposition failed adequately to take into account the realities of this problem and to take refuge from them in the mystique of "planning" (on Labor lips a somewhat esoteric conception) or the sheer gimmickry of the popular conception of automation.

But, in its true bearing, the need for modernization extends well beyond the industrial field narrowly defined. It is the product of competitive pressures by trade rivals on the one hand, and

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the sheer weight of demand for higher productivity and capital investment in an over-employed labor market on the other. In part, of course, modernization results in the creation of new, science-based industries and the adoption of modern, automated, techniques of production. But at no ascertainable date in the future can Britain afford to base its industrial policy on these alone or to be without its traditional industries. In truth, the need for modernization is greater and more urgent in these than in the newer fields, and extends to management and trade-union attitudes as well as to the technical means of production and the precise nature of the product. The modernization of our whole system of internal transport, of our construction industries and even of much of our traditional engineering is far greater, and more urgently necessary than, for example, electronics, computers or chemicals, which by their nature must in any case be scientifically based. It is precisely in the more traditional fields that conservative habits of workers and management are most widespread, and most difficult to combat. Modernization is required as much in the design of traditional products as in the creation of new industries, in the higher education and training of executives as in the direct application of science, as much in plant layout and industrial psychology as in the industrial process, in sales and purchasing technology as much as metal forming or control mechanisms.

But this is precisely what brings us back to economics and social policy. Except perhaps in the transport and construction industries, all this clearly requires political and economic attitudes which affect our relations with other countries, particularly, if I may say so, the United States. On the part of the United States, it will imply, almost certainly, a far greater willingness to permit and encourage European nations to participate in the really advanced industries—let us say in the production of communication satellites, or modern navigational aids—than so far either the Government of the United States or American industry has been prepared to envisage. From this side of the Atlantic, it has seemed that Americans have only too often failed to realize how firmly Europeans from General de Gaulle to Mr. Macmillan are simply not prepared to be confined to traditional industries, processes, methods or products. Too often, for instance, when the technical arguments have seemed to favor the adoption of a British navigational aid, or a British-designed

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weapon, American business, often with government assistance, has appeared to move heaven and earth to oust the British product from the market. Americans must realize that whether they are dealing with British, French, German, Benelux or Italian industries, these are simply not prepared to accept American technological hegemony as part of the unassailable order of the universe, whatever, and however convincing, the arguments used to show the length of the American lead or the convenience or scale of an American source of supply.

A third fashionable phrase in Britain, accepted currently by both political parties, is the rate of economic growth, which, it is now generally agreed, should be placed nearer 4 percent than the 2½ percent we have achieved in the postwar period. I am not sure here that both parties are not to a great extent guilty of a degree of self-deception. It seems to me that both parties are strangely unwilling to examine the price that would have to be paid for such a rate or even to accept that a price would be payable at all, and that both are equally slow to understand the extent to which the option for a lower rate has been, though unspoken, deliberate, and, though economically expensive, beneficial in terms of social harmony and human values.

We tend to overlook the difference in the relative unemployment figures since the war in Britain and the United States. Whenever unemployment here has risen much above 2.5 percent of the insured population, there has been something like a rush towards reflationary measures by both sides of the House of Commons—even though a little greater mobility of labor would have been manifestly in the interests of efficiency. Both parties, and the electorate, have favored, or at least acquiesced in, a high rate of personal consumption and of social investment, a more rapid increase in wages than productivity, a budget designed to ensure a high proportion of transfer payments in the shape of social benefits, and have ignored the loss in terms of industrial efficiency, capital investment in production plant and the redeployment of labor that such factors have inevitably meant. I am not myself quite so sure as some of my colleagues in Opposition or as Labor Ministers that this choice has been unwise.

To some extent, the advantages of this combination of preferences may have been underestimated. We tend to cast envious eyes at the higher growth rates of France (which has followed a *dirigiste* policy since the war) and of Germany (which has pur-

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sued a laissez-faire policy since the war), without reflecting on the repeated devaluation of the franc (far more catastrophic than that of the pound) or the wide latent misemployment of labor in French and German agriculture where about 25 percent of the population, as against our 4 percent, are employed on the land, or the pressure, before the construction of the Berlin Wall, of the refugees from East Germany, or the immense mobility of Italian and Spanish labor throughout the Continent.

In contrast, we have been fully employed for nearly a quarter of a century. We have never made so many advances in personal or social wealth or economic prosperity. Though the temporary (at least till the last) financial crises have caused widespread grumbling at the measures necessary to contain them, we have never, at least so far, been prepared to pay the price necessary to prevent the crises without the measures. Where any degree of sacrifice has been concerned, it has not been so much a question of "I'm all right, Jack" as of "After you, Claude"—and that not least on the part of hard-core Labor supporters.

At the end of the day, although I for one am deeply conscious of the humiliation involved (whoever was responsible) in the need to go to the Central Banks for a $3 billion dollar credit (and whatever the measures necessary to repay it), I am left immensely impressed by the underlying strength of the British economic and social position, and the vigor, political sense and adaptability of the British people. To quote only a few figures, in the past 13 years the national product has risen by more than a third in real terms (£13 billion to £27 billion in crude figures), the amount of annual savings from about £100,000,000 to £2 billion, the proportion of the G.N.P. spent on education from about 3 percent to 5 percent, the investment in scientific research and development from about 1.9 percent to about 3 percent. The volume of trade in both directions has increased enormously. There has been peace, and full employment. We have enfranchised almost all our overseas dominions with extraordinarily little bloodshed or fuss. In the meantime we have been conducting as complete a redeployment of national outlook and personality as is imaginable in so short a time. Such scandals as we have had have been almost unimaginably trivial compared with the violence, corruption and chaos elsewhere. Indeed, were it not for our extraordinary, and to my mind unnecessarily morbid, orgy of self-criticism, I would have been tempted to say that

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we had weathered the half century since 1914 as well as any, and better than most, and that the role that we could hope to play in the next half century is at least as useful, if less dominant, and not less exciting, than in the past.

V

This brings me to the last great element of policy—that of the structure of society itself. Apart from the changes inherent in our military and international position, I am quite sure that this represents the most dramatic development of all. Britain has become a social democracy. In my childhood, the whole structure of society was hierarchical. People "knew their place"—and even in the lower ranks it was not always a bad one. The Britain of today is, in fact, though it has not fully grasped the implications, socially and economically egalitarian, far more so than the United States, and still more so than the Soviet Union.

On balance the change is wholly to the good, for it has been brought about by the immense improvement of the economic strength and position of the wage earner. In my childhood underemployment and poverty were the dominating factors in the position of the working class—even when they were fully employed and prosperous—which was not the case between the wars. But we have had full employment now since 1940, and since 1951 the consequences of this have been more and more apparent in terms of personal satisfactions and social policy.

Here, in my opinion, although it is the point at which party controversy is most strident, there is most similarity between the parties from the viewpoint of the outside observer. Moreover, this is precisely the point at which British politicians are least prepared to take lessons from North America. This is the more paradoxical because in the past American attitudes have seemed, and perhaps have been, in advance of our own. But we are no longer prepared to believe that this is so. Rightly or wrongly, we have come to think that the United States is so wealthy as to be able to afford to tolerate certain types of social inefficiency which would be disastrous if applied to a poorer nation. Many Americans regard this as a dangerous delusion on our part, and ask us to believe that many of our present economic evils stem precisely from our failure adequately to accept the American version of what creates self-reliance and a sense of individual responsibility.

This can be a source of real misunderstanding, because the

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British simply do not believe this. Rightly or wrongly, we tend to regard our social legislation, whether in the form of pensions, socialized medicine or education (or at least school education) as in advance of anything to be found on the other side of the Atlantic. We are aware, of course, that, for instance, socialized medicine is political dynamite in Canada and the United States. We are also aware that we have failed to solve for ourselves many of the problems inherent with it in our own scheme. But after nearly 20 years of the National Health Service, practically no one can be found in Britain, from the most extreme Socialist to the most diehard Conservative, to advocate a return to the point from which we came in 1948. We may be misguided. But that is the way in which our electorate and our politicians think.

If I were asked the most potent source of disagreement, at present between the Europe of the Market and Britain, or between the United States and Britain, it is to this difference of outlook that I would point first. Although firmly aligned with the West, Britain is not, in the sense in which the word is understood abroad, a conservative country. From the point of view of social policy, our Conservative Party is about two paces to the left of the Democratic Party in the United States and of most of the parties (however designated) outside the Communist Party on the Continent of Europe. Moreover, it is this, more than anything else, which in my judgment has been responsible for the unexampled success of the Conservatives at the polls over three successive general elections, and our near success—for our failure was a very near miss—in the last. Britain is, in fact, wholly committed at one and the same moment to the Welfare State and the Affluent Society, to Consumer Choice and an Educated Democracy. It may seem that she wants her bread buttered on both sides, and, though this is a very dangerous aspiration, she is nearer to getting it that way than most. Upon our success or failure to combine aspects of internal policy hitherto thought incompatible may depend our ability to convert uncommitted nations to the philosophy of the West. We hope Americans will wish us well in our experiment. Whether it succeeds or fails, it can hardly avoid being cited as precedent in American as well as European circles.

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THE MAN IN THE AMERICAN MASK

By Jacques Barzun

TO see ourselves as others see us is a rare and valuable gift, without a doubt. But in international relations what is still rarer and far more useful is to see others as they see themselves. The two talents, the double *giftie,* would, if generalized, abort many preconceptions that delay or obstruct agreement, and would also reduce that sterile indignation on which the newspaper-nurtured peoples feed. It is indeed extraordinary how little the power to spread news and opinion around the globe in a few seconds affects the judgments that one nation passes on another which is accessible and "well-known." Travel itself, which is now so frequent as to seem a childish indulgence without excuse, leaves the casual and the trained observers equally at fault. Everybody responds as if involved in a social encounter. Thus de Gaulle remains puzzling or is deemed perverse because his foreign critics do not see the French as they happen to see themselves today—rehashing the causes of defeat and loss of empire and needing to stiffen their morale with an exacting ideal of greatness in a period of relaxing prosperity. Again, the American experts visiting Britain in hopes of aiding the increase of her industrial output do not see that the resistance to modernizing springs from the intuition that the new methods must destroy the quiet restraint and wordless adjustment between persons and classes which the English know to be their strength as a people.

Foreign views of the United States are just as blind, and in their dull repetition we detect also the universal reasons for preferring not to understand, the domestic motive for self-blinding. It may be the need to feel superior, to fight a local fight, to froth at the mouth. Consider the jubilant parodies of our desegregation efforts, or the reception of the Warren Commission's report on the assassination of President Kennedy. As all foreigners know, violence is an American monopoly, and conspiracy is a congenial idea that explains all; in Europe it is a tradition, and so is the concealment of conspiracy by the state. Suddenly, therefore, all that has been said *ad nauseam* about the immaturity and carelessness of American life is forgotten in the attempt to make rational and sinister the blunders and incoherencies of Dallas.

Of what use, then, the clichés about the all-explaining national

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character? They shift and return, go out of date and are replaced at random. The character itself is a will-o'-the-wisp, a perpetual mystery. The bearers of it themselves do not know what it is or how it works. Are we sure it exists? For we know that even a few thousand people—any small town—will present the full range of human temperament, and it is only in the governess type of history that the Such-and-Such are a "crafty people" and their neighbors across the river a "frank and manly nation." But something floating above their respective heads—a symbol, a tradition, a manner, an intricate set of signals and responses—brings out of the diversity of individual temperaments a phantasm which now and again impresses its uniqueness on the stranger and makes the native live up to its specifications. The native conforms especially when challenged or disoriented. Though reasonably civilized at home, abroad he reverts to the feral state; that is, acts like a tourist and confirms the prejudices of the world.

This representative figure, in a pinch, serves both the spectator and the projector to accomplish certain collective ends. For comfort the Russians need their caricatures of the American capitalist and warmonger, just as for the stilling of vague disquiet the American reactionary needs the ubiquitous Soviet foe. Nor does this image-making always seek a symbol of evil. To C.P. Snow the American colleges and universities show a perfection hidden from closer observers; he obviously sees qualities he would like to graft upon English higher education. Who shall say that he is wrong? And more generally, what is American and what is not? The answer can be what you will, provided it is plausible and fits a felt need. In other words, the domain of national character is a cloudy province of the ideal. The archetype is not opinion or error, reality or fancy: it is all of these; and analyzed or swallowed whole it defies empirical tests. Yet it issues in hard realities at last; for out of the interplay of men and interests with these ghostly presences the relations of one people with another are made. It is only in this mixture that we find them when we study their public shape and irrational consequences.

II

As a nation whose citizens seek popularity more than any other kind of success, it is galling (and inexplicable) that we, the United States, are so extensively unpopular. We periodically send out envoys of various plumage to find the cause of this failure, and

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the little doves come back with a surprised look and no olive branch, even when they have been personally well received. Perhaps the reason for the surprise is a clue to the failure and can tell us something about our national character—or rather, about its present complexion as seen from within and without.

The determining fact, I suspect, is that we are the most powerful industrial nation since nineteenth-century England, and the most pacific. We lack, for reasons I shall suggest, the self-conceit of power and the tradition of aggressive war. We are not in truth a *nation*, forged by centuries of armed expansion and forced retreat, but a *people* spread out over a convenient island of huge extent. Our state is for practical purposes neighborless, and save in rare fits of excitement, barren of imperial ideas. What masquerades as our imperialism is the love of business, which no doubt we do not sufficiently recognize as a form of aggression. Nor do we remember that in foreign eyes business is a peculiarly hateful form of power, because it breeds envious resentment instead of respectful fear. In nations with a monarchical past the ability to conquer and command still seems nobler than the ability to produce and sell. Hence we do not make ourselves more welcome by our repeated acts of economic aid. For as many have pointed out, help breeds ingratitude in the normal course. At best, generosity only *initiates* liking; it takes other gestures than kind ones to engender admiration and respect. And soon the largesse of those who can well afford it appears as the product of a dull habit or a foolish nature.

But the American power based on industry and spread by the unlovely ways of business begets resentment for an even deeper reason: it is felt as the irresistible force making for a uniform world. Actually "Americanization" is a misnomer. Modernizing is the word for the fact that industry, democracy, automation, mass media, urbanism and artificial longevity have now their roots everywhere. And everywhere in proportion to their number and strength they produce identical results. The helpless rage against this cultural transformation readily takes the form of political animus. The foreigner is a scapegoat for our sins, as one can see in works as diverse as Gheorghiu's "Twenty-Fifth Hour" and Etiemble's "Parlez-vous Franglais?" The second is one long exploitation of this anti-historical view: all its sound and witty objections against the mongrelizing of the French language take it for granted that recent "Anglo-Saxon" imperialism, chiefly

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"Yankee," is the efficient cause. That the French people willingly and eagerly adopt what they think are glamorous American expressions is not once admitted in the indictment. Nor does the author seem aware that the disease he laments was already well developed after the First World War, when France was victorious and dominant and American power diffident and isolationist. In cold-sober fact, the headlong anglicizing of French dates back to the turn of the century and the Entente Cordiale.

When we speak of the old-world hostility to the modern world, we refer of course to the articulate minority. The masses obviously like Coca-Cola, Hollywood movies, and the *Reader's Digest* in Patagonian. Their tastes matter more and more, yet in the conduct of international affairs the opinions of the educated retain their greater influence. So we must continue to ask ourselves why the falsely called Americanization feeds hatreds so strong that they often neutralize self-interest. One could propose as an answer: "the fear of stylelessness," if it did not seem at first sight too abstract and remote. A moment's thought will show that the abstract words point to a potent emotion. Style is the collective form of individuality. Style distinguishes one tradition, one time, one region from another. Style gives edge and strength to life and character, as it does to the handmade object. All this seems threatened by the machine product, physical and spiritual. In a word, the culture, the nation, the good and right life are in mortal peril. Modernization is seen (and rightly) as a kind of conquest, a bloodless deprivation of former liberties. Any civilization except the very primitive is bound to resist.

Similarly, when our European critics assail what they call "American pragmatism," they do not mean pragmatism at all; they have no notion of what it means. But they know very well the part of modernization that they hate: they mean the diminished role of principle and theory, of barriers and distinctions; the increasing role of coöperation and good fellowship; the unpolitical, businesslike view of things; the substitution of the burdensome morality of good intention for the protecting morality of forms, of etiquette. The rejection of this new way of life is both instinctive and reasoned out. It is instinct when the profusion of identical things and the personality that goes with them, bland and mediocre, arouse distaste. It is reasoning when the corresponding wooliness of doctrine in religion and politics repels an active mind and makes him adopt the harsh theologies of Com-

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munism or Reaction. In both cases it seems as if men acting from the depths of their being were pleading for the preservation of the hardness of life; as if modernity were the descending path of least resistance, the road to an irreversible unmanning of Man. Which is doubtless why our artists also contrive by preference myths of the violent and the *outré,* to save us—save us from the good life in the great society.

III

Our foreign friends, moreover, are understandably confused by the American character in its double aspect of violence and easy-goingness. They do not know how to assess the part each plays in our national life or individual character. This is because they do not know what I might call our *present* origins. Some think of us as seventeenth-century Puritans, others as eighteenth-century rationalists, still others as nineteenth-century robber barons. The fact is that we—meaning our habits and beliefs—are no longer in touch with any of these; we are descended from the last tidal wave of immigration that began in 1880. A shorthand term for our ideal collective self might be the Prosperous Poor. Without special effort, thanks to our latest tradition, we live the democratic ideal par excellence. We are by birthright the unassuming, unclassified, miscellaneous, non-inheriting people which the whole world is fast becoming. Non-inheritance is the overarching principle which covers material, intellectual and spiritual goods, not to their neglect, but so that they may be remade fresh with each generation. This ensures the flexibility indispensable to progress and perpetual change. Habits and traditions are elements of resistance or delay that are incompatible with technological movement.

From the European poor, the *dis*inherited, have come also the familiar traits that still startle the old world—a diffused amiability, an indifference to marks of caste—in clothes, speech, manners and even in expectations from life; a readiness to pitch in and help and also to accept help; a restraint in social intercourse which excludes bristling prejudgments, self-assertiveness and the desire to shine and score off—an inbred recognition, as it were, that we must live together in cramped quarters and had best make ourselves pleasant to one another.

This historical preparation of the social character could not fit better the conditions of an overpopulated democratic world.

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For the first time in history, perhaps, poverty and group discrimination persist in a society largely because no one knows how to remove them more quickly, and not because the poverty of the poor furnishes the tables of the rich and exclusivism flatters them. By the prevailing ethos, the rich feel only half proud; they are half ashamed, call their fortunes a public trust, and atone for their wealth by dispersing it nervously in good works.

Where in all this is the place of violence? Two years ago, the federal director of prisons told the Senate: "I think it is fair to say that we are a frontier country and we have certain elements in our background and culture that incline us to the use of weapons more than some other countries in the world."[1] This explanation holds a portion of the truth, a small portion. The frontiersman has faded out of American life as urbanization conquered, and he lives only in the make-believe of hunting and fishing during the three weeks' vacation. Violence with us is highly specialized: it springs from the pathology of city life (the addict, the delinquent, the rebel, the rapist) or from the big business of supplying prohibited pleasures. And for this second group the models and often the leaders are imported from Europe. What permits and almost encourages violence and crime is another thing—the lax good nature, the old street tie, the passion for coöperating and helping out, which John Jay Chapman was already observing in city politics 70 years ago.

The confirmation of these views may be seen in the extraordinary spectacle of our race conflicts in which, by world standards, violence has so far been almost nonexistent. To say this is not to condone the riots and bombings and murders that have taken place, but to point out that in other countries old and new the death rate in political and social struggles—and sometimes in the excitement of sports—exceeds in an hour or two that which we have barely attained in a decade. Our moderation—and this is the important point—has not come so much from respect for the law, a respect which the frontier was not likely to develop; it has come from the anti-aristocratic manners I have described, the influence of the unassuming ego. This is evident again in the new forms of protest now commonly accepted as part of the mores—the pickets, the sit-in, the boycott—new expressions of the power of the weak, democratic substitutes for the barricades.

[1] James V. Bennett, testifying before the Senate Subcommittee on Juvenile Delinquency, March 1963.

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IV

As long as men are men, individual temperament will be discerned under the national character and friendships will form. Indeed, the qualities of the national character itself will bear similar fruit under favoring circumstances; and it is clear that despite the massive dislike of "the" American, the American without quotation marks generally receives his due even if he is typical. For one thing, he has a deep-rooted impulse to help, and even more important he knows how to organize help. Two world wars demonstrated this on the large scale; innumerable private and public efforts abroad, including the Peace Corps, have shown our zest for tackling difficulties, emergencies, impossibilities. It is paradoxically our lack of doctrine, theory, ancestral experience, that makes us possibilists. We are not diffident, hierarchical or kid-gloved, and these freedoms are prerequisite to giving prompt and effective aid of the material kind to which other human beings do not remain insensible.

With this practical help Americans tend also to furnish the cheerfulness, the encouragement, the enthusiasm that can make the disaster temporary and the relief given seem a mere incident which does not define a permanent relation between the parties. The appeal of the American outlook lies in the freshness and ebullience of the free. Not long ago, a young American girl who was studying to be a lawyer decided to take her vacation in Asia Minor, where her hobby of archeology suggested that she would find rewarding sights. After a dip into Turkish grammar and a few calls on persons to whom she had letters of introduction, she set out into the alien territory. In one town her visit brought out nearly the entire male population, at first suspicious, then derisive and finally won over, after an English-speaking resident had explained the relevant details of this strange safari. Lively conversation ensued for the whole afternoon. There was then nothing but admiration amounting to awe for the simple courage, dignity, resourcefulness, intellectual strength and disarming confidence of the student from afar. It proved so striking that ever since she has been receiving, by way of the interpreter, the questions and the friendly regards of her hosts.

Few foreigners are unmoved by the fearlessness and voluble ease of the genuine American who, like Howells' Lady of the Aroostook, simply "wants to know." What is so winning is not

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energy alone—in some ways the energy of Europeans being more hemmed in is greater—it is a freedom even from concentration: it is the absence of weariness, the absence of restraint, the absence of system. The reflection of this natural insouciance may be seen in the way our schools have evolved during the past 50 years. The school, once a lesser prison, became with us a lesser paradise: "Do what thou wilt." The principle was to release the talents together with the peccant humors. Democratic individualism said: "Be thyself, but not *by* thyself." In short, everything is possible with the consent of the group. Only persuade it, coax it, lead it along the desired path and, once again, everything is possible.

In this near-utopia there is clearly no ordered fate, no nemesis or even memory to avenge error. Tragedy is not recognized, which undoubtedly makes for a less vivid life, weaker pleasures. Instead there is romance, which unlike the tragic life can always be begun afresh; which brings out the eager interest and diffuses it over a multitude of objects and persons; and which as it were socializes, turns into public property, the inner resources of each self. Half a century ago, William James remarked with some dismay upon the American people's "too intense responsiveness and good will, . . . [their] inner panting and expectancy . . . [and] absence of repose." For our own good, he felt, we should not "wear too much expression on our faces;" we should combat "those absurd feelings of hurry and having no time" which lead to "that breathlessness and tension, that anxiety of feature, and that solicitude for results . . . by which with us the work is so apt to be accompanied, and from which a European who should do the same work would nine times out of ten be free."[2] James's advice was excellent but it may no longer be applicable. The multiplication of contacts and of the demands and duties that follow is compelling not only the American but every citizen of the emerging world to live the life of responsive good will and solicitude for results. And this too is modernization.

V

In the light of these facts and impressions, is there anything unique that the American national character can offer the world, that is, something above and beyond the individual contributions of knowledge and talents? By offer, I mean convey without effort,

[2] William James, "The Gospel of Relaxation," in "Talks to Teachers on Psychology." New York: Henry Holt, 1915, p. 199–228, *passim.*

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by way of example, not by precept; spontaneously, not by growing stiff with self-consciousness. I think the answer is Yes. The tendencies that some of the rising nations could emulate with profit lie on the surface of our being and are easy to imitate without being expounded. Our simplicity, to begin with, is worth assimilating as a moral comment on our know-how about complex installations. It is remarkable that there is in fact no need of intellectual or political systems to set up power plants or get rid of malaria. Our virtues are naïve, sometimes silly; we put on no "side;" we even lack *gravitas,* but this immaturity does not lessen our effective concern for the next man. Better still, our regard for the individual does not rest on his specialness but on his being another fellow—we are *that* simple. Older cultures have met the crowding of the earth with total indifference to the dying passer-by. We cannot rise to such impassivity and do not want to. Nor are we deterred by dangers of samaritanism. The stories of Americans abroad who have found themselves in serious predicaments as a result of neighborly acts are frequent and well-attested; they are also inconceivable in the American scene. There is, in short, a leaven of the primitive gospel about us, the natural magnanimity of the poor.

Equally strange and striking, our gift for technology and organization is likewise a moral force. The atmosphere of practical knowledge—and not just the application of knowledge—makes men more confident, ready to act and move, and move *now.* Some critics, it is true, deplore this restlessness. Reviewing the case in a recent article, George W. Pierson asks: "Our inveterate preference for the new, our disrespect for elders, our careless disregard of traditions, may not these traits derive as much from the acceptance and habit of mobility as from any other aspect of the American condition?"[3] I think it a sufficient answer that the restlessness not only suits the needs of the deprived and demanding, to whom things and ideas must be brought, but also substitutes that group activity for personal ambition of the old kind. To the American, "accomplishment" is reward and fulfillment. And any nation that should become thoroughly "Americanized" by unconscious example would find that the Yankee passion for building, producing and consuming was the reverse of materialistic. Compare the European, whether peasant, bourgeois or baron, and you will see the difference between, on the one hand,

[3] George W. Pierson, "Goin' Some," *The South Atlantic Quarterly,* Autumn 1964, p. 568.

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a cheerful, careless, wasteful use of goods as a means of enjoyment and a sign of success; and, on the other, a sleepless, accumulating greed, rendered necessary by ages of scarcity. The American lack of worry about small gains and trifling advantage maintains a healthful detachment of the will from its prey. In effect, though it may seem a paradox, only the adoption of the American character can save the world from the worst evil imputed to machine civilization, namely a swinish materialism.

The third and last free gift to be had by mere inspection from our singular character is allied to the other two: we tend to diffuse power rather than concentrate it. This is why we dislike its trappings—protocol, uniforms, the stern mien, any visible apparatus or enforcement of authority. In our preferred device, the committee, we give up victory if the margin is too narrow. By common consent, a vote of 12 to 10 only postpones a *real* decision which will prevent reprisals and vindictive rage. What is more, our use of power is rarely secret. Cabals are seldom attempted and schemes always leak out. As the highest authorities experience daily, the whole nation suffers from reflex candor. Full disclosure seems easiest in the end, and it is too bad that in foreign parts some of our normally relaxed ambassadors take to unfamiliar astringents. We should gain so much more by remaining ourselves, earning the credit of truthfulness and profiting from the automatic deception of the skeptical.

This last suggestion must not be thought a recipe. At the outset my major premise was that in the affairs of a troubled world no appearance or reality has any force unless it is adapted by chance or design to the receiving mind. Saunders Redding has told in a moving confession how his American heart and intellect were misunderstood and misprized in Africa.[4] But his failure to overcome suspicion, like the United States' unpopularity, is no reason for assuming a false face. We can by taking thought correct some of our faults, individual or collective; we can by sharpening our sensibility learn how to appease or tolerate our enemies; but for any relations to yield more than a momentary benefit, each party to them must retain his identity. The devious must of of course be unmasked and the intransigent ignored or put down. But disarmament begins when one or the other perseveres in being disarming.

[4] Saunders Redding, "Home to Africa," *The American Scholar*, Spring 1963, p. 183–191.

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THE ALLIANCE AND THE FUTURE OF GERMANY

By Fritz Erler

THE aims of German foreign policy are three and inseparable: to preserve peace, to defend the freedom of the country and to restore German unity by peaceful means. None of them should be pursued at the cost of neglecting either of the others.

In the early 1950s, there was a great debate about the framework in which German rearmament should take place. The Western governments and the Government of the Federal Republic advocated a German military contribution to NATO, hoping thereby not only to strengthen Western security but also to force the Soviet Union to permit the reunification of Germany under free conditions. The Social Democratic opposition were doubtful about the second proposition. They wanted to explore whether the Soviet Union would not be more ready to accept reunification if security arrangements in Europe did not involve the participation of two Germanys in opposing military alliances. It was clear that armed neutrality and unarmed neutralization were out of the question: no one would have allowed the necessarily gigantic rearmament of a united Germany (nor would the Germans have wanted this); and a Germany unarmed and neutralized would have created an undesirable power vacuum in the heart of Europe and a bitter feeling of frustration within the German nation. Such a situation would have been a permanent cause of foreign intervention in Germany's internal affairs. Therefore only a European security system which provided for the balanced participation of Germany and her neighbors under proper control and with adequate guarantees by the world powers could have offered a suitable framework for German unity at that time—thereby eliminating the understandable Soviet fear of the combination of American power, German military tradition and all the unsolved problems in the heart of Europe.

In his press conference of February 4, 1965, de Gaulle spoke in terms similar to those of the German opposition in the 1950s: "The United States, whose policy was inspired by John Foster Dulles, may have believed that the West could make Moscow withdraw by strongly reinforcing NATO, and thus restore Ger-

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man unity. But that was only a dream, unless someone made war, which Washington and its allies were in no way disposed to do." I am curious to see if some of the right-wing admirers of de Gaulle in Germany will now accept that reasoning too.

But we cannot go back to the 'fifties. Conditions have changed. Some of de Gaulle's ideas nevertheless appear to assume that we *are* still in that epoch—for example, his strategy of massive retaliation against any kind of aggression. His concept that the German problem is an exclusively European one and his attempt to endow Europe with the attributes of a Third Force between East and West reflect a touch of neutralism.

In 1955 the Federal Republic of Germany joined NATO and the three Western powers ratified the Paris agreements by which Germany made a substantial military contribution to NATO in exchange for their support for German reunification under the principles of the right of self-determination and a free democratic constitution. We cannot shape our policy now as if these international commitments had not been made. They bind all the signers. But the strategic situation has changed, and so have its political implications. In 1950 the United States alone had operational atomic weapons and a strategic air force to deliver them; it could hit the Soviet Union in case of a conflict but was not itself vulnerable. Now the possession by both countries of a wide range of nuclear weapons and an advanced missile technology has created a stalemate. The achievements of the Soviet Union in this field made it euphoric about its new-found power, as we saw in the Berlin ultimatum in the fall of 1958. Only the Cuban crisis succeeded in modifying the Soviet position somewhat by making the Soviet leaders understand that the United States would use nuclear force if necessary.

This stalemate precludes an effective threat to use military force against a nuclear power as a means of achieving political aims. The situation has made the German problem no easier to solve. Security is still one of the key questions relating to it, but not the only key to its solution.

The legal position is clear: until there is a peace treaty, Germany's boundaries continue legally to be those of 1937. And it is common Western policy that only a freely elected government representing the whole of Germany has a legal mandate to negotiate that peace treaty. No government of a part can set the boundaries of the whole. But politically we have to admit that

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no all-German government will come into existence until certain problems relating to German unity have been clarified. Therefore the unification of Germany and the preparation of the peace treaty are two sides of the same coin—the future of Germany. This also means that no peace treaty can be made on present Soviet terms, that is to say, a treaty with several Germanys. Unity and a peace treaty form one political complex. Linked to it is the security problem. Germany wants to be sure of her freedom from foreign intervention or aggression, but her neighbors want also to be secure against German aggression, from which they have suffered in the past. Therefore the problem of security and of the German frontiers will also be part of the whole negotiation.

And finally, economic problems will play an important role. The present Soviet zone has many links with the Soviet Union and the East European states. Reunification of Germany will be possible only if the whole of Germany—or better, the European Common Market—can become more attractive as an economic partner in the eyes of the Soviet Union and the East European countries than the present Soviet zone of Germany can be alone.

The West cannot impose a solution of the German problem on the Soviet Union. But neither is it necessary to allow the Soviet Union to impose its solution on the West, confirming the partition of the country, cutting Berlin's links with the West and in addition discriminating against the international standing of the Federal Republic of Germany—all this without any countervailing benefits whatsoever.

Only Moscow can negotiate on German unity. East Berlin cannot; it is hopeless to talk with a régime about the terms for liquidating it. Therefore the only hope lies in creating a Soviet interest in restoring German unity. In the meantime, administrative arrangements with the authorities in the Soviet zone are useful in order to diminish the human sufferings created by the division of the country and by the Berlin wall. Economic and cultural contacts, the visits of West Berliners to the eastern part of their city, the visits of old people from the Soviet zone to West Germany—all these maintain links appropriate between parts of a single nation. In order to preserve these links and to protect the bargaining position of the Federal Republic of Germany in obtaining civil access to Berlin, interzonal trade should be increased. This should not be regarded by Germany's Western partners as unfair competition, for it is not foreign trade but a small remain-

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ing part of the blood circulation through what formerly was one national and economic unit. If German interzonal trade is too largely replaced by trade between the Soviet zone and Western countries, one further link between the parts of Germany would be destroyed and Mr. Ulbricht's capacity to vex Berlin enhanced.

There is one limit to these administrative arrangements: they cannot be pushed to a point (as wanted by Ulbricht) where they would acquire the character of foreign policy relations between sovereign governments. In that case Ulbricht would no longer be forced to make concessions in order to gain benefits for East German citizens. To go so far would be tantamount to accepting the partition of Germany forever, and would be regarded as treachery by the Germans in the Soviet zone. This is no legalistic quarrel but the unavoidable consequence of the iron tenacity with which Soviet policy tries to achieve its aims.

Under present conditions, with no immediate solution visible, the German question has to be held open. Berlin itself is proof that it *is* still open. There we have the last visible evidence of the four-power status. The physical presence of the Western powers and the physical links of West Berlin with the Federal Republic are vital for the city's survival in freedom. These links have more than an economic importance; they also have political meaning. The occasional visits to West Berlin of authorities of the Federal Republic, including the President and the parliament, are, like the permanent presence of agencies there, necessary elements to counterbalance Mr. Ulbricht's establishment in East Berlin. If the Federal Republic does not show those symbols of freedom in West Berlin, the four-power status would shrink to West Berlin alone and be regarded as allowing the Soviet Union to have a say there without any corresponding right of the Western powers in East Berlin. The wall is a permanent violation of the four-power status. There is no reason to add voluntary gifts to the Communists—for example, by agreeing not to have plenary meetings of the Federal parliament in West Berlin. Since the Soviet ultimatum in 1958, a sound formula has been: no provocation, but no capitulation either. If this is valid, we have to exercise our rights and not give them up, either wholesale or in slices. The way in which the Western powers and West Germany deal with Berlin is regarded as an indicator of how they stand regarding the future of Germany.

Who is to negotiate that future with the Soviet Union? The

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answer is found in formal international commitments—the four-power agreements of 1944 and 1945 and the Paris agreements of 1955 binding the three Western powers to work for German unity. To achieve the objective, they can use all possible channels. The United States can act as the common spokesman if it becomes possible to raise German problems in a proper context. But of course precise consultation is necessary to avoid misunderstandings. The working group in Washington is a good instrument to prepare such talks if they are to lead to a four-power conference or to other forms of East-West contacts. Diplomatic relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union can also provide useful services. But Germany should be careful not to fall into the Soviet trap of isolated direct negotiations; to pit small Germany alone against the Soviet world power would lead nowhere. The Soviet attempt to refer the German problem to Ulbricht comes to the same end; in negotiations with Ulbricht, the Soviet Union would be present, but the Federal Republic would be alone, having lost the support and confidence of its Western allies and perhaps having raised the old fear of a Rapallo. To achieve results, there must be a partner at the conference table equal in strength to the Soviet Union. Therefore, no serious negotiation is possible without the participation and backing of the United States. Its responsibility for Germany's security and for the protection of Berlin makes its participation vital in any event.

This points to a dangerous remark in de Gaulle's press conference of February 4. He said then that he regards the German problem as a European question to be solved by the Europeans alone—*i.e.* with the Soviet Union but without the United States. This destroys the four-power responsibility for Germany and denies the formal commitment made in the Paris treaty. If the French Government now says that de Gaulle's remark was misinterpreted, it must explain what his words do really mean; for taken at their face value, they would destroy the power equilibrium in Europe and bring the Soviet military superiority and geographical proximity to bear full force on European politics. That power cannot be balanced by French or European aspirations, but only by coöperation and close links with the other world power—the United States.

De Gaulle's long-term expectation that Germany will be united only after the Soviet Union ceases to be a totalitarian state and after the East European nations are free is a great vision but of no

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help in the foreseeable future. Nor does it indicate what our present policy should be. Indeed, his forecast destroys hope, for there is very little probability that Russia will give up Communism, even though we can admit that the forms of Communism will change.

The situation in the East European states and that in the Soviet zone of Germany are not the same. The greater part of Germany is free, and there exists there a German government which is truly independent and which participates actively in important international organizations. In the Soviet zone the existing authorities are detested by the people, as evidenced by the stream of refugees and the wall erected to hold them in. The régime there is not in a position to defend national aims as the Communist régimes in Eastern Europe do. It is bound to act against the national interest; otherwise it would immediately align itself with Bonn. Therefore it is useless to suggest that the German problem be left to the forces of evolution and meanwhile to do nothing to solve it.

In his press conference de Gaulle found very warm words with which to emphasize the necessity of German unity. He said there would be no peace in Europe without the unification of Germany, but he did not draw the right conclusion—namely, that it is necessary to work for that unification as a means to further the movement toward greater freedom in Eastern Europe.

President de Gaulle was right to urge that the fear of Germany among her East European neighbors should be reduced. German policy has already created better relations through trade missions to those states and through individual and cultural exchanges, and these might well be increased. Also, German industry is making an interesting attempt to build industrial plants in cooperation with the Communist governments of Eastern Europe in order to utilize their available manpower. But we have to differentiate between Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. We should strengthen the economic basis for independence in the East European countries without trying to create tensions between them and the Soviet Union. Credits to Eastern Europe do not have the same effect as they do in the Soviet Union; credits to the Soviet Union are equivalent to development aid without political dividends, and should not be given without political advantages. The Soviet Union has shown in Egypt that it is able to lend large sums. Why should we help to create more trouble for the West? In East-West trade a minimum of coöperation between the West-

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ern governments is necessary; otherwise the competition between individual nations and between business firms puts them at a commercial disadvantage in dealing with a state economy operating as a single trader—to say nothing of the political problems involved.

There will be no solution of the German problem without a new approach in the field of security. As long as the arms race continues, Germany will remain divided. But arms control and limitation of armaments will not automatically lead to German unity, since they could be based on Germany's continuing partition. However, arrangements made on that basis would provide only illusory security, for a new arms race will surely start unless one of the main origins of tension can be eliminated. The German interest is not to block but to help disarmament. Therefore we welcome the decision of the Federal parliament to appoint a disarmament commissioner in the German Foreign Office who will have the necessary staff and research facilities. He will have to determine which proposals in the disarmament field would be detrimental to German unity, which could help German unity and which would have no implications for it. Only then will it be possible to put forward German proposals which may contribute to international negotiations.

It has been a Western aim to avoid the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The British attempt to give up its existing nuclear arsenal must therefore be welcomed, but it makes sense only if we replace national by community solutions. The French example would lead to nuclear weapons for everybody. No responsible German wants national nuclear weapons for Germany; but in a world where every nation would have them, it would be impossible to exclude forever one country alone without creating feelings of frustration that would lead to violent nationalism. Therefore Germany advocates a community solution within the alliance. For years I have urged that the European partners in NATO be given a share in planning, in deciding on common strategy, in preparing future weapons developments and similar matters, leaving the ultimate decision on the use of nuclear weapons in the hands of the President of the United States, acting as trustee for the alliance but basing his decision on a commonly agreed strategy. The Multilateral Nuclear Force was a second-best alternative to the simpler solution of giving every partner in NATO—provided he is making a fair contribution to the conventional field—a say

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in the nuclear part of the strategy too. Since no government took up this proposal, the M.L.F., with its features of common ownership and financing, was a step in the right direction. A community solution might take other forms, but any solution must serve the community and not be simply bilateral. If Europe achieves unification, its participation in the common defense could be integrated with that of the United States; but it could not replace it.

The division of labor should not exclude the exchange of knowledge and experience in all aspects of modern technology, as otherwise the peaceful application of military technology will remain a monopoly of the few. If the industry of all NATO members is not helped, there will be a strong tendency to develop national nuclear weapons industries in most of the Western countries, or perhaps on a European scale, with all the waste of resources and all the bad psychological consequences which this would entail for the solidarity of the alliance. Not everybody has to provide everything, but the whole potential of the alliance has to protect every single member.

This would be the spirit of European-American partnership, based on two pillars. But pillars must support something; they are useless without an Atlantic bridge. The two pillars would not be independent but would be a function of the interdependence which is already a fact and not a distant aim. Geography, technology and the cost of modern defense make American participation—even integration—in the defense of Europe a vital necessity. We sometimes hear in France that the United States is not reliable because in two wars it entered too late. But there is a vast difference in the formal American commitments and the actual American presence in existence today and the situation as it was in 1914 or 1940. Raymond Aron was right when he pointed out in *Le Figaro* that present French policy makes sense as a means of winning more influence only if the United States is more reliable than some quarters of French opinion pretend and only because American nuclear power and American and German conventional forces provide the necessary shield.

According to present French strategy, every kind of aggression is to be deterred by the threat of the immediate use of nuclear weapons. This threat has lost its credibility even when it is posed by the United States, but in Western Europe it was never credible, for Europe was, and is, more vulnerable than the United States

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to Soviet blows. An aggressor is deterred only if the defender has more alternatives than suicide or capitulation. To establish a credible deterrent there must be a capacity to fight a war if deterrence fails. Only that amount of force should be used which is adequate to meet the threat and to stop aggression on the spot. A nation that disposes only of nuclear weapons is defenseless against other forms of aggression or blackmail. In the light of her strategy, neither France's present strength nor her future capability is an alternative to the American commitment and presence, which are necessary unless and until substantial progress is made in disarmament—in fact and not on paper.

On these questions the United States has developed concepts for a common strategy of the alliance. Understandably, it does not want to be accused of imposing its will on reluctant allies. But if the political will of the strongest power in the alliance is not visible, the gap will be filled by others. This explains the growing influence of de Gaulle in some European countries, including Germany. Of course, the friendship which has been established between France and Germany is one of the great achievements of the postwar period. It can never be given up; it is deeply rooted in the two nations which have suffered for so long from mutual hostility. But the preamble to the German-French Treaty, which was added by the German parliament, says that this friendship must be placed within the framework of the European community and Atlantic solidarity.

Chancellor Erhard returned from Paris and Rambouillet with a statement of full agreement with de Gaulle. After the Chancellor's last visit to President Johnson, he was in full agreement with him. Is there really complete agreement between Johnson and de Gaulle and Erhard or are these statements without real meaning? It is more than doubtful that agreement does exist on the future of Germany, the shape of Europe, the future of the alliance and common strategy. The climate in the alliance is better than it was some months ago, but this is due more to postponement of necessary decisions than to new agreements. To reach decisions, open-minded discussions are necessary. A strategy for peace requires a common Western position on disarmament issues, but unfortunately France has not taken her seat at Geneva. Better relations between East and West cannot be achieved by Western competition but only by carefully harmonizing Western policy, allowing for some flexibility in individual positions. Since no

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better security arrangements have come into effect, we need to organize our defenses so as to cover all kinds of contingencies, and not just the least likely—that of nuclear attack.

Europe must become a real community so that it can be a partner of the United States speaking with one voice. The harmonization of policies by a series of government conferences will not bring this community into being, as the history of diplomacy has demonstrated for two thousand years. Europe needs institutions. Statesmen who are not willing to develop those already existing, to add new fields of community action, to give a proper degree of democratic control to the European executives, and to attempt to enlarge the European framework by the addition of new members are not shaping the Europe of tomorrow but trying to influence independent sovereign nations by the methods of yesterday.

Europe must make up its mind whether it wants the relationship of partner with the United States or whether, while paying lip service to the idea of partnership, it casts the United States in the role of distant friend. The concept of Europe as a Third Force cannot create political cohesion in the Atlantic Alliance; yet de Gaulle at his last press conference came pretty close to such a concept, with this qualification: that he refuses even to organize that force. Never has he indicated how Europe should be organized in an effective way.

The future of Germany cannot wait until a miracle occurs. We have to prepare better conditions for a new approach—doing our homework in Germany, looking into the complexity of all the related problems, creating a common position in the West which alone can offer a possibility of presenting the Soviet Union with a serious Western approach. At his last press conference de Gaulle was restrained and polite. His earlier utterances had made an impact on some circles of public opinion in Germany, creating a tendency to blame the United States for being too soft and making unnecessary concessions to the Soviet Union in contrast to what some believed to be de Gaulle's hard policy. Now those who adopted that view will understand their error. De Gaulle will have *his* détente—and will therefore postpone the German problem. American policy has at least offered the possibility that progress with the German problem may be made part of a policy of détente.

Words like "national sovereignty," "grandeur" and "pride," though sometimes given a European label, could become dan-

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gerous in Germany and excite nationalistic emotions—especially if they are combined with an overestimation of German and French capacities and an underestimation of the real power situation in the world.

We should not confuse these dangers with the expression of a healthy national solidarity. German democratic forces must prove that they strive for the freedom and unity of the whole nation. If the legitimate interests of the nation are not well served by these forces, others may take up these national aims and turn them against democracy. We witnessed the rise of those dangers in the Weimar period. Therefore our Western allies must stand firmly with us in support of Germany's vital interests. If they do not, the alliance will lose its attraction for Germany. Commitments are mutual, not unilateral. The German people know very well that they cannot go it alone, that no peaceful solution of the German problem is possible without the help of friends and the understanding of others. They know that they can only persuade —not force. If this conviction is to be maintained, we need to make a permanent effort, work carefully and have confidence in one another.

The European Community is making progress; its institutions prove that patience and hard work pay if they are combined with a firm will. Let us restore that will to the Western Alliance and its leadership! Without an effective alliance, there will be no adequate help for the developing areas, no peace and security for all of us, and no German unity.

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ESSENTIALS FOR NIGERIAN SURVIVAL

By Nnamdi Azikiwe

AFTER four years of independence, the Federal Republic of Nigeria is experiencing teething troubles. As Africa's most populous country, its role in contemporary history is significant. There are only nine nations in the world larger than Nigeria in population, and it is worthy of note that of these six are federal in structure. Ironically, our population gives us an advantage and places us under a handicap. Though it earns us prestige, it also causes us to be visited by a multiplicity of problems.

The election to our Parliament, which took place last December 30, brought some of these problems into sharp focus and precipitated a crisis. Whether the containment of the crisis will be permanent or temporary depends upon how those in authority take cognizance of the forces that are working to undermine the security of the state and the stability of the government.

The immediate causes of the crisis were the incompetent manner in which the electoral machinery was operated, the undemocratic nature of the electioneering campaigns which were featured by violence and lawlessness, the boycotting of elections in one-fourth of the 312 constituencies and the threat of secession by one of the four regions forming the Federation.

But there were remote political causes which accentuated the problems of federalism in the Republic and ultimately precipitated the December crisis. These were related to the exercise of executive, legislative and judicial power, the enjoyment of fundamental human rights, the creation of more states and the status of the Head of State.

Before the advent of British rule in Nigeria, most of our people were essentially democratic in their political institutions. There were exceptions in communities where strong men emerged and assumed power or usurped it, but such autocratic tendencies were generally resisted. This heritage of democracy has been preserved through the elders of the community, who became an instrument for the maintenance of law and order in their society. To ensure that the canons of ethics and law were not discarded, responsibility was granted to the elders, who were presumed to know and cherish the customs and traditions of the group.

"Gerontocracy" means government by elders. Although the

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exercise of power is vested in a caste of elderly people, this type of government is a form of representative democracy. Throughout Nigeria, the observer of indigenous customs must be struck by the way Nigerians respect their elders as guardians of their heritage and trustees of their communities. The council of elders usually comprised the leading chiefs of the community, most of them titled men and women, whose powers were subject to the usages of custom and convention. The paramount ruler usually exercised power after consultation with the council of elders. Failure to consult or to act on advice often led to a crisis which might develop into warfare or loss of human life or violence or dethronement.

The main political lesson learned from this Nigerian experience is the premium placed on collective leadership. A strong monarch might find himself in trouble if he did not respect the collective views of his council of elders. The word "council" is antonymous to "individual." Its operation is collectivist and not individualist. It is becoming clearer now that in many African societies the community acts collectively through a chosen leader—what I would describe as conciliar democracy. I believe that the reason why liberal democracy has not been wholly successful in many African countries is because they failed to grasp its collective element. When an individual is placed in a position to exercise omnipotent authority, there is always a likelihood that he may become power drunk. This aspect of human nature is often overlooked by political leaders of countries which presume to be "advanced," and until they reckon with its importance to social stability, we shall continue to hear of successful and unsuccessful coups.

Everywhere in the world, the story of this mad scramble and struggle for power is the same. It makes no difference whether it is in Africa or Asia or Europe or America; history keeps repeating and displaying itself to new generations in a different garb. The issue, then, is: What price power, if on attaining political autonomy human beings are obliged to resort to violence in order to cling to what they have won with so great sacrifice? Nigerians must decide whether they, too, wish to tread the beaten path of violence enabling the chosen few to exercise the power of life and death over the inarticulate many.

II

The House of Representatives is the effective legislature of the Federal Government, whose membership is elected on the basis

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of qualified adult suffrage. Representation in the House is roughly one for every 178,270 inhabitants of Nigeria, but it is uneven, because, whilst the North is represented on the basis of the adult population of both sexes, only men are eligible to vote. In the South, both male and female adults are eligible to vote. This unevenness has created inequality in representation and there has been agitation to amend the Constitution so that the basis of representation and eligibility for voting should be uniform throughout the country. Either there should be universal adult suffrage in the North or the seats allocated to it should be reduced to make it reflect its male population only. As I see it, the Federation of Nigeria has come to stay and if we are sincere in our profession of national unity, then the North should enfranchise its female population and thus fall in line with the rest of the country. This is the only clean method of effecting a healthy and desirable change.

Another matter which has disturbed many people is the tendency to rush government measures through Parliament without giving Members sufficient time to study and debate them intelligently and fully in an atmosphere of deliberate tranquility. As a democratic people, Nigerians do not like to be rushed in expressing the collective will of the nation. After all, the original idea of parliament is to provide a place of calm to which men may repair to deliberate on great issues of state and resolve them in accordance with the rules of dialectics. An examination of our *Hansards* will show the spate of criticisms made by Members on what they regard as a subtle attempt to rule Nigeria by rushing legislation without full debate.

A problem which has caused grave concern in Nigeria is the practice of carpet-crossing—that is, of M.P.s abandoning one party for another. Since January 1952, when 14 members of the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens (N.C.N.C.) and six sympathizers crossed the carpet, thereby bolstering the government in Western Nigeria, this immoral practice has continued to plague our parliamentary institutions. Early in 1964, eight Nigerian M.P.s crossed the carpet from the Action Group to the Northern Peoples Congress (N.P.C.).

There have been revulsions against this exhibition of lack of principle. In a front-page editorial, one of our national newspapers, the *West African Pilot,* commented that, "In Nigeria, poli-

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tics appears to have become a game for scoundrels. The bankruptcy of politics is shown by the ease with which mercenaries and opportunists change camps at the slightest pretext. The pious and grand statements they make as they shuffle from one camp to another is no more than a brazen effort to hide the shame of their sullied souls." It counseled that, "Any legislator who feels so sore about the party on whose platform he won a seat to the legislature that he wants to leave the party, should also have the courage to resign his seat in the legislature simultaneously. He can now come back on his own or on the ticket of the new party of his choice to ask for a fresh mandate."

The Nigerian National Democratic Party (N.N.D.P.) is the political party at present in control of Western Nigeria, which has 94 members in its House of Assembly. It is significant that of this number 54 are members of the N.N.D.P., of whom 49 are Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries, and four are the Speaker, Deputy Speaker, Chief Whip and Party Whip, respectively. In the words of a columnist in the *Sunday Times:* "The only member remaining resigned from the party only a few days ago. So that every legislator on the Government Bench holds an office. This record goes beyond the continent of Africa. It is a world record. . . ."

We should tackle this problem of carpet-crossing realistically. I know the usual argument put forward to justify it on the exigencies of politics. I cannot agree that Members of Parliament should betray the trust of the electorate on the grounds of "conscience" whenever their opportunism excites their inordinate ambition. We should now lay it down in our Constitution that, if any legislator decides to change parties, or desires to become an independent member, then his seat should be declared vacant, to enable him to test the popularity of his change of front.

Mr. O. C. Ememe, a former Member of Parliament, felt that the mood of our leaders was geared "towards the preservation of the authority handed over to them by the imperial British." He thought that this was motivated by fear and desire for self-preservation:

> The leaders are afraid that power might slip off their hands only to fall into the hands of their opponents. Therefore, they designed a Constitution which would leave all powers in the hands of politicians. As a result, the President, the Regional Governors, the Judges, including the Chief Justice, are to be made appendages of the politicians—the Prime Minister and his regional colleagues—the Premiers. . . .

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In this country, the executive is already usurping the powers of Parliament. It is with great difficulty that Parliament exerts any influence on the executive. In fact, Parliament is used here as a rubber stamp. When controversial issues are tabled for discussion M.P.s, especially those on the Government Bench, are supposed to vote according to political parties, the policies of which are dictated by the same executive. But party leaders constitute the executive. Deviationists are penalised. Thus the same politician who controls the legislature would also control the judiciary. When the legislature, the executive and the judiciary come under the control of one and the same person or a group of persons, then the Government is said to be a dictatorship.[1]

The Senate of Nigeria was devised to have delaying powers only. It has no jurisdiction over financial matters and to this extent its avowed concurrent jurisdiction is of little practical consequence. After a fairly good start, Nigeria's upper house appears to have been transformed by politicians into a dumping ground for those who failed to win seats at popular elections but who have ambition to become Ministers. An emasculated legislature of this nature stands the risk of exposing itself to criticism as a haven for mercenary "elder statesmen." The Senate should be reformed and be vested with complete concurrent jurisdiction with the House of Representatives. The corollary of this is that Senators should stand for election in their various constituencies. Its advantage would be to discourage ciphers and nonentities from elbowing their way to the legislature through the back door.

The exercise of the legislative power is a most important responsibility, which should not be trifled with, especially in an embryonic nation. We must ensure that well-educated people of good character are elected to parliamentary seats in order to participate intelligently and responsibly in parliamentary debates. If there is decline in the functions of Parliament, the fault must lie not in its forms, organization and administration, but in its *dramatis personae,* that is, the politicians who run the affairs of the country.

III

The Nigerian judiciary is the bulwark of the liberty of the citizen. We regard it as our last best hope for survival as a democracy. In a study which he prepared for Liberty, an organization of Nigerian jurists whose objective is to maintain and uphold the principles of justice and fundamental liberties, Mr. Aliyi Ekineh, Secretary of the Nigeria Bar Association, asserted: "The extent of our freedom in Nigeria . . . is to a large measure the responsi-

[1] *Daily Express,* Lagos, September 4, 1963.

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bility of the courts. The courts can curtail our freedom and they can widen it just as they please. The Constitution gives this great power to them in order to protect the rights of everybody in Nigeria."

Great care was taken to ensure that in the exercise of judicial power individual freedom would be guaranteed in a manner that would be consistent with the concept of the rule of law, which animates the activities of truly democratic societies. Those who dispense justice in a democratic society must be part of the democratic system and must be imbued with democratic ideas. Therefore, we have insulated our judicial officers from the undercurrents of partisan politics. As individuals, we cannot expect them to be immune from having their own political beliefs and persuasions, but they must divorce their personalities from the partisan aspect of politics, if they would be trusted to dispense justice without fear or favor, ill will or affection.

In spite of adequate safeguards to insulate our judiciary from the humdrum of political strife, our federal system has labored under a great strain, due to the tricorporal nature of our legal and judicial systems.[2] Our judicature is organized into courts of superior jurisdiction and those of inferior jurisdiction. In the former, the recording is usually done by the presiding judge or magistrate and not by a court stenographer; neither an accused person nor the litigant or his counsel can fairly ensure the accuracy of such records, although they are usually accurate. In criminal cases, a very limited type of offense is tried by a restricted jury. As far as the customary courts are concerned, they are presided over by laymen who are neither legal practitioners nor persons who are learned in the secular law, although some of them may be well-read in Islamic or Canon Law. But an irony is that these inferior courts are equally vested with civil and criminal jurisdiction. Not only are they clothed with power over life and death of the citizen, but they have extensive powers to apply Islamic Law over non-Muslims.

Under Section 21 of our Constitution

(5) Every person who is charged with a criminal offence shall be entitled . . .

(c) to defend himself in person or by legal representatives of his own choice; . . .

[2] The English legal system (Nigerian Constitutional Law, Nigerian Statute Law, and Nigerian Case Law); Nigerian Customary Laws; and Islamic Law (Maliki school). There is definite need for a monistic system of *corpus juris Nigeriensis*.

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Provided that nothing in this subsection shall invalidate any law by reason only that the law prohibits legal representation in a court established by or under the Native Courts Law, 1956, the Sharia Court of Appeal Law, 1960, or the Court of Resolution Law, 1960, of Northern Nigeria (a), the Customary Courts Law, 1957, of Western Nigeria (b), or the Customary Courts Law, 1956, of Eastern Nigeria (c), as amended, or any law replacing any of those laws.

Practically, this fundamental right of the citizen to legal counsel is a dead letter, in view of the above proviso. The customary courts are exempted from the application of this entrenched clause with the result that political opponents have complained of deliberate persecution in being denied representation by counsel. There have been cases of legal practitioners, Southerners and nominally Christian, who were tried for political offenses in customary courts in Northern Nigeria by the al-kalai—that is, laymen who are not legal practitioners but are said to be well-read in Islamic Law. The accused persons were sentenced to severe terms of imprisonment and in one case the prisoner was marched through the streets manacled.

Extensive reforms in our judicial system are overdue so as to harmonize it with expectations that are reasonably justifiable in a democratic society. As an independent Federal Republic, we have severed our connections with the Judicial Committee of the British Privy Council. Our Supreme Court is now our judicial tribunal of last resort. The present regional High Courts should be transformed into Federal Courts of Appeal to be presided over by justices identified by number and stationed at regional capitals. The jurisdiction of the Federal Courts of Appeal should be defined to avoid conflict of authority with any other superior court of record; appeal should be to the Supreme Court.

A High Court should be stationed at the headquarters of each province and presided over by a judge. Its jurisdiction should be defined and it should have appellate jurisdiction from the lower courts of record. The Sharia Court of Appeal should have concurrent jurisdiction with the Provincial High Court, but accused persons and litigants should have the option to decide whether or not to make use of this court of appeal or its concurrent court of jurisdiction; and it should be up to the latter court to decide whether it should refer certain issues of a technical nature to the Sharia Court of Appeal for an opinion, before judgment is delivered.

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A county court should be established at the headquarters of each Local Authority and presided over by a Magistrate. It should be a court of record and it should have appellate jurisdiction from lower courts. There should be a local court in each local council area of authority to be presided over by a Justice of the Peace. This should be the present customary courts. The civil and criminal jurisdictions of the local court should be carefully defined and strictly limited.

In civil cases, the local court should deal with customary and petty cases, with power to award damages not exceeding £10. In criminal cases, it should have the right to detain, but not to imprison or to impose severe bodily punishment on any guilty person. Even detention should be temporary, not exceeding 24 hours, and should be for the sole purpose of transferring an accused person to either a guardroom or prison. Otherwise, the person concerned should be either granted bail or discharged.

The criminal jurisdiction of the local court should be limited to the imposition of a fine not exceeding £5 and it should have no jurisdiction to imprison any person.[3] If an accused person is unable to pay a fine, then the county should arraign the individual concerned in a county court. Under this scheme, all customary courts and al-kali courts would be absorbed in the local courts, and their jurisdiction restricted.

I have suggested the unification of the judicial system to enable all the courts of the land to dispense justice on a uniform basis. My aim is to make it possible for the Federal Government to control and supervise all our courts, whether customary or al-kalai or Sharia or Magistrate or High or Appeal or Supreme. After all, the dispensation of justice is a judicial and not a religious or political act. Whilst I will admit that only persons learned in Islamic jurisprudence should be appointed to dispense justice in customary courts where Muslims may be tried, yet I must insist that the courts of the land should not take cognizance of the religious beliefs or political attachment of any person when his liberty is placed in jeopardy. After all, Nigeria is a secular state; it is not a Christian or an Islamic state.

[3] The severity of the sentences imposed by these courts is proverbial in Nigeria. For example, a customary court in Gboko, Tiv Division, Northern Nigeria, was reported to have sentenced each of the six persons accused of rioting to serve 24 years in prison and, in addition, to be flogged with 12 strokes of the cane. Fifteen months ago, another customary court in Kano sentenced each of the ten NEPU and Action Group supporters accused of criminal defamation to serve 12 months in prison and, in addition, to be flogged with 80 strokes of the cane.

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The story of the human race is a recapitulation, from age to age, of the struggle of man to enjoy fundamental rights. When Nigerian newspaper editors joined other West African journalists to visit the United Kingdom in 1943, they urged the Government to extend basic human rights to all the British territories in West Africa. In their memorandum, they included the right to life and all the fundamental rights of man, which were to find a worthy supporter, five years later, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

During the Constitutional Conferences of 1953, 1957 and 1958, the N.C.N.C. and Northern Elements Progressive Union joined the Action Group in demanding the incorporation of fundamental rights in our Constitution. It was not until 1959 that the Colonial Office was convinced of the wisdom of doing so. Sections 18 to 33 of our Constitution contain provisions for the enjoyment of certain basic rights in Nigeria, namely: freedom from inhuman treatment; freedom from slavery and forced labor; personal liberty; freedom of private and family life; freedom of thought, conscience and religion; freedom of expression and opinion; freedom of peaceful assembly and association; freedom of movement; freedom from discrimination; and freedom to possess property.

In spite of these far-reaching measures, our Constitution vests the Federal and Regional Governments with the power to enact laws which would neutralize these ten fundamental rights, provided that such laws are "reasonably justifiable in a democratic society." The reasonableness and justifiableness of any such law is one of interpretation by the courts. Hence, whilst this innovation is highly appreciated, the provisos give one cause for justifiable apprehension, since they virtually stultify our charter of liberty.

The proviso to Section 28, in respect of freedom from discrimination, is a case in point. It stipulates that "a citizen of Nigeria of a particular community, tribe, place of origin or political opinion shall not, by reason only that he is such a person" be exposed to discrimination; but there is a proviso which vitiates this by virtually encouraging discrimination *ad libitum* against Nigerians anywhere in Nigeria as regards employment in the public service, the armed forces, the police force and the statutory corporations. There is also a proviso validating discrimination against Nigerians "with respect to the acquisition or use by any person of land or property." And the Constitution also legalizes discrimination

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against Nigerians if any region enacts legislation imposing disability or restriction or accords privilege or advantage that, "having regard to its nature and to special circumstances pertaining to the persons to whom it applies, is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society."

These provisos which encourage discrimination against Nigerians in their own country are scandalous. It is not a good advertisement for a nation which believes in liberal democracy and the rule of law to insert in its Constitution provisions which would vest its constituent units with power to foster discrimination against its citizens who happen to originate from other regions. We must either have one country or separate and independent countries. We are either Nigerians or we are not.

Nigerian leaders must address themselves to the root causes of bad faith and suspicion in our body politic. We must be frank in tackling the problems which have arisen as a result of our decision to live together as one country. I cannot see the logic in depriving a Nigerian, anywhere in Nigeria, of the liberty to lease or purchase land, simply because he comes from a different region. After all, one of the advantages of the federal system of government is common nationality, and to deprive a Nigerian national of the right to own property in his own country is a violation of the spirit of our Constitution. Therefore, our Constitution must be revised to enable Nigerian nationals—be they Northerners or Easterners or Westerners or Mid-Westerners or Lagosians—to be entitled, as of right, to own property anywhere in Nigeria, to seek for employment anywhere in Nigeria, to enjoy all the rights and fulfill all the obligations of Nigerian citizenship anywhere in Nigeria.

IV

One formidable barrier to be hurdled by this young Republic is the question of creating more states. Whilst there had been agitation for breaking the country into smaller units, it was not until the 1957 Constitutional Conference in London that it became a live issue. In 1943, I had suggested that Nigeria should become a federation of eight protectorates, but in 1946 Nigeria was officially divided into three virtually separate regions. In 1955, Mr. Okoi Arikpo, a former Federal Minister, developed my idea with some modifications. Immediately thereafter, a Nigerian political analyst proposed 30 states for the country.

In order to evolve into a near perfect union, the whole of

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Nigeria should be divided and so demarcated geographically and demographically that no one region would be in position to dominate the rest. When I proposed that Nigeria should become a federation of eight regions, I was being political, and not sociological, in my approach. I did not necessarily overlook the tribal factor, but in my innocence I deliberately minimized it. Within five years, tribalism had reared its horrid head and Nigerian politics was saturated with its obnoxious ramifications. Since then tribalism has displaced patriotism as the center of political gravity and Nigerian leaders have been manœuvred to dissipate their energies and turn against themselves.

In making my suggestion, I was thinking of the country as a whole, as I still do. I did not bother to think of a Nigerian specifically in terms of his tribe or clan. I regarded a Nigerian as a citizen who had certain rights and obligations. When tribalism had replaced patriotism, the N.C.N.C., the party I led at the time, grudgingly decided that Nigeria should be split into 14 states in order to accommodate what had become a reality in Nigerian politics. This explanation is necessary, because I am not sure that the political situation and the psychological factors involved were fully considered when my proposal and that of Mr. Arikpo were critically analyzed in a doctoral dissertation, in which the author advocated the creation of 30 states, based mainly on nationalities.

Irrespective of the number of regions suggested and in the light of the present situation, the idea of dividing Nigeria into many regions is basically sound because the aim is to consolidate national unity. If Nigerian leaders are disposed to listen to the voice of experience, they would see the wisdom in further splitting this country according to the main *nationalities* or *linguistic groups* (not ethnic groups) which form the bulk of the population. I prefer to use the more correct anthropological terminology because there has been loose talk about "tribes," "ethnic groups," "races," etc., by some ill-informed but well-meaning Nigerians and by many "experts" from abroad. Professor Ashley Montagu correctly said that without language human culture would be impossible; thus it is "the great stimulator and binder." Those who speak the same language generally come under the organizing influence of the environment into which they are born.

The requirements of contemporary political life are becoming extremely complex and the demands of the modern state on the citizen are becoming more exacting, if not confounding. This calls

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for a critical appraisal of the effect of federalism on the body politic. Since its introduction, Nigerians have had the mortifying experience of seeing claims and counter-claims made for the creation of separate states because of alleged neglect on the part of the Federal and Regional Governments to provide the people concerned with the amenities of modern life, to wit: postal facilities and telecommunications, tarred roads, free elementary schools, general and specialist hospitals, rehabilitation centers, recreational facilities, cheap housing schemes, secondary industries, electricity, cheap transportation on land and inland waterways, piers and quays, cheap foodstuff during all seasons of the year, libraries, theatres, etc.

The pragmatic alternative open to developing countries which are federal in character is to alter fundamentally the basis of their federation. It is apparent that only affluent societies are capable of assuming the financial obligations to which the member states of a federation are committed. This is due to their economic growth, high standard of living and immense purchasing power. If one contrasts the income of the largest African federal government with that of the smallest American state government one will be shocked at the disparity. Take Rhode Island, for instance: its area is 1,214 square miles, and its population is 859,488. Yet its total revenue for the financial year ended June 1960 was $123,000,000. During the same period the Nigerian Federation, with an area of 339,170 square miles, and a population of 35,297,000, grossed a total revenue equivalent to $266,000,000, one of the highest in Africa. In other words, Rhode Island had a per capita revenue income of $266 to Nigeria's $8.40. In the face of this disparity, Rhode Island can afford to stick to the region as a basis of federation, since it is financially viable. But Nigeria certainly cannot. In fact, no regional government in Nigeria is able to provide all the necessary amenities for its inhabitants, with or without the subvention of an already impoverished Federal Government.

We should, then, diversify our federal system by basing it on the local authorities and provinces as well as the regions. In doing so, we shall have to expand the areas in which the Federal Government shares responsibility so that all the governments of the Federation participate in the crusade for even development, and thus ensure economic, social and political equality for all, irrespective of the abstruse doctrine of states' rights.

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In this line of reasoning, I suggest that each region, province and local authority in Nigeria should be entitled, as of right, to certain basic amenities. This should stem the present tide of apparent utter helplessness, planlessness and destituteness. With a high degree of courage and planning, the Nigerian economy can be revamped and, instead of our financial and commercial emissaries globe-trotting, begging for financial aid "without strings"—which plea cannot make the least impression on the affluent nations in the present diplomacy of geopolitics—we should start our own "Operation Bootstrap" and straighten out our economy in a way that would make federalism a blessing and not a curse to our people.

Another safeguard suggested for sustaining federalism in Nigeria is the popular idea of having an executive Head of State. It is obvious that Nigeria's brief experience with constitutional government has not developed a tradition of respect for a selected constitutional Head of State, as distinct from an elected executive. The fact that in recent years, Heads of Government in Nigeria have tended to be very conspicuous in performing ceremonial functions, which are customarily reserved for the *ceremonial* Head of State and Regional Governors, has not improved matters. Prudence and modesty should have influenced the judgment of those concerned; but as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes ruminated: "Self-love is a cup without any bottom; you might pour all the Great Lakes into it, and never fill it up."

The majority of Nigerians are still illiterate; their cultural development is still limited to the tribal level, comparatively speaking, so that it is the source of power and show of authority that appeal to the primitive mind, the poverty-stricken opportunist and the sophisticated careerist. Psychologically, the tendency to worship and flatter the Head of Government, even at the expense of the Head of State, must naturally lead to mutual jealousies, unless those concerned are incapable of being infected by the virus of inordinate political ambition.

Nigeria simply is not ready to have a constitutional Head of State with hollow power working parallel with a power-loaded Head of Government. No matter what may be the good relations between the two persons involved, as has been the case between me and Sir Abubakar, external factors are bound to provoke feelings and sow seeds of misunderstanding. As far as I am concerned, I can say without hesitation that I have no personal ambition in partisan politics; this explains why I have been able

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to play the role of a prisoner in a gilded cage with personal satisfaction and complete equanimity.

To save the Nigerian federal structure from perennial infighting among its leaders, it is imperative that we do one of two things: either we should have an elected executive Head of State and scrap the post of Prime Minister, or we should retain both functionaries but vest an elected Head of State with certain specific powers, whilst retaining the Prime Minister with the plenary powers he exercises at present.

If we accept the first proposition, then supreme powers shall be vested in an elected Head of State. The popular tendency in the world is to adopt this line of action; but the effect has not always been salutary. Rather, in some instances, it has strengthened the strong and weakened the weak; and it has encouraged instability in government. The countries of Latin America and the Caribbean are classic examples of the tragedy of the strong-man executive.

If, in view of the foregoing, we prefer to vest the constitutional Head of State with certain specific powers, then he should be an elected officeholder and his responsibilities might include the following areas, among others: control of the Federal Public Service Commission, the Federal Audit, the Federal Electoral Commission and the Federal Census Board. These are four explosive areas of politics, and by placing them under the exclusive control of the Head of State, an impartial non-partisan, they can be insulated from being subverted for partisan ends.

Even after we have bifurcated power and have vested the Head of State with specific powers, leaving the plenary powers with the Prime Minister, it will still be necessary to insulate certain organs of the Federal Government from being subverted for political ends. I have in mind the use of the police and the armed forces for ostensibly military, but actually political, purposes. At the present stage of Nigerian development, and in the light of the experience of contemporary African and other countries, we should now make it impossible for politicians to use our service forces for partisan purposes. As an antidote to political subversion, we should create a Federal Privy Council and charge it with the sole responsibility of advising the Head of State on matters relating to the use of the Army, Navy, Air Force and the Police—for military purposes.

The Federal Privy Council should comprise a panel consisting of past and present Heads of State, Heads of Government, Re-

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gional Governors, Regional Premiers, Presidents of the Senate, and Speakers of the House. It should be charged with the exclusive responsibility of advising the President on: (1) the military use of the armed forces and the police for the maintenance of law and order and other purposes of internal security; (2) when to declare war; (3) when to terminate a state of war; (4) when to negotiate and conclude a military alliance or a peace treaty.

V

The central problem of federalism in Nigeria is how to coexist in harmony. How can people who speak diverse tongues and have inherited different cultural traditions cultivate a national spirit of oneness? By enlarging the scope of authority of the Federal Government to include more concurrent subjects, by vesting the Senate with concurrent powers, by unifying our legal and judicial systems, by reinforcing the fundamental rights clauses in the Constitution, by creating more states, and by augmenting the prestige of the Head of State, definite steps would have been taken to strengthen coöperation between the regions and the Federal Government. This should create an atmosphere of confidence and ease tensions that are inherent in federations.

Nigerian federalism can lead to concord if areas of conflict can be mutually adjusted. Should more states be created? If not, should not the smallest unit of government be guaranteed equal development, under the Constitution—irrespective of its size, population and region of origin—thus countering the charge of partiality or the weapon of almightiness, which may goad regions with large areas and huge populations to behave like giants and thus invite repercussions that would be based on fears and apprehensions of imagined domination?

The federal system of government is based on compromise between conflicting interests in order to produce a harmonious union of apparently irreconcilable elements. The Nigerian federal system derives its inspiration from this universal experience; hence Nigerian political unity has been forged on the anvil of compromise. When a compromise is effected some concessions are usually made; but this should not necessarily imply surrender of principles or virtual extinction of any of the compromisers. In most federal systems, the principle of local autonomy is respected on the assumption that if the parts can coexist, then the whole will exist.

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THE FRENCH-CANADIAN DILEMMA

By Claude Ryan

THE last five years have been portentous ones in the Province of Quebec. In September 1959, Premier Maurice Duplessis died of a stroke after 15 years of uninterrupted rule. He was succeeded by an enlightened conservative, Paul Sauvé, who also died four months later following a heart attack. That was the beginning of a rapid disintegration for Duplessis' National Union Party. At the next provincial election held in June 1960, the Liberal Party won a surprise victory over the National Union. Jean Lesage, a former minister in the federal cabinet of Louis St. Laurent, became head of the first Liberal administration in Quebec since 1944.

Mr. Lesage came into office with the help of three reform-minded colleagues, Georges-Emile Lapalme, René Lévesque and Paul Gérin-Lajoie, who were deeply committed to modernizing the government machinery and making democracy become a living reality in economics, education and welfare. Lapalme and Gérin-Lajoie had opposed Lesage at a leadership convention of their party in 1958 but had then rallied under the new leader. Lévesque had been a highly popular broadcaster but had never had anything to do with an organized political party; he was known for his advanced social views but was not generally considered as a nationalist. Each of these three men was assigned to a key post in the new Lesage administration and it became clear from that very moment that, regardless of his personal leanings, Mr. Lesage had committed his administration to a progressive line which was to change the face of the province and raise anew the question of what should be the position of French Canada in North America.

The Prime Minister of Quebec is not merely the political head of a province. He is also the leader of French Canadians. He is the one to whom they look for guidance in all matters related to their temporal welfare. French Canadians may be proud to see one of their men as Prime Minister in Ottawa, but the Premier of Quebec is always closer to their hearts than their federal leaders. The latter are more or less captive, having to compromise with the rest of Canada; the former owes no allegiance but to his own people. Mr. Duplessis had used his position to exalt the virtues of work

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and tradition. He staunchly opposed the encroachments of the Federal Government upon provincial jurisdiction, which became a frequent practice, easily accepted by the other provinces in the postwar period. He rigidly adhered to the old-fashioned philosophy of surplus budgeting and limited public debt. He often seemed to place the religious and cultural homogeneity of his people above individual liberties. He was a warm upholder of private enterprise and maintained very cordial relations with American investors. To his American friends he appeared as the man who could safely welcome them to Quebec and interpret their role to his own people. To his people he appeared as the man who was strong enough to protect them against the Anglo-Saxon centralizers of Ottawa. At home, he kept extolling the merits of an old-fashioned educational system which helped perpetuate the long-cherished myth of Quebec's unique and providential mission in North America.

Mr. Lesage was elected on a platform of "liberation." By that, he meant all sorts of things: liberation from the corrupt political machine of the National Union Government; liberation from foreign economic domination; liberation from all inequalities in the field of education and welfare; liberation from the evils of patronage in the handling of government jobs and contracts; liberation of the intellectuals from the unavowed tutelage in which they had been kept; liberation of French Canadians from unjust domination by English Canadians; liberation of Quebec from the excessive invasion of provincial prerogatives by the central government.

The men who were elected on this platform were secretly longing, in spite of their electoral utterances, for a gradual evolution which would represent no radical break with the past. But the energies that were released in the wake of the Liberal victory of 1960 were to prove much more explosive and widespread than anybody had thought. The June 1960 election actually marked the crystallization of an intellectual and social revolution which had been in preparation long before the death of Duplessis.

In the labor movement, in coöperative associations, in university departments of social sciences, in the mass media, in the arts, even in many Church organizations, thousands of French Canadians had been studying the problems of French Canadian society ever since the end of the war. New scientific methods had supplanted the old patriotic and moralizing approach. Democracy

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instead of being a borrowed garment had become a living ideal. Dozens of intellectuals had begun to leak away from the Church; hundreds of others were now seriously questioning the role which the Church had traditionally played in the institutions of French Canada. In many circles there was also a strong revival of the old nationalist instinct which had seemed to be on the wane. All those who had been secretly hoping for a resurgence of liberty in Quebec suddenly found themselves supporting Mr. Lesage's team and pushing it simultaneously in all directions. Militant nationalists who had deplored the negative autonomist policies of Duplessis, labor leaders who had long complained about the former government's open sympathies for employers, intellectuals who were determined to "de-clericalize" Quebec's institutions, plain democrats who were merely longing for honesty and efficiency in government—all these found themselves on the side of the Liberals. And curiously enough, a people which had traditionally been—and still remained—conservative, showed an enthusiastic readiness to invest its hopes in a clearly liberal team.

On the whole, Mr. Lesage and his team have kept their promises. Hydroelectric companies were nationalized in 1963. Substantial concessions were obtained from the Federal Government in the fiscal field. Sweeping reforms were introduced in the educational system of the province. Hundreds of competent experts were given key positions in the civil service. Labor laws were redrafted in consultation with labor leaders. New forms of encouragement to the arts and other expressions of French culture were devised. The government became more directly involved than before in the economic development of the province. Quebec in the last five years could boast of an administration which was as good as that of any other province or state in North America. It has ceased to be a mediæval reserve of the Roman Catholic Church or a backward remnant of French culture on the North American continent. Under Mr. Lesage it has made a belated but brilliant entry into the modern world.

Of all the influences which have helped shape Quebec's course since 1960, the nationalist ferment has been one of the most decisive. Some people supported Mr. Lesage because they counted on him to modernize the administration; others joined him because they thought he would restore civil liberties and democracy in the province; still others gave him their votes because he had come out so clearly in favor of social justice; yet others supported

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him because he had promised to fulfill long-frustrated aspirations of French Canadians. On the whole, it seems that the most pervasive influence was the nationalist one.

French Canadians, like all other peoples, have always dreamed of a homogeneous political society. Ever since the British conquest of 1760 they have had to accommodate themselves to the will of the conqueror who was later to form a majority. Through successive constitutional developments they were able to preserve their language and traditions, but they have not been, since 1760, the complete masters of their own destiny. During the century which followed the defeat of 1760, they still formed the majority of the Canadian population, but they had to live under a political yoke which inevitably bent the use of power to the advantage of the conqueror. After 1867, the Constitution was made more democratic and flexible, but it contained many loopholes which, in later years, the English-speaking majority was to turn to its advantage. No French Canadians—except perhaps those who "collaborated" with English Canadians for their own personal profit—were ever completely satisfied with this ambiguous situation. The question of the status of the "French Canadian nation" in the Canadian political framework has always remained open for most French Canadian thinkers, historians, poets and political philosophers.

It was inevitable that the question should come to the fore with the advent of a dynamic government in Quebec. Consciously or not, the nationalist elements quickly tried to turn the Lesage administration into an instrument for the realization of their dreams. This was made easier by the fact that Mr. Lesage had exploited familiar nationalist themes in his electoral campaign. Within a few months everybody began to exalt the overruling responsibility of the State in fields which had hitherto been considered as sanctuaries of private enterprise. Scores of commentators, teachers and politicians began to describe the Quebec government as *the* national government of French Canadians. They would no longer speak of the province but of the state of Quebec and would thus pave the way for their ensuing claim that the state of Quebec is the national state of French Canadians.

Among Mr. Lesage's colleagues were a few men, particularly René Lévesque, who seemed disposed to go nearly as far as many separatists. He himself was carried away on a few occasions by rash sentences which were nothing but hard ultimatums to the rest of Canada. When action seemed to let up, bombs began to

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explode in federally owned armories, and the outside world suddenly learned that terrorist tactics had moved into Quebec. As for the rest of Canada, it belatedly began to wonder if Quebec would some day secede from the other provinces and form a nation of its own.

Mr. Lesage has recently appeared willing to turn his back upon his former ultranationalist supporters. He has claimed on many occasions that he is not himself a nationalist. But his position is not strong enough to enable him to dismiss a colleague like Mr. Lévesque, who continues to profess ardent nationalist convictions and has remained to this day a leading member of the cabinet. The presence of these two men in the same cabinet is symbolic of the classic dilemma of French Canada. The dilemma is not new. It has haunted the minds of French Canadian leaders ever since the conquest. But it has taken on new momentum.

II

While French Canadians have always been united in their will to survive, they have been divided as to the methods whereby their objective could be realized.

It has become commonplace to talk of Canadian Confederation in terms of a moral compact between two nations. According to this interpretation of the events of 1867, the two founding nations of Canada would then have reached an agreement whereby each would be given a fair chance to develop in a subtly conceived, federal régime. The reality seems to have been somewhat different. Let us forget about English Canadians. As for French Canadians, they were already sharply divided at the time of Confederation. Nearly half of the French-speaking parliamentarians of the time were opposed to the Confederation scheme on the grounds that it would be the graveyard of French Canada. Opposition in the press and among intellectuals was still more pronounced. It was a tiny majority of French leaders, not a unanimous body of opinion, which brought Quebec into the federal union of 1867.

Ever since that moment, the debate has remained alive. Two schools of thought have been contending against each other as regards the future of the French Canadian nation.

The first school could be called the "Canadian" school. According to this school, the decision to join Confederation was a wise one. All things considered, say the tenants of this point of

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view, French Canadians have certainly been treated unjustly by the English-speaking majority in many spheres, *e.g.* lack of school facilities in provinces other than Quebec, lack of respect for the French language in several services of the Federal Government, limited opportunities for personal advancement for French Canadians in English-dominated firms operating in the Province of Quebec, bullying tactics of the central government in the period which followed World War II, etc. But on the whole, Confederation has deprived French Canadians of none of their essential liberties and has brought them considerable blessings in many spheres. Spokesmen for this approach willingly concede that not everything is perfect in the Canadian set-up, that the government of Quebec must assume heavier responsibilities in view of its direct obligation to act as the leading promoter of French culture in the country, and that a total revision of the Canadian Constitution will soon be required. But all this they want to achieve not on the back of English Canada but through democratic consultations with their English-speaking counterpart. They are more concerned with the quality of political life as such than with fostering a particular culture by one single government. They sincerely believe that diversity of cultures, in spite of the difficulties that are caused in the day-to-day operations of government, is in itself a great positive challenge in that it offers a built-in guarantee against totalitarianism and narrow nationalism. Finally, they consider that Canada is an historic and geographical necessity and that nothing short of a complete amalgamation with the United States or the creation of another Cuba in North America could be a valuable substitute for the present political arrangement. This is the point of view of Premier Lesage and most of his colleagues in the Quebec government. It is upheld by most of the political leaders representing Quebec in the federal arena. It has also been endorsed by the most important leaders of the labor movement, the press and the large voluntary associations.

In order to make their case acceptable, the leaders of the "Canadian" school have set out in greater detail recently two fundamental conditions which they consider essential to the realization of a new Canada which would be seriously founded upon the principle of cultural dualism. One condition is the formal and practical acceptance of the absolute equality of the English and French cultures in Canada. The Federal Government and all its services must become thoroughly bi-cultural—not merely bilingual—in

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the near future. Equality of opportunity must become a living reality for French Canadians in the school systems of every province. On no score must the French-speaking citizens of Canada be considered or treated as inferior because of their language or culture. This objective seems fair enough, but in practice it would involve far-reaching changes in most departments of the Federal Government and in the educational policies of most provinces.

A second condition is the recognition of a "special status" for the Province of Quebec in the framework of Confederation. Canadian politics have been more or less paralyzed recently by the clash of centripetal and centrifugal forces. While English-speaking provinces were attracted by the need to establish "national" standards, identical from coast to coast, in the fields of education and social welfare, Quebec felt more strongly than ever before the need to assert and develop its own original way of life. The other provinces seemed willing to enlarge the sphere of action of the Federal Government; Quebec would rather strive to take away from Ottawa responsibilities which it felt its own government could discharge in a more appropriate manner. The conflict revolved for nearly 15 years around the crucial areas of education and social security, and corresponding powers of taxation. New "opting-out" devices, which would allow Quebec to withdraw from federally sponsored programs in these areas without suffering any financial disadvantage, will probably provide an acceptable solution.

But the conflict is far from eliminated; it is now moving to the equally crucial area of broader economic policies. The question of the future is which government is going to be primarily responsible for economic development and planning. Here, a strong case can be made for the central government. But the advocates of provincial autonomy rightly answer that no policy of cultural development is viable in the long run unless it is supported by corresponding policies in the economic field. French Canadians no longer accept the old dichotomy whereby they would enjoy cultural autonomy coupled with a tragically acephalous economic existence.

An example of this new attitude was provided by the recent controversy on the Canada Pension Plan. Ottawa had conceived a "national" program which would have set identical standards for the entire population. Quebec replied with a program of her own which was to be run by the Quebec government. The crux of the matter, of course, was that the Quebec government was determined to keep under its immediate control the tremendous invest-

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ing resources which will become available through the accumulation of savings resulting from the pension program. After tense negotiations which nearly brought Confederation to the brink of disruption, a satisfactory compromise was finally reached which gave satisfaction to both governments and to the other provinces as well. Quebec advocates of the "Canadian" point of view like to see in this recent arrangement an example of the new type of solution which can be brought to old and apparently insoluble problems.

The granting of a "special status" to Quebec would also involve a more active role for the provincial government of Quebec in fields such as immigration, broadcasting and foreign affairs. The Quebec government would like to be more directly involved in international activities connected with its own jurisdiction—in particular in technical assistance programs, in programs involving exchanges of experts and students, etc. It would wish eventually to have a more direct voice in the shaping of the programming policies of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (a federally owned and controlled body) or any state-sponsored broadcasting service operating in Quebec. It would also like to be associated more intimately in the shaping and implementation of immigration policies. These objectives are all related rather directly to the conviction—widespread in Quebec—that the Quebec government is, as Mr. Lesage likes to put it, the "political expression of French Canada" and should serve as the leading custodian and promoter of the French fact in North America.

But this "Canadian" point of view represents only one side of the French-Canadian quandary. In the very heart of every French-Canadian institution, one is bound to meet representatives of another equally articulate point of view which we shall identify as the "Quebec First" school.

If it were only a matter of listing specific French-Canadian grievances against English Canada, spokesmen for this approach would often appear to be in agreement with their "Canadian" counterpart. But the agreement is superficial and accidental. There are, in reality, radical differences of philosophy between the two groups.

We have seen that the "Canadian" school tends to interpret the balance sheet of the last century in rather positive terms. It holds that on the whole French Canadians have progressed rather than regressed since 1867. The "Quebec Firsters" rather suggest that

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Confederation was a political straitjacket for Quebec and that the history of the last hundred years has been marked by a series of dubious concessions on the altar of Canadian unity. They make a subtle distinction between the "Canadians" and the "Canadiens." They then observe that Canada has always been ruled, to all practical ends, by the "Canadians" and that the "Canadiens" were systematically kept in the position of junior partners. Minor concessions in the language field or secondary posts in the federal cabinet might be made to them from time to time, but there was no real desire on the part of the rest of Canada to help bring French Canadians out of their position of inferiority. One need only look, they contend, at the standard of living of the two central provinces of Canada to find out that Quebec is trailing Ontario by a margin of at least 20 percent in this respect. They never explain, though, why the Maritime Provinces, which are predominantly English but are situated east of Quebec, are even less developed than Quebec.

Where the first school scores injustice, the Quebec First school rather suggests that, in acting the way they do, English Canadians are only logical and realistic. It is no longer the lack of sympathy or the imperialist feelings of English Canadians that they denounce, but the very association which places all the political trumps in their hands. To count on an English majority to ensure the blossoming of French culture on this continent is, according to this point of view, pure folly. The only practical course for the French is to build for themselves a position of force in Quebec and from that position to negotiate freely with the rest of the world, including of course Quebec's immediate neighbors.

The Canadian experiment has rested on a delicate political machinery which first considered each Canadian as an individual citizen before the law, regardless of his language, race or creed. National rights of French Canadians have often proved difficult to harmonize with this basic premise. According to the Quebec First school, there would no longer be any fatal dilution of "national realities" in a vaguely polyethnic political structure. There would be two nations, each being sovereign: one, Quebec, would be French; the other would be English. The Quebec nation would have all the attributes of a sovereign state, save those which it might freely choose to share with its neighbor. The Canadian nation would no longer have to cope with "the French problem;" it could freely follow its destiny as an English-speaking nation. Each

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nation would of course be unilingual. The status of minorities in each of the two nations would be determined by treaty.

There are, of course, various shades of opinion and even deep divergencies among those who hold the Quebec First point of view. Some would achieve their goal gradually; others contend that gradualism in this respect is a smoke screen and that nothing short of a radical separation of Quebec from the rest of Canada will satisfy them. Some would maintain the existing economic structures and touch only the political apparatus. Some would incline toward a corporative pattern of society. Others would rather establish a frankly socialist republic in Quebec. But they are all agreed on one fundamental premise: the interests of Quebec must supersede all other considerations. Underlying this premise is a burning faith in the ability of French Canadians to accomplish for themselves what scores of other previously "occupied" nations have achieved in the last 20 years in Asia and Africa.

Not many advocates of this approach at present hold positions of key responsibility in the political and social life of Quebec. Neither Marcel Chaput nor Raymond Barbeau nor Pierre Bourgault, the three outstanding spokesmen of the separatist point of view, has ever accomplished anything significant in any of the numerous intermediary bodies which are so important in French-Canadian society. Neither the labor movement, nor the powerful *Caisses Populaires* movement, nor the Catholic Action organization was built by leaders like them. None of these organizations would entrust vital positions to such persons. But one must not be misled by this characteristic trait of a conservative society. The fact remains that the Quebec First view has made important inroads among artists, the mass media, educators, high and low-ranking civil servants, and scores of professionals, students, small businessmen and members of the lower clergy. A French Canadian professing that point of view would have been branded as a lunatic or a dreamer only ten years ago. He may now remain as a respected colleague on the staff of any college, newspaper or government department. He may even, as Mr. Lévesque's experience suggests, remain as a member of the provincial cabinet in spite of his leader's commitment to the "Canadian" point of view.

III

The paradox in the Quebec First approach is that it breeds upon a pessimistic interpretation of past history, while it owes its in-

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creased influence to the very progress which French Canadians have achieved in the last 25 years. Confederation, it is claimed, has been a frustrating experience for French Canadians, but in the next breath representatives of this point of view answer objections on the viability of separation by citing recent achievements which would provide an adequate institutional base for a radical political option.

This debate on past history is insoluble. The more one looks at history, the more one is inclined to interpret great historical trends in the light of one's own convictions. The more I reflect upon this question, the more I think it is a certain view of the future which is the key factor in shaping the fundamental options of a nation.

In all my discussions with representatives of the radical Quebec First point of view, we have been led to a far-reaching interrogation: "What is going to be the future of this piece of land called Quebec?" If we let the forces of history follow their course, my friends reason, the French fact is doomed. This pessimistic interpretation seems to find support in demography: if French Canadians still form a vast majority of the population of Quebec, they have none the less shown a very limited power of assimilation with respect to immigrants who settle in Quebec. A large majority of the latter opt for the English language because to them it is the quickest road to success in business. The English language remains in Quebec the leading medium of communication in business. The attachment of the French Canadians themselves to their language is very high indeed but not always matched by a corresponding determination to speak it perfectly or with pride.

The situation is so grave, the Quebec Firsters point out, that a state of emergency must be proclaimed and radical cultural policies must be enacted by the "national state" of French Canadians. Let us create the framework while there is still time, they secretly reason, and we will thus have a fairly good chance to mold the future history of Quebec along French lines. What these men want is the emergence of a brand-new type of man, "the Quebec man," a man who would be wholly committed to reincarnating French culture in North America and would cease to live the hermaphroditic existence which has been imposed upon the French Canadians since 1760.

One wonders at times if it is really the men and women living in Quebec which these people have espoused or a more or less abstract cultural ideal. The exponents of the "Canadian" point of

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view are more modest and perhaps more genuinely liberal. They instinctively feel that a new type of man will progressively emerge from the Canadian experiment. This new man will be shaped, they sense, as much by geography and economics as by the cultural blending that is inevitably taking place in a bi-cultural country. They know that the risks are considerable for French culture. But they have a boundless confidence in the fundamental resilience of the French Canadian species and they believe that, provided reasonable compromises are worked out with English-speaking Canadians, French life will continue to prosper.

The "Canadian" point of view would be supported by a large majority of the people of Quebec in any immediate confrontation. It is, after all, the modern expression of the line which French Canadians have traditionally followed for well over a century. It appears more realistic. It also takes into account the fact that about one out of five French Canadians lives outside the Province of Quebec. But the Quebec First point of view must not be dismissed too lightly. It rides upon the new wave of nationalism which has swept so many colonized people in recent years. It has the advantage of logic and clarity. It appeals to aspirations which have deep roots in the French Canadian soul. It also finds negative support in the numerous abuses which are still being heaped every day upon French Canadians by their old economic masters.

I would even suggest that in the long run, unless dynamic new arrangements are worked out between Quebec and the rest of Canada, the Quebec thesis might well prevail. This consideration brings us to a cardinal element which we have scarcely mentioned: the future of Quebec may largely depend upon the attitude which is adopted by English Canada in the next ten years.

French Canadians like to think of English Canada in terms of a monolith. This representation is no more true of English Canada than it is of French Canada. Many English Canadians have nourished—and still nourish—the same nationalist dreams about Canada as are evoked by some French Canadians. To them Canada has been and must remain a predominantly Anglo-Saxon country. They are willing to grant a few concessions to Quebec since it is impossible to wipe out "the French problem" in Canada. That is about as far as they are willing to go. I would not be surprised if they were still a majority among their own group. The only difference is that this ugly reality has been masked in the past by the fact that these people were in power and that, rather than pro-

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claim their convictions openly, they could discreetly translate them into action.

Encouraging signs of change have fortunately begun to appear on the English-Canadian scene in the last few years. Academics and students in practically all English-Canadian universities have organized countless seminars on the "new Quebec" and the demands of French Canada. The teaching of the French language is rapidly becoming a top priority in the curricula of public schools in most Canadian provinces. A growing number of English-Canadian political leaders are now able to express themselves in French. French lessons are being taken at an accelerated rate by hundreds of federal civil servants and by members of the largely English-speaking managerial class. Recent negotiations between the central government and the provinces have led to more satisfactory agreements than had been the case in the 15 years which followed the war. Quebec leaders have been in high demand as speakers in all parts of the country. A Royal Commission has been quietly exploring all aspects of bi-culturalism for over a year and a half and is expected to produce a final, far-reaching report early in 1967. The French Canadian "moderates" have finally found a corresponding group of "moderates" among English Canadians. A dialogue is now in progress in most influential circles of both Canadas. The dialogue has merely begun. It has yet to come to grips with specific difficult issues which still divide English and French Canadians. No new, tangible consensus is yet in sight. But the high caliber of many of the men who have chosen this course is in itself an encouraging omen for the future.

Most modern nations came into being as a result of violent upheavals which were largely determined by the rebellious instinct of repressed nature. Canada stands almost alone in this respect with her historic dependence on the law of reasonable compromise. The will to compromise was largely influenced in 1867 by a common fear of absorption into the American melting pot. Both founding peoples were too much attached to their European traditions to be seduced by the American cultural proposition. The fear of external danger is no longer sufficient in 1965 to warrant a continuation of a loose compromise which does not take into account the new aspirations of French Canadians. There must be a deeper understanding, a more radical mutual acceptance among the two founding peoples of Canada. Otherwise the blind forces of national pride will be let loose for good.

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HEALTH AND POPULATION

By Carl E. Taylor

"YOU health experts are just too efficient; you create more problems than you solve." It is time to challenge statements such as this which result from tacit acceptance of the syllogism that since population growth tends to neutralize other development efforts, and since health programs contribute to population growth, reduction of the health component of international aid is therefore a logical step in promoting economic development.

Health programs, which once represented a major effort in American technical assistance, are now being quietly downgraded or phased out in most countries, except those that are obviously underpopulated, such as Ethiopia. Instead of challenging such decisions, most international health workers react with a puzzled sense of embarrassment. Why should they be apologetic for doing a good job? The humanitarian urge to improve the health of the world's needy people is so much a part of our total value system that it is disillusioning to find that good results have boomeranged.

It is demographic nonsense to think that the population problem can be postponed by maintaining high death rates. In underdeveloped countries, if high birth rates had not been biologically adjusted to the high death rates, the population would have faced extinction. As part of the development process the death rate is bound to fall and recent studies of demographic trends in Western countries show convincingly that health and medical services can claim regrettably little credit for this improvement. In eighteenth-century England mortality rates began to fall long before sanitation improved; the sanitary revolution occurred only after the cholera epidemics of the mid-nineteenth century. The mortality decline was probably due to better economic conditions permitting better nutrition and generally better living conditions. The birth rate also fell spontaneously but only after a lag period of one or more centuries during which the population soared.

The first reason, then, for doing something about the death rate is that with modernization it will come down anyway and equivalent population growth will occur. A characteristic of the development process is that birth rates eventually but somewhat

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erratically follow the decline of death rates. We have learned a great deal about lowering mortality. We are now beginning to learn what is involved in decreasing natality. As understanding of family planning improves, birth rates should become responsive to social and economic forces. The time lag between falling death rates and falling birth rates, which used to extend over several generations, should now be reduced to one to two generations and the total population growth should be less.

Put in terms of the average village family, the population problem is due to the fact that families previously had to have six or eight children in order to raise three or four. With readily available health improvements, only an occasional child need now be lost. It takes about a generation for parents to feel secure in the conviction that their children will survive and for them to be willing seriously and consistently to practice family limitation. It should be recognized also that even if effective family planning were to be promptly introduced into newly developing countries a high rate of population increase would continue for at least one generation. So many young mothers will be entering the childbearing age that the number of children they produce will remain high until the population has aged.

Humanitarian and logical considerations justifying a positive health program are strongly supported by political realities. The purpose of economic development is not merely to raise per capita income but more importantly to raise standards of living. Better health is an important part of better living. Though we are primarily concerned here with people as producers, it must not be forgotten that they are also consumers of health services. The people of developing countries are demanding health as a basic right. Even the humblest villagers have learned that it is not necessary for them to continue to carry the present burden of disease. The demand for better health can usually be satisfied with a relatively elementary type of medical care. This is what village people know most about, and immediate relief from physical suffering means more to them than the less tangible benefits of preventive services.

Effectively organized preventive services provide long-range investments in a better way of life even though they do have an immediate collateral effect on population growth. This relationship is most evident with maternal and child-health services and mass programs for controlling communicable diseases such as

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malaria and smallpox. In many areas half of all children have been lost, while the remainder established immunity to the range of pathogenic organisms in their particular environment and became accustomed to the adult diet of their social group. In much of the world a major restraint on population growth continues to be "weanling diarrhea," a combination of infectious diarrhea and nutritional deficiency which makes the second year of life almost as dangerous as the first. Endemic malaria, typhoid and other infections take a great toll among children who prove unable to develop resistance. Simple and practical training of village midwives prevents most maternal deaths and the women thus saved will continue to have babies.

It is probably the dramatic quality and relative newness of modern health improvements which have led some development economists to conclude that public health programs should be delayed until economic development can accommodate the population growth they bring. They feel that the medical demand of developing countries can, in the meantime, be satisfied with simple therapeutic services. Not only is such an attitude impossible to justify morally, but it is also poor development planning because better health itself contributes to economic development.

II

How can health programs promote economic development? First, better health is an investment in the human resources required for economic development. We have been too much concerned with the quantitative effects of reducing mortality and the frightening population growth which results. The qualitative benefits of increased labor productivity which result from reductions in morbidity are even more important than the effects on mortality. Many dramatic case histories can be cited of the effects of removing long-standing obstacles to development programs through improved health. One instance I observed personally is the opening up of the Rapti Valley in Nepal by a malaria-control program. In 1949 I conducted the first general health survey of Nepal. At that time, the malaria barrier along the southern border strongly reinforced the country's political isolation. For centuries the severe hyperendemic malaria of the Terai forests below the Himalayan foothills had made this area uninhabitable for any except local jungle tribes who had developed a high degree of resistance. A mass mosquito-control pro-

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gram with insecticide spraying has now opened up this fertile area for settlers from the grossly overpopulated hillsides of Nepal. Within five years local immigration produced a tenfold increase in population with dramatic and spreading economic development.

In the case of Ceylon, whose rapid population growth is frequently cited, it is usually overlooked that malaria control has had a net economic benefit. Reduction in morbidity more than offset the effect on mortality. Especially important was the fact that the two-thirds of the island which was malarious and thinly populated became attractive for more intensive settlement. As a result, mass migration from the crowded third of the island occurred with general economic benefit. Similar examples can be cited following the control of other mass diseases such as hookworm, schistosomiasis, yaws, sleeping sickness and mass malnutrition. Opening up new areas to agricultural development provides new opportunities for employment as well as the manpower to fill the new jobs.

In already crowded areas the economic impact of health programs is harder to demonstrate, because chronic local underemployment makes additions to the labor force a less obvious contribution. In such situations benefits are evidenced mostly by increased efficiency and productivity of labor and changing attitudes to work. One factor that is often ignored in general statistical analyses is the selectivity of diseases. Often malaria epidemics hit during harvest or planting seasons and produce a severe labor shortage at a critical time, even when there is a high annual level of underemployment. Or tuberculosis often selectively attacks special groups of young adults such as college and graduate-school students. As a result of health programs, therefore, the size of the effective or most needed labor force is increased by an even larger factor than the population as a whole. Also important is the fact that a further brake on the net rate of economic growth in developing areas is provided by the large proportion of dependent children. As a new demographic balance is achieved, with lowered birth rates following lowered death rates, the proportion of children will be reduced from about one-half to less than one-third. This means that the proportion of producers to consumers will be improved.

A second contribution of health to economic development is that a dramatic demonstration of improved health in a tradi-

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tional society can spark more widespread acceptance of other innovations. Modern medical care in an area of great need provides a clear demonstration that the past does not have to determine the future. Better health changes motivation. Improved human welfare becomes a reasonable goal. Increased life expectancy in itself changes the human time scale and makes effort and planning for the future worthwhile.

The third and most important way in which health programs contribute to economic development is by providing the best prospects of solving the population problem. In order to get acceptance of family planning, it is essential that parents have some assurance that children already born will have a reasonable chance of surviving to adulthood. The crucial decision to practice family planning on a continuing basis is made by parents in the privacy of the home on the basis of family needs and aspirations. Parents are willing to listen to advice on family planning from the health personnel whose work makes survival of their children possible. It would be difficult for any other agency or service organization to establish equivalent rapport. Advice on child-spacing can be provided as a normal part of post-partum care of mothers, whether by private practitioners or public clinics. Also, the new contraceptive devices tend to require continuing utilization of health services.

A preliminary generalization based on some of the more successful field trials in developing countries is that family planning is accepted most readily where health and medical services have been established longest. Examples of such partial successes are the rural projects in Japan, a study at Singur Health Center outside of Calcutta, and in certain rural health centers outside of Colombo, Ceylon. These family-planning projects were superimposed on local health services which had been running more or less successfully for at least 20 years. The progressive development of prolonged contact between village people and health personnel builds confidence and a willingness to contemplate change. The acceptance of innovation is cumulative. Use of contraceptives is encouraged by past demonstrations of the effectiveness of scientific medicine. Almost all of the experimental family-planning programs which have been started outside such a framework of steadily developing health activities have been notably unsuccessful in winning sufficient general acceptance to alter birth rates. We learned this lesson the hard way in the Pun-

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jab where a large staff concentrated on a small population for five years; there was much verbal acceptance but little decrease in the birth rate.

III

A consequence of the logical relationship between health programs and population control is the increasing tendency to assign national family-planning programs to health services. It has been only 15 years since Japan and India pioneered the development of national family-planning programs. Other countries which have joined this growing international movement include Korea, Taiwan, Pakistan, Egypt, Turkey, Tunisia, Czechoslovakia and Poland. To improve understanding of how such national family-planning programs should be organized, a number of intensive local field studies have been conducted.

These field studies have begun to clarify the basic relationship in population dynamics which is the uneasy equilibrium between the technical difficulties of using specific family-planning methods and the motivational level of potential users. Technical considerations influencing the use of a particular method include such practical issues as availability, cost, esthetics, safety, religious beliefs, need for repeatedly remembering, and actual effectiveness in use. To achieve regular use of a method, motivation has to be high enough to rise above what may be seen as a threshold formed by the technical limitations and liabilities of that method. If there is insufficient use to provide balanced population growth, then the national family-planning program must work toward either increasing motivation or lowering the technical threshold.

When conditions get bad enough, people will control population growth by methods that would normally be considered immoral or otherwise objectionable. This is why mathematical predictions of the obviously ridiculous consequences of uncontrolled population increase, leading to "standing room only," have little chance of becoming reality. In Ireland, the population crisis culminating in the potato famines of 100 years ago was solved not only by mass emigration but also by changing inheritance legislation to favor elder sons. As a result, nearly a third of Irish colleens remain spinsters and those who marry have to wait until they are almost 30 years old. In Japan, abortion has been the principal method of population control, with more abortions than live births in an average year. Surveys of urban popula-

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tions in many parts of the world, and especially Central Europe and South America, also indicate that abortions are numerous and sometimes exceed the number of live births. In Mainland China today demographic analyses suggest that in rural areas there may have been a return to the old custom of female infanticide.

Particular attention is now being given to the problem of motivation in obtaining widespread acceptance and use of contraceptives in family-planning programs. In each social group the complex framework of tradition, religious beliefs and intra-family relationships creates cultural inertia to change. Specific effort is needed to identify the spontaneous social forces which lead to acceptance of innovation. Among the many factors which are being studied, three approaches seem particularly important in planning the course of national programs.

A primary need in program development is to start with families already motivated rather than trying to include everyone at once. An obvious and direct relationship is that motivation increases proportionately with the number of living children. In at least 20 different studies in different parts of India, parents uniformly reported that they wanted only three children. The average couple is, however, unwilling to do anything about this somewhat vague wish until there are six or more living children; they especially need at least two sons to be sure that one will survive to carry out family responsibilities and funeral rites for the father. By that time, of course, the family has more than contributed its share to doubling the population in that generation. Even this level of six to seven children is below the biological norm of ten to twelve for fertile women, so that considerable fertility control is already going on. The methods used, however, are usually social restraints such as taboos on intercourse during lactation. With modernization such restraints tend to break down; this, along with improved health and nutrition, explains the actual rise in birth rate which often occurs as economic development starts. The phenomenon negates the hope of those who claim that lowered fertility will follow economic development as readily and spontaneously as the lamb followed Mary.

Several studies have shown that these parents with large families compose most of the 10 to 20 percent of village couples who welcome a new family-planning program with an enthusiasm that is somewhat misleading because community birth rates do not fall as expected. The reason is that these cou-

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ples would have used some method anyhow. An example of such apparent success is provided by the numerous sterilization camps that have been promoted with much publicity by certain states in India. Teams of surgeons go for a few days to a rural school or other public buildings where large numbers of village men are lined up to have the relatively simple operation of vasectomy performed under local anesthesia. The government pays them 15 to 25 rupees compensation for the loss of a day's wages. Even though the first candidates for sterilization tend to be those who have already contributed substantially to population increase, it is hoped that from satisfied patients the notion will progressively filter through their social groups that the procedure is desirable and effective. As the motivational level rises throughout the community, couples with fewer children will also begin to limit family size.

Another factor influencing motivation is the family's view of its own socio-economic condition. When parents realize that they are living below subsistence levels so that family members are obviously suffering, they resort to extreme methods such as abortion. More commonly, a natural optimism leads people to think they are just maintaining a subsistence level, or that things will soon improve. In a traditional agrarian economy, children are considered a sound financial investment. Where old age security depends on the family rather than society, large families provide not only more labor for the farm now, but also a larger credit account for the future. When economic conditions start to improve, these values begin to change as family expectations increase. Motivation for family planning should develop with recognition of the greater good of providing the best possible care and education for a few children rather than struggling with bare subsistence support for many. Somewhat more selfish but useful influences also appear when parents balance the choice of another baby against a team of bullocks, a bicycle or even a tractor.

On the other hand, social and economic development can influence family planning adversely as shown by research conducted in Ludhiana District in the Punjab. When the studies began in the early 1950s, conditions were distinctly unfavorable. The large influx of refugees from Pakistan was accompanied by severe disruption of economic and social stability. We were repeatedly told by village leaders on the *panchayat,* or elected village council, that important as all of their other problems were,

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"the biggest problem is that there are just too many of us." By the end of the study period in 1960, a remarkable change had occurred. With the introduction of more irrigation canals and with rural electrification from the Bhakra-Nangal Dam, and with better roads to transport produce to markets, improved seed and other benefits of community development, and especially because there were increasing employment opportunities for Punjabi boys in the cities, a general feeling of optimism had developed. A common response of the same village leaders now was, "Why should we limit our families? India needs all the Punjabis she can get." During this transitional period an important reason for the failure of education in family planning was the favorable pace of economic development. Children were no longer a handicap. Rather than blaming health for the population problem, general development must accept part of the responsibility.

The reasons for the decline in birth rates which spontaneously occurs with education, urbanization and industrialization are not particularly mysterious. Information about family planning spreads more rapidly as people get together more, talk more, read more and have more diverse wants and the ability to satisfy them. The rational approach, then, is to bring this subterranean spread of information out into the open and channel it in appropriate ways. We should not rely only on subtle and uncontrolled social dispersion of knowledge about contraceptive methods, but make it part of health education. Society went through a similar process in bringing the problems of venereal disease, alcoholism and drug addiction out into the open in order to make a rational approach possible.

Population growth is not uniformly bad. Moderate population growth can be an important incentive to economic development. Europe's spontaneous balancing of the demographic gap took one to two centuries, and provided the manpower for the industrial revolution. An optimum rate of increase stimulates hard work, especially where conditions are such that parents have the financial flexibility to think beyond the basic subsistence needs of their families. Population growth interferes with economic development when parents are not able to adjust the number of their children to the supporting resources. In biological terms, a parallel can be drawn with the role of stress on the physical condition of the body. A certain amount of stress is good in that physiological and psychological challenges promote optimum develop-

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ment and function. Too much stress, on the other hand, can overwhelm resistance and produce disease.

The third major consideration which can influence motivation for family planning is the effect of multiple and rapid childbearing on the health of mothers and children. This relationship has received surprisingly little study and data are still incomplete. For mothers, a sequence of health hazards results from having too many babies too fast, in the absence of prenatal and postnatal care, with inadequate nutrition, and with deliveries conducted by untutored midwives whose ignorance leads to damaging intervention. These dangers are often cumulative. Second, third and additional pregnancies lead to progressive conditions such as osteomalacia—a calcium deficiency which causes gross caricaturing of the skeletal structure, the shadowy pallor and weakness of anemia, the still somewhat mysterious explosion of blood pressure and metabolites known as eclampsia or toxemia, and the sharp increase of almost all complications of the delivery process itself. Contrary to the usual pattern in Western countries where women outnumber and live longer than men, the vital statistics of many developing countries show 20 percent fewer women than men during the childbearing period. Almost as serious are the effects on children of having to compete for limited nutrition and care. In much of Africa a major cause of death is Kwashiorkor, a symptom complex due to protein deficiency that follows weaning; its tribal names carry the connotation that it is a disease of third children or of twins among whom sibling competition for food determines survival. The women of Asia, Africa and Latin America are intuitively aware of these hazards. Appropriate health education couched in terms that they can understand should significantly raise their motivation. On the other hand, a purely maternal and child-health approach will probably not be enough because of the dominant role of the male, especially in developing countries. Husbands have to be educated, too.

National family-planning programs have been concentrating on trying to increase motivation. Although this is important, there is a more immediate and practical need for health education, especially in the countries with the biggest population problems. The first need is to give simple and direct information about family-planning methods and where contraceptive devices can be obtained.

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IV

What are the possibilities of improving family planning methods? As we have noted above, if methods become simpler, cheaper, safer, more effective and more esthetic, a lower level of motivation will be sufficient to provide more widespread use.

Any method requiring repetitive use will be troublesome. If preventive measures must be taken at the time of intercourse, the procedure tends to be inconvenient for a variety of reasons inherent in the simple living conditions of poor people. If women have to remember to take a pill every day for a portion of a month, they need relatively high motivation and an ability to calculate. Such methods compete with Ayurvedic and other indigenous practitioners who promise that their pills will suppress fertility for at least a year and who continue to do a great business in spite of obvious failures. Complicated directions lead to situations such as that of the village woman we encountered in a region where polyandry is practiced. Because she was told to use foam tablets before intercourse with her husband, she carefully refrained from using them when having intercourse with the younger brothers.

It seems probable that the best solution for village people will be the temporary infertility which is obtained with the increasingly popular intrauterine devices. Intrauterine contraceptive devices first were used widely in Europe some 50 years ago when metal Gräfenberg rings were found to be effective. However, the fact that complications frequently resulted caused them to fall into professional disrepute. Within the last ten years modern plastic devices have been developed which largely eliminate previous hazards. In spite of continuing alarmist predictions, there is rapidly accumulating evidence that major dangers, such as the possibility of precipitating cancer, are essentially nonexistent. Furthermore, the minor hazards such as slight bleeding and cramping or unnoticed expulsion are being rapidly reduced by improvements in the design of the devices. Their effectiveness is only slightly below the 100 percent effectiveness of oral contraceptives. They are cheap and need be applied only once. Some public health experts are beginning to feel that these devices may provide the sort of technical breakthrough which came with the discovery of D.D.T. in malaria control.

The first indications of dramatic success are beginning to come from mass programs in Taiwan and Korea. The high rate of

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acceptance there, largely through spontaneous spread of information from woman to woman, is already leading to sharp differences in birth rates as between areas where the method is available and where it is not. Wide and rapidly increasing acceptance of the method is also occurring in the slums of Santiago, Chile, and in rural Pakistan. The present feeling of optimism is based on the conviction that if couples can go through a relatively simple procedure and then forget about the need for contraceptives until they are ready to have a child, and if they can then have fertility reëstablished with another simple procedure, we will be approaching the ideal family-planning method.

There is now an encouraging tendency for international agencies to respond to requests from developing countries for help in finding ways of meeting their population problems. This will lead to continuing need for more careful analysis of the relationships between population growth and health, and the ways in which this interaction influences economic development.

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WHICH WAY EUROPE?

By J. H. Huizinga

WHAT is the destiny of the Europe of the Six? What should be its aim? Should it be content with economic integration and remain what the Gaullists contemptuously call a mere *Europe des Marchands,* sheltered under the American umbrella? Or should it aspire to become a power in its own right, a self-reliant Europe enjoying the status of "equal partner" with the United States, as the late President Kennedy, with unprecedented generosity, exhorted it to do? The debate on these questions now in progress throughout the Europe of the Six has been forced on its members by the American invitation to switch over to a somewhat doubtful form of Atlantic integration —the Multilateral Nuclear Force.

Even devoted Europeans saw some merit in the project because originally it could be viewed as providing a long but safe detour to the goal of a self-reliant Europe. Not only had President Kennedy often expressed his wish for such a Europe, but also the road toward this ultimate destination had been left open by the American designers of the M.L.F.; once Europe had achieved sufficient unity, they agreed, a European nuclear power might be allowed to emerge. Thus the M.L.F. could be seen as a school for nuclear self-government. When and if the European trainee inspired his American tutor with enough confidence in his loyalty to the alliance, as well as in his ability to handle a deterrent of his own, he could expect emancipation from American tutelage.

With Mr. Harold Wilson's entry upon the scene, however, things have changed. His Atlantic Nuclear Force (A.N.F.) is not a detour to the goal of European integration but a dead end. For Mr. Wilson has emphasized with the utmost vigor that he will not allow the emergence of a European deterrent which—with a blithe disregard for elementary arithmetic—he qualifies as "nuclear proliferation." Hence his demand for a veto on any future reconstruction of the A.N.F.'s constitution. The reason is no doubt partly that he cannot afford to ignore—and may even share—the lingering obsessions of many of his followers with the "German danger." But at least as likely an explanation is that he cannot conceive of Britain entering a tightly federated Europe such as a European deterrent presupposes and is therefore compelled, in

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Britain's interest, to discourage its evolution just as his predecessors (until Macmillan) were obliged to try to prevent the emergence of *l'Europe des Marchands*. Mr. Wilson's only innovation is to invoke a new and very respectable-sounding excuse for opposing European unification: "non-dissemination."

It still remains to be seen whether the Americans will really play along with him, for it would mean abandoning Mr. Kennedy's rousing vision of an Atlantic "Partnership of Equals." But if they do, they will only follow in the footsteps of Britain, which lost much of its original enthusiasm for Mr. Churchill's three-pillar structure—Europe, the Commonwealth and America—as soon as the first of these pillars showed signs of becoming a reality. Since then, the Europe of the Six, going from strength to strength, has given its uniquely helpful American uncle ample enough reason to wonder whether he has not been a bit too generous for his own good; especially now that the Six show signs of becoming ambitious as well as prosperous.

This latest development is at least partly due to the man who might well go down in history as the *Fédérateur malgré lui,* Charles de Gaulle. He takes his place among the Founding Fathers of a United Europe as the first to appeal to Europe's heart. Schuman appealed to the reason and good will of a disillusioned, hate-torn Europe; Spaak, architect of *l'Europe des Marchands,* appealed to the stomach and the pocket of a reviving and reconciled Europe. De Gaulle, the only prophet since Churchill with a charismatic personality, tries to mobilize the ambition and the pride of a reinvigorated, self-confident Europe. Nor is that all: he appeals also to the no less powerful emotion of fear felt by a Europe that is bound to ask itself whether it can still wholly rely on its American protector.

Europe's latest and most inspiring prophet appeared on the scene just when a spellbinder of his quality was most needed. Once the Treaty of Rome was signed, the blissful dawn of the European Revolution was over. "Making Europe" became the esoteric profession of a small band of technocrats. And precisely because the nations of Europe had become reconciled, their revolutionary urge slackened. It had derived most of its impetus from the post-war disenchantment with national sovereignty and its concomitant, the intra-European anarchy that had caused its internecine wars. But by 1957 the European jungle of 1939 had been changed into a garden city whose still largely sovereign inhabitants—

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rendered powerless to indulge in their antiquated heroics—had learned to live together as peacefully and decently as the Scandinavians had done for decades past. Why then impose further supranational disciplines? Why not rest content with *l'Europe des Marchands?* Economic integration demonstrably served the interests of each member state. It paid. But what had they to gain, individually, by political union—a Europe with its own foreign policy and its own defense? Only one thing: power—greater collective influence in the alliance dominated by the American protector. And would not that entail the risk of incurring his displeasure?

Thus, right from the moment de Gaulle began to call upon the *Europe des Marchands* to show the courage of its European convictions and transform itself into a *Europe des Hommes* with its own voice (his) and its own big stick (his), the Six were faced with the great question which they can now no longer evade. Does their Europe really want to become a power in its own right? Does it still agree with Spaak that "il faut vouloir les conséquences de ce que l'on veut"? Does it want to hold on to the bold aims proclaimed by the first of its founding fathers?

Even without de Gaulle these questions would have presented themselves sooner or later. The crisis in which the Europe of the Six finds itself at present is partly that which nature inflicts on every adolescent. It is nearing the age of discretion when one must choose a career, set one's sights, determine what place one intends to carve out for oneself. But it is de Gaulle—assisted only by a small élite of European militants—who has forced the adolescent at a painfully tender age to begin to think about his future. It is he who has been pressing for "political union" ever since he was compelled to realize that he was not going to achieve his unchanging aim of the power and glory of France by way of the three-power world-directorate he asked for in 1958.

It was, of course, perfectly clear from the beginning what he was really about when he started his career as the passionate prophet of a self-reliant Europe. The modern European clothes he then put on are so much too small for a man of his obsession with national grandeur that his French elbows show most embarrassingly through his sleeves. His almost psychopathic aversion to any form of real union leads him into semantic absurdities one would have thought impossible for a *soi-disant Cartesien.* "An integrated Europe," he has said, "would be a Europe without a

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backbone." He wants the sort of Europe Napoleon wanted, with this difference: that he seems to think he can impose unity by the force of his personality instead of by the force of arms. Just so did he once think he could induce the Algerian nationalists to cease their rebellion simply because he had come on the scene and asked them to trust him. He appears to see himself as the incarnation not only of French but of European "legitimacy." Yet he has nothing to offer the Europe he asks to unite under his leadership. Rejecting organic unity, he refuses to offer de jure participation in the handling of the instrument of power he is forging with his *force de frappe*. And living in nuclear times, he cannot offer the objects of his courtship the de facto influence which junior allies used to derive from their geographic and military contribution to the joint power of the alliance. For in an alliance whose *ultima ratio* are nuclear missiles, these contributions have lost nearly all their value. It is clear, therefore, what he asks of the Five: acceptance, not of *l'Europe des Etats* but of *l'Europe de l'état c'est moi*. And to this end he appeals to those feelings of supranational solidarity, European pride, European will to power, European patriotism whose very existence and, indeed, possibility he, the apostle of national patriotism, contemptuously denies. Poor, dizzy Descartes, one dreads to think of him spinning in his grave!

Yet such is the magic of the fabulous general that his attempts to rouse a European will to power have been far from unsuccessful. Its intensity varies from country to country. It is weakest in Holland, congenitally averse to that sinful thing—power and the responsibility it entails. It is strongest in Germany and France where the anti-Gaullists are no less insistent in their demands for a self-reliant Europe than their political opponents. But there is hardly a leading statesman anywhere in the Europe of the Six who does not feel compelled at any rate to pay lip service to the ideal of a Europe that can stand on its own feet as an "equal partner" of the United States. It is an ideal that can, of course, only be realized if Europe finds the way to organic union, federation. Thus by encouraging its ambitions the *Fédérateur malgré lui* has fanned a spirit, which can achieve satisfaction only through the creation of what he ceaselessly reviles as "ce monstre, ce robot, cette Europe sans âme, sans vertèbre, sans racines."

The prisoner of pre-nuclear thinking or, at any rate, pre-nuclear feeling that seems to get the better of his thinking, he has landed

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himself in what *Le Monde* calls a policy of "appalling, insoluble self-contradiction." Wedded to the strategy of maximum deterrence, instantaneous use of the nuclear button at the first sign of aggression, he yet justifies the withdrawal of most of his forces from the NATO Command with the argument that Frenchmen can fight well only if they know they are fighting for France. As if under his strategy there would be any "fighting"! Aiming at a Europe sufficiently strong to play the part of an "equal partner" of America within the alliance, he has adopted a style of *fortiter in modo, impossibiliter in re,* which renders the achievement of this legitimate aim out of the question on both counts. On the one hand, his provocative diplomacy has cost him the indispensable confidence even of such a uniquely generous and long-suffering protector as America has shown itself to be these many years past, while at the same time it has frightened off the European bride he woos with offers of nuclear protection of derisory value. On the other hand he has emptied the visions of power and glory he holds out to her by his refusal of a marriage contract allowing her a voice in the handling of this power.

II

Thus all those who fear the emergence of a self-reliant Europe have reason to be grateful as well as hateful to de Gaulle. As long as he is around, the two conditions for its achievement—continued American coöperation and intra-European integration—are not likely to be fulfilled. But meanwhile he is, unwittingly, preparing the ground for a new advance toward his opponents' goal. For in his role as the first rabble-rouser the Six have ever had —though a very stylish one—he has done a good deal to stimulate the will to self-assertion. He more than anyone else has given voice to a new self-confidence born of impressive achievement. With Germany having worked its way back to the status of the strongest industrial and—in classical terms—military power on the Continent, with Italy having performed an economic miracle of its own by reducing its unemployment to one-quarter of what it used to be, with France at the top of its form both economically and politically, with the Six as a whole having accumulated nearly as much gold in the kitty as America, and with economic integration succeeding beyond all expectations, this new Europe has every reason to begin to feel uppity. Nor should one forget that it has been encouraged to do so by two other charismatic

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personalities besides de Gaulle: Sir Winston Churchill, who first inspired it to show "the spasm of resolve" he asked for: and the late President Kennedy who, surely unique in history, exhorted it to constitute itself an "equal partner" of his country when it was already beginning to show ample signs of becoming a formidable rival.

It is one thing, however, to assert one's claim to the status of an equal partner and quite another to pay its price. Not a few of the European leaders who so glibly demand "absolute equality" with the United States take refuge in woolly talk about "interdependence" and "integrated deterrents" when asked whether they want to see Europe become a nuclear power in its own right, with all the risks and the awesome responsibilities this entails. Yet, by and large, the idea of a Europe that can stand on its own nuclear feet, if only on one, is accepted as the ultimate aim. In France de Gaulle's opponents, men like Defferre or Maurice Faure, show themselves almost without exception as convinced of the necessity and, indeed, the inevitableness of a European deterrent as they are opposed to his purely national *force de frappe.* In Germany they enjoy the outright support of the so-called German Gaullists as well as the qualified approval of at least some members of the ruling party who insist, as they do in Italy, that the road should be left open for the emergence of a nuclear Europe. In Belgium a man like Spaak recognizes that, whatever smaller powers like the Belgians or the Dutch may feel, nations that have only recently lost their great-power status can hardly be expected permanently to resign themselves to remaining American protectorates. And in Paris, Jean Monnet's Committee of Action for the United States of Europe, speaking for influential leaders from all over the Continent, is on record as favoring "a European-controlled contribution to the nuclear resources of the West."

With two important differences, the case for a European deterrent is argued on much the same grounds as that which one can make out for de Gaulle's *force de frappe,* or, for that matter, its sister under the skin, the British deterrent. The first difference is that Europe, pooling its resources, might in time be able to achieve the "second-strike capacity" which alone could make it truly an equal and as such independent of the American protector. The second is that the creation of a European deterrent would be the most constructive as well as the most realistic ap-

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proach to the problem of preventing proliferation, the ideal solution of which—emancipation from nuclear tutelage through Atlantic federation—is obviously beyond man's present reach. By federating in order to become master of its own destinies again, Europe would show the world how the destructive power of thermonuclear fusion can be turned to the constructive purpose of political fusion. It would be an object lesson of the price to be paid in our day for what most men hold dearest—which is not so much power as the self-respect that goes with the responsibility it entails.

It is true, of course, that few in the Europe of the Six have any illusions as to the willingness of their peoples to shoulder the economic burdens required for the acquisition of a "second-strike capacity." They readily admit that a Europe with its own nuclear big stick would still remain dependent on its American protector. For if it were ever to make threatening gestures without his backing, the stick could only too easily be struck from its hands with one mighty preventive blow. But in their view that is not to say it would be worse than useless. Their argument here rejoins the more sophisticated defense of national deterrents. This is not that Europe and America have conflicting interests requiring different strategies of deterrence. At first sight this justification of an autonomous European deterrent seems plausible enough. For it is indeed arguable that the American strategy of "flexible response," which aims at limiting damage if deterrence should fail, would have the practical effect of limiting the damage not *in* but *to* Europe. Hence the European preference for the old strategy of maximum deterrence—near-automatic, massive retaliation involving a nuclear duel between the two giants over the head of Europe as soon as deterrence is seen to fail. But altogether apart from the doubtful validity of the assumption that in such a duel the Russian missiles targeted on Europe would remain on their launching pads, this argument for an autonomous European deterrent falls down on the score that it presupposes a "second-strike capacity." For only in that case could a European strategy of deterrence, *ex hypothesi* disapproved of by America, achieve credibility.

The more sophisticated argument for a European deterrent is twofold. On the one hand, the possession of nuclear weapons undeniably creates what Coral Bell has called in "The Debatable Alliance" an "aura of power" out of all proportion to their mili-

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tary or diplomatic efficacy; however lacking in megatons or credibility the present Chinese bomb may be, it has certainly made China's neighbors apprehensive. On the other hand, a nuclear power is bound to carry more weight, not only in the world at large but even in the counsels of the alliance to which it belongs, than a non-nuclear power. For just as the Russians cannot be wholly certain that the Americans bluff when they swear to commit suicide for Berlin, so the American leader of the Atlantic Alliance cannot be wholly certain that his nuclear allies are bluffing when they threaten to go it alone if he does not pay due regard to their interests. That is to say, among allies even the power to threaten suicide is a real power, to say nothing of the more credible threat of contracting out if the leader should show himself too aggressive rather than too feeble for his ally's taste. If the latter is sensible, he will of course never utter such threats explicitly; unlike de Gaulle, he will be careful not to put too great a strain on his relationship with his indispensable protector. The senior partner's knowledge that the junior partner is *capable* of fulfilling his threats, if driven to despair, is sufficient to alter the balance of power within the alliance somewhat to the advantage of the lesser partner.

Or did Suez show this theory to be untenable?

In that case the advocates of a European deterrent come back with another argument. It is that you have proved nothing when you have proved that there is no rational case for it. Even if it were true that the margin of independence derived from the possession of contemporary armament is wholly illusory, it would still meet an elementary need. Men do not live by cold truth alone. They demand something more: the ability to *feel,* however unreasonably, that they are not just disenfranchized citizens of Pentagonia, even though that might be a much cheaper and safer way of life; their birthright, never questioned in pre-nuclear times, to a sense of responsibility for their own fate; in short, their self-respect and what they call their honor. Now that these powerful sentiments can no longer find satisfaction in national self-defense, the modern means of which have become too costly, they are bound to set up an ever growing pressure for "self-defense" in a wider framework which, pending a federal Atlantis, can only be a nuclear Europe. Nor need it be detrimental to the cohesion of the alliance on which ultimate safety depends. For as the so-called German Gaullist, Baron zu Guttenberg, has written in his

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interesting "Wenn der Westen Will": "Helpless allies are more vulnerable to the enemy's threats or temptations to hedge their bets than self-reliant allies. . . . A hegemonial structure is more likely to lead to suspicion and recrimination than an alliance of more or less equal partners." That is also the view of some American writers like Herman Kahn or Kissinger; the latter has said that "the unity of the Atlantic area may well be furthered by a structure which grants the possibility of autonomous action while reducing the desire for it."

III

The very fact that de Gaulle's appeal to a nascent European pride has met with response is the best proof that his old-fashioned tribal nationalism has been much less contagious than one might have feared. The European antibody that M. Schuman first injected into the bloodstream of the Six appears to remain remarkably effective. In fact, it looks as if the absurd contradiction between de Gaulle's predication of European patriotism and French nationalism has made all but his followers in France itself only the more aware of the latter's anachronistic character. Neither Italy nor even Germany, which one might have thought particularly vulnerable to the old fever, shows any signs of it—least of all those who are often and so illogically thought to have become dangerously infected, the so-called German Gaullists. Afflicted as their foreign critics are by incurable Germanophobia, it seems to have escaped them that one can hardly qualify as a German nationalist when choosing a Frenchman as one's hero.

The fact is of course that German Gaullism, by definition the opposite of German nationalism, is not much more than a very obvious stick with which to belabor the government in power. It has the difficult task of keeping on good terms with its American protector as well as his French miniature competitor. Nothing is more jejune than to suggest that Dr. Erhard should simply cut the Gordian knot and tell the Frenchman he is neither needed nor wanted. For while the latter may have nothing to offer in comparison with America, he has a good deal to threaten with: not only breaking up the Common Market—though this would hurt him as much as the intended victim of such a spiteful operation—but also chumming up with Eastern Europe. Moreover, the General has wooed *le grand peuple allemand,* both in speech and action, so effectively that to snub him might prove very costly

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electorally as well. Is he not the architect of the beautifully stage-managed Franco-German reconciliation? Indeed he is not. Schuman and his contemporaries were. But the myth of de Gaulle as the great conciliator has been solidly put across. And the "romance" of this reconciliation, as the *Frankfurter Allgemeine* has called it, is so precious to a nation of sentimentalists, who have few other friends to get romantic about, that to destroy it would be risky indeed.

Thus as long as Germany's giant protector is at loggerheads with its dwarf-competitor any German government is compelled to do a delicate balancing act. The German Gaullists' case is not that such an act is unnecessary; they are the last to suggest that Germany could afford to swap the American for the French guarantee. In so far as they differ at all with the government it is only on the question how far one can go in pleasing the one without alienating the other. And if their judgment is influenced by their preference, if they would like to go along a little further with de Gaulle, it is not because of his old-fashioned nationalism but in spite of it. They are with de Gaulle in his desire for a self-reliant Europe; they are most explicitly opposed to his archaic method of achieving it. They have remained unaffected by the ridicule and contempt which their hero has poured on the idea of European integration. They confess themselves one and all, Strauss no less than the others, convinced federalists—as indeed they are bound to do. For even their sense of national identity and pride has not yet been dissolved to the point where they would have their country surrender itself to de Gaulle's *Europe de l'état c'est moi.*

Those who are still obsessed with the "German danger" would do well to ponder the words of two of these men, Eugen Gerstenmaier, Speaker of the West German parliament, who was involved in the July plot, and Baron zu Guttenberg, who during the war worked for the clandestine British radio station, Sender Calais. "Germany," the first has said, "has abjured the old nationalism that championed national sovereignty. . . . The emotional depth of this abjuration is difficult to realize for those who have not had our experiences with extreme nationalism. . . . In this sense the mentality of present-day Germany is totally different from that after the first world war." "The concept of national sovereignty," writes Guttenberg, "has reduced itself to absurdity. . . . It often amazes me that those who most fear a revival of German na-

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tionalism rarely seem to realize what is the only form in which it could still manifest itself today. . . . They are hypnotized by the absurd remains of a warlike chauvinism and they fail to see that in the divided Germany of the nuclear era our nationalism can only take the form of neutralism or even pacifism."

But, it will be said, is not this allegedly harmless Germany asking for nuclear status? Is not that the reason why America offered it the sop of the M.L.F.? According to General Norstad the answer is No. America, he has said, has forced the M.L.F. on Germany. That may be putting it a little too strongly, just as another American, Professor Stanley Hoffmann of Harvard University, doubtless oversimplifies when he sees the M.L.F. as inspired by the desire to "consolidate" America's domination. There were other motives as well. One was the desire to meet the long-standing demand of the NATO Command for a force of I.R.B.M.s to offset the missiles Russia holds targeted on Western Europe. Another was the wish to forestall the emergence of a Versailles complex in Germany. Yet another was the fear that it might be driven to seek satisfaction for its alleged nuclear ambitions in a deal with France.

Perhaps these fears were sincerely held in Washington. But they can hardly explain the urgency with which the case for the M.L.F. has been pressed at a time when it was clear that it would cause the gravest tensions in the Europe of the Six. Not even the Americans themselves claim that this politico-military gimmick was urgently required for Europe's security. Nor can a convincing case be made out for its immediate political necessity. For it just is not true that there is any danger of Germany getting nuclear weapons from France. De Gaulle has made it perfectly clear that he does not dream of giving Germany a finger on the trigger in any shape whatsoever. Moreover, there are so far no real signs of the alleged German hunger for nuclear weapons. It exists only, as *Die Welt* wrote recently, in the imagination of Washington. Certainly, it is by no means inconceivable that in time it might become a reality. But no one with any knowledge of present-day Germany denies that that time has not yet come.

If many in Germany welcome the M.L.F., it is not because they are itching to get a finger on the nuclear trigger—which in any case the M.L.F. does not provide—but for a number of quite different reasons: because they have convinced themselves—without much regard for strict logic—that it would bind the

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American protector more closely to them; because it bears the trademark "made in U.S.A." and many Germans—especially the Socialists—like many Italians and Dutchmen, argue, not unreasonably, that Uncle Sam knows what is best for them, or that at any rate they cannot afford to go against his wishes, or, finally, because having been told so often that they are hungry for nuclear weapons and equality of status, some of them may by now have begun to believe it themselves.

IV

Meanwhile, however mixed America's motives may have been in putting forward the M.L.F. and however dense the fog generated by its discussion, one thing stands out clearly. It is that the choice now facing the Six is whether to continue on the road they took 15 years ago toward a self-reliant Europe or to be deviated onto a long detour, perhaps even, if Mr. Wilson has his way, a dead end; to stick to the principle of European integration—in the hope of resuming its practice once de Gaulle is out of the way—or to switch over to an as yet nebulous form of Atlantic integration; to go on making Europe or to start making Atlantis; to opt for the remote *mieux* that is Atlantic federation or to go for the less remote *bien* of European federation. For it is no better than childish self-deception to pretend that no choice is necessary, that one can have both an Atlantic Deterrent Community like the M.L.F. or A.N.F. and European Political Union, too. In this respect de Gaulle, whose childishness takes other forms, is perfectly right. If Europe is to have a voice and a big stick of its own, which is the whole object and meaning of political union, you cannot allow some of its members to join quite a different club, whose only function is to wield just such a stick.

The crucial decision which has thus been forced upon the Six is all the more difficult because of the danger that they might not even be left with their *Europe des Marchands* if some of them decide to accept the American invitation. For there is always the risk—though much diminished now that France's farmers are going to do so well out of this uncompleted Europe—that the impetuous General might blow it up out of sheer disgust with what he would consider the spineless bourgeois mentality manifested by his partners.

Fortunately for them, there are some signs that Mr. Johnson does not intend to put the heat on, thereby once again showing

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up the Gaullist talk about "the two hegemonies" (as if there were nothing to choose between Russia's and America's treatment of their dependents) for the puerile malevolence it is. Fortunately for them, also, it seems difficult to imagine that he would back up Mr. Wilson's demand for power to reverse Mr. Kennedy's policy by sealing off once and for all the road toward a European Deterrent Community, in which alone Europe could find the strength to become an "equal partner" of America. The more likely prospect would seem to be that the Six will somehow be enabled to mark time, postponing the fateful decision whether or not to become a nuclear power in their own right until a later date when the General will no longer be around to complicate matters.

Then, and only then, the time will have come to reap the fruits of his labors, giving a voice and a nuclear fist to the Europe whose spirit he, the *Fédérateur malgré lui,* has done so much to awaken. Until that day nothing can be done except talk, partly—supreme irony—because he himself will not allow it; partly because America, without whose indispensable help and approval no one outside France would dream of setting up a European deterrent, would frown on it. It is only when and if American confidence and good will, so recklessly destroyed by Gaullist diplomacy, have been regained that the task of "making Europe" can be resumed.

But will France even then be ready to play its part? Will the France of the new Age of Reason, typified by men like Monnet or Schuman, reëmerge from the shadows to which it has been relegated by the new Romantic Movement led by de Gaulle? It seems by no means impossible. In this connection we do well to recall a line of one of the early Europeans, Victor Hugo, about "la quantité d'avenir qu'on peut introduire dans le présent." Those who conceived the European Defense Community overestimated this quantity with the result that their experiment failed. But is there not equally a limit to the quantity of the past one can successfully introduce into the present? Has not de Gaulle exceeded this maximum? Is it not to be expected, therefore, that this experiment, too, will fail? Is not his policy too absurdly contradictory to survive the great alchemist who promises to distill the gold of European union from the scrap iron of national sovereignty?

It is only when the Gaullist obstacle has been removed, however, that the architects of the new Europe will come up against

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the full magnitude of the task they set themselves 15 years ago. For, once they are free to go back to work, there will be no escaping the fact that its completion will require an immense "leap forward" or at the very least an equally arduous climb upward to full-fledged federation. Short of that there can be no hope of emancipation from nuclear tutelage, no question of a responsible self-reliant Europe, no prospect of equal partnership.

Nearly all the leading European politicians recognize this and declare themselves willing to embark on the great exploit here and now. It demands a powerful effort of imagination, however, to see them reaching their goal. For it presupposes a will to responsibility so strong as to induce the French to entrust the handling of the *ultima ratio*—better described in our day as the *ultima dementia*—to a German or Italian president or premier of a United Europe, and vice versa. Such is the contemporary price for the self-respect that most of us derive from the illusion of independence which can no longer be adequately financed from national means.

Who will be prepared to pay this price? Perhaps, paradoxical as it may seem, the French sooner than anybody else. Because with them—the men of the new Age of Reason as much as the neo-Romantics—the will to responsibility, self-reliance and self-respect, facets of the same elementary human urge, seems stronger than anywhere else. Thus a vista seems to open up so tempting in its promise that it is almost certain to prove but a mirage. It is the vision of a France which, back in its old role of the indispensable *état fédérateur,* once again takes the lead in the grand adventure that began 15 years ago with the crossing of the Rubicon and only last month brought the historic conquest of the long-promised "green pastures," behind which now looms a towering peak, as inaccessible but also as challenging as Mount Everest.

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THE ARAB WORLD'S HEAVY LEGACY

By Charles Issawi

NO observer of present trends in the Arab world can fail to be impressed by the strength of its revulsion against Western political and economic values and ideologies. To take one example among many, a recent book by a prominent Egyptian publicist starts with two propositions which he not only believes to be self-evident but obviously assumes are accepted as such by his readers: present-day capitalism does not work; and Western democracy is a sham, since all power is concentrated in the hands of the owners of the means of production. Judging from pronouncements at the recent Cairo conference of non-aligned nations, such views are widespread in Africa and Asia.

The revulsion of the Arabs is not difficult to understand in view of their grievances—many real, more fancied—against the various Western peoples. But the matter is more complex. It is not just a question of a whole society turning against an alien civilization. It is also a process in which some parts of a society turn against other parts, and in so doing against certain alien values which the latter represent. In other words, the ideological changes taking place in the Arab countries today reflect deep structural changes in their society. The principles and institutions that held together the traditional Arab society have broken down; a desperate search is under way for new bases of integration; and it is felt that the traditional Western ideologies and institutions do not provide these bases.

Arab society in the eighteenth century had very few virtues. Its economy was not only stagnant but actually retrogressing. Its politics were characterized by venality, rapacity, insecurity and oppression. Its intellectual and artistic life was barren. Worst of all, it lived in a smug, self-satisfied lethargy, completely isolated from the outside world—"we do not hear of a single Egyptian who had visited Europe in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries."[1] But it had one redeeming feature, the obverse of some

[1] G. al-Shayyal in "Historians of the Middle East," edited by Bernard Lewis and P. M. Holt. (London: Oxford University Press, 1962, p. 410.) By way of contrast, by the end of the eighteenth century, a group of Japanese scholars had achieved—through the small chink provided by the Dutch settlement in Deshima—a much clearer picture of contemporary Western civilization. They had accepted the Copernican cosmology and understood the system of the circulation of the blood. (See Donald Keene, "The Japanese Discovery of Europe." London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952.)

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of its defects: it was a stable, integrated society, *i.e.* practically all its members believed in the prevailing values and had a strong loyalty to a small group and at least passive acceptance of existing institutions.

Of the sedentary population, perhaps four-fifths consisted of peasants, whose condition was hardly idyllic. Their exploitation by the tax-farmers cannot but have aroused deep resentment. The constant feuds between village factions added their share of misery. Bedouin raiders, famine and plagues were frequent visitors. But the prevailing communal systems of land tenure (*musha, dira* and *ard al-fallah*) provided both security and a rough measure of equality, since the land of the village was periodically redistributed among its members in more or less equal shares. This meant that there were no landless peasants. It also meant that within the community there were no great differentiations of wealth. Lastly, it meant that each individual knew that he belonged to two closely knit units, the family and the village, which would stand by him in case of need.

The handicraftsmen, who probably constituted the majority of the urban population, were bound together by guilds (*asnaf*) and religious brotherhoods (*turuq*). The former regulated production and doubtless formed strong barriers against technological and economic progress. But, in alliance with the brotherhoods, to which they were closely tied, they did provide the craftsmen with security and an object of loyalty. A further integrating factor was the tie of kinship binding the inhabitants of each quarter, which often constituted a self-contained unit with its own gates, baths and place of worship.

The merchants, who in Europe were for several centuries a dynamic and even revolutionary class, certainly did not constitute a threat to the existing order. For one thing, their wealth was small and their social and political power very limited—the Islamic world never had city-states with independent, self-reliant bourgeoisies. For another, they had practically no contacts with the outside world which might have inspired them with new ideas. Lastly, in many areas and branches their activity was largely regulated by custom, which meant that the driving force of competition was greatly attenuated.[2]

[2] A friend told me that as a young man in Damascus, in the 1860s, wanting to buy some cloth, he was told by the shopkeeper: "I have sold quite a bit today—try my neighbor, who has done very little business."

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Another group which in the West and Russia has been both dynamic and subversive of existing régimes is the intelligentsia. Its nearest counterpart in the Arab world were the *ulama,* men trained in religion and jurisprudence. But because of their religious background the *ulama* were almost necessarily bound to be loyal to any society based on Islam. Moreover, for many centuries Muslim political theory had stressed the principle of obedience to any government that both had military power and promised to respect the *sharia,* or religious law of Islam. In the absence of an intellectual ferment and of a group that could utilize it to further its own ends, the various disturbances that occurred in the Arab world—army insurrections, conquests by one ruler or pasha of another's territory, bedouin raids, local revolts, etc.—could not lead to any important modification in the social structure, but only to a change in the composition of the ruling group.

Of course Arab society was not completely static. Economic and social changes occurred in Syria and Iraq in the eighteenth century. The Egyptian scholar, Shayyal, already quoted, states that: "Towards the close of the eighteenth century we detect the first signs of a spontaneous cultural revival. It was an internal movement which emerged from within Egypt away from any outside influence whether from the East or from the West." The Wahhabi movement was a challenge that might have revitalized Islam. A Soviet scholar has discerned the beginnings of "capitalist production" in the larger textile and other establishments in Egypt at the end of the eighteenth century. It is just conceivable, though highly improbable, that left to itself Arab society might have evolved into a healthier state. But in fact it was violently thrown into the mainstream of world history.

The chief responsibility for this may well lie, as Toynbee, Gibb and other Western writers claim, with those monarchs and statesmen—Muhammad Ali in Egypt, Mahmud II and Reshid Pasha in Turkey, Khaireddin in Tunisia—who realized that, without some thoroughgoing modernization their countries could not survive a European onslaught. But an equally important factor was the quest of the Western countries for raw materials, markets, bases and spheres of political, religious and cultural influence. This led them to open up the Ottoman Empire to Western traders by such measures as the Anglo-Turkish Commercial Convention of 1838, to back with diplomatic and other means those of their citizens who were hunting for concessions, and eventually to impose their

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rule over practically the whole Arab world. And it was certainly the presence of the West in the region that caused the latter's development to take the peculiar form that it did. To put the matter concisely, Western influence accelerated the transformation of the Arab world from a subsistence to a market economy, and the dissolution of its communal and organizational ties and their replacement by individual, contractual relationships; at the same time, it inhibited the growth of an Arab bourgeoisie.

II

The process of transformation, and the consequent dislocations, took much the same form as in other parts of the world. In the first place, Western medicine and hygiene eliminated the plagues and many of the endemic diseases prevalent in the region, while improved transport and increased food supplies prevented the occurrence of famines. The result was a sharp reduction in the death rate which, since the birth rate remained at its previous high level, led to a rapid increase in the population. For a long time the annual rate of growth averaged about 1 percent, but in recent years it has risen to between 2 and 3 and may soon go over the latter figure, which would mean a doubling of the population every 20–25 years. The vast growth that has already taken place, unaccompanied by either massive industrialization or a commensurate extension of the cultivated area, has led to great pressure on the land and, in recent years, to an exodus to the cities. The social consequences have been the appearance of two new phenomena: the landless peasant, and a large, underemployed, amorphous, urban proletariat.

The emergence of a landless peasantry was also promoted by another important transformation: the change-over from a subsistence to a market-oriented, cash-crop agriculture. The economic consequences of this change were predominantly beneficial—a large increase in agricultural productivity and output, greatly expanded exports and a substantial growth in the national product. But the social consequences were far less favorable. Thus the dissolution of the village community—without which no progress could have taken place—eliminated the security formerly enjoyed by all peasants. Production for the market meant exposure to price fluctuations, which often led to indebtedness and loss of land. Economic progress produced a rapidly widening gap between the able, cunning or lucky members of the village on the

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one hand and the inefficient, simpleminded or unfortunate on the other; and such inequalities tended to be self-perpetuating and cumulative. The adoption of Western law codes and their application to land worked in the same direction. Moreover, much of the land was appropriated by former tax-farmers, tribal chieftains, city notables or others, and since rents soon came to absorb a large and growing portion of the total product, the benefits of agricultural progress accrued primarily to a small number of landlords, often absentees. Again, in some countries, notably Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Palestine and Morocco, a large fraction of the cultivated area passed—partly by expropriation or chicanery, partly by purchase—into the hands of foreign settlers, thus reducing still further the area available to Arab farmers. Lastly, it should be noted that agricultural techniques showed little or no improvement. The only exceptions were Egypt and such enclaves as the European farms in North Africa, the Zionist settlements in Palestine, the Gezira scheme in the Sudan, and parts of Lebanon. The cumulative effect of all these factors—coupled with the lack of industrialization—was that the Arab countries did not acquire a prosperous, conservative peasantry. Instead, there was an ever-growing number of landless peasants, or of land-hungry farmers with steadily shrinking plots, envious of the neighboring estates of native landlords or foreign planters. Where, as in Egypt and Algeria, the level of living of the rural populations actually declined, the explosiveness of the situation was greatly increased.

Meanwhile, the towns were passing through an even more acute crisis. The handicrafts, which had occupied the greater part of their population, received mortal blows from the competition of machine-made European goods and, in Egypt, from Muhammad Ali's state factories and monopolies. The disruptive effects of this shock went deepest in such towns as Aleppo, Damascus, Baghdad, Cairo and Tunis, which had previously supplied the adjoining regions with manufactured goods.[3] And with the ruin of the handicrafts came the dissolution of the guilds that had bound together their members. In their place emerged a mass of unemployed or underemployed workmen, constantly augmented by influxes from the villages and—again in the absence of industrial development—unable to organize and raise its level of living.

[3] The above is an oversimplified account of a long-drawn and complicated process. Some handicrafts gained a new lease on life by using cheaper imported materials, *e.g.* cotton yarn. Others managed to survive by drastically reducing the earnings of the craftsmen. A handful improved their processes, thus raising their productivity.

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The processes so far described do not differ basically from those that took place in Western Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries, or in many other parts of the world somewhat later. But the crucial difference lies in the fact that Western Europe industrialized. This greatly strengthened its bourgeoisie, which had already become a significant force thanks to the earlier development of trade and finance. And in the course of the 19th century the bourgeoisie became the dominant power in society. But the Arab countries began to industrialize only during the last few years, and their economic and social structure was such that—with the exceptions noted below—no native bourgeoisie developed until very recently. This delay, and the consequent weakness of the bourgeoisie, prevented the latter from playing a significant part until hostile forces had developed to the point where they could overwhelm it. And, since the political and economic values and institutions of the West—liberalism, constitutionalism and free enterprise—are essentially middle-class ones, the crushing of the Arab middle class has meant the elimination of the one class that could still have defended these values and institutions.

The factors that impeded the industrialization of the Arab countries, and of other underdeveloped areas, have often been described. Some would have existed under any political régime: the narrowness of the market, because of low agricultural productivity; the unfavorable social structure; the scarcity of iron and coal, until very recently almost indispensable to industrialization; the dearness of fuel, until the discovery of petroleum and natural gas in the last few decades; the very poor transport systems; the paucity of investment capital; the absence of industrial credit; and the lack of technicians and skilled workmen and, still more, entrepreneurs. But it is no less true that some of these difficulties were greatly aggravated by the nature of the relationships between the Arab countries and the West. Thus the shortage of capital was accentuated by the heavy service charges on the debts contracted—often at usurious rates—by spendthrift monarchs.[4] Industrial credit facilities could have been expanded by government pressure on the banks, which confined their activities almost solely to trade. The lack of skills could have been partly remedied by an appropriate educational policy. But the absence

[4] At the beginning of this century, interest and service charges on the public debt absorbed nearly a third of the Ottoman budget, in Egypt nearly a half and in Tunisia a quarter. The £5,000,000 thus paid out annually by Egypt represented perhaps 4 percent of its gross national product.

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of Western interest in Arab education may be illustrated by the fact that in 1955, after 125 years of French rule, the literacy rate among Algerian Muslims was about 15 percent and only one-sixth of the children of school age (6–14) were attending school. Similarly in Egypt during the first 20 years of British rule government expenditure on education was under 1 percent of the total.

Moreover, the little that was done in education was misdirected, from the point of view of economic development. Thus whereas under Muhammad Ali (1813–1848) 327 of the 339 students who were sent abroad on government missions studied industrial technology, engineering, medicine or agriculture, and under his successors (1849–1882) 270 out of 279, during the British Occupation (1883–1919) the figure was 74 out of 289. But the most important point is that a sympathetic government could have given the encouragement and protection without which no industry could possibly have established itself against foreign competition: tax exemptions, rebates on transport rates, preferential purchases and, above all, tariff protection. Instead, local industries were exposed to the full blast of foreign competition. Thus French goods entering Algeria and, with few exceptions Tunisia, and Italian goods entering Libya were exempt from duty, and all imports into the Ottoman Empire and Egypt paid a flat rate of 8 percent, no distinction being made between raw materials, capital goods and consumer goods. Indeed hostility to local industrialization went further: when a small cotton textile industry did develop in Egypt it was subjected to an 8 percent excise duty, *i.e.* the rate levied on imports.

Lack of industrial development and the weakness of the bourgeoisie are closely interconnected. On the one hand, industry has everywhere been one of the main sources of middle-class strength. And, on the other hand, in most countries capital and entrepreneurship have flowed into industry from other sectors of the economy dominated by the bourgeoisie, notably trade and finance. But the fact that Arab handicrafts were under such great pressure meant that few if any could expand and develop into workshops and factories, and industrial recruitment from this source was negligible. And in the Arab world all the main sectors of the economy, with the partial exception of agriculture and petty trade, were largely or wholly controlled by foreigners.

This situation comes out most clearly in Arab Africa. In Algeria and Libya almost every single urban activity—finance, transport,

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trade, real estate, manufacturing and the professions—was controlled by Europeans, who even provided most of the skilled labor; in addition they ran most of the "modernized" agriculture. In Tunisia and Morocco, the bulk of urban activity and a significant part of agriculture were similarly controlled by Europeans. And the same applied to Egypt until the 1950s, with the not very important difference that here Europeans shared their control, to a certain extent, with various minority groups. In Arab Asia, except for Palestine under the Mandate, foreign investment and immigration were insignificant until the recent expansion of the oil industry. But in several of these countries the middle class consisted to a large extent of minority groups—Jews in Iraq and Christians in Syria and Jordan.

The effect of this phenomenon was that for about a century the entrepreneurial middle class (as distinct from the salaried middle class) became identified with foreigners or minority groups. Of course a Muslim bourgeoisie did eventually develop but, except in Lebanon and to a lesser degree Syria, it came too late and was too weak to meet the onslaught of the hostile forces that had emerged. In Egypt, the bourgeoisie developed as a result of the efforts of the Misr group, of the 1930 tariff, of the abolition of the Capitulations in 1936, of various government measures to "Egyptianize" business, of the weakening of the Europeans during and after the Second World War and of the Arab-Israeli War of 1948. In the Arabian peninsula the small middle class that arose owed its existence to the oil boom of the 1940s and 1950s. The same cause was at work in Iraq, supplemented by the exodus of Jews after the Arab-Israeli War. In Libya the sequence was reversed, the withdrawal of the Italians after the Second World War being followed by an oil boom. In Tunisia and Morocco French withdrawal enabled the local bourgeoisie greatly to increase its strength. And in the Sudan a small middle class is being slowly formed, thanks to the country's relatively undisturbed development.

Given sufficient time, these bourgeoisies might have been able to get control of their societies and reshape them in their image. Unfortunately for them, and for the West, the fabric of their societies was already being torn by the various stresses to which they were being subjected. Among such stresses were the population explosion, the hypertrophic urbanization, the agricultural revolution and the industrial revolution referred to above. Two other

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processes deserve more detailed treatment: the cultural changes and the political struggles.

The discovery of the West, and the consequent cultural transformation of Arab society, has had the revitalizing—and intoxicating—effect of a renaissance. Its over-all consequences have of course been incalculably beneficial. But it has had a very unsettling effect on Arab society by bringing into being a new class of intellectuals. And whereas the old "intellectuals," the *ulama,* were deeply loyal to the basic values and institutions of their society the new ones did not owe it any such allegiance and looked right and left, East and West, for new sources of inspiration and loyalty. Thus, for the first time in many centuries, new ideas began to corrode the fabric of Arab society.

Meanwhile political strife was being added to social discontent and stirring up the masses. In the Arab East there were the struggles against the British and French, the traumatic Arab-Israeli War and the Suez attack of 1956. In North Africa there was the shattering effect of the Algerian Revolution. All these struggles could be waged only by calling on ever wider sections of the population to participate, by digging into ever deeper social strata. The increased participation of the masses meant that new leaders, of more humble origins, soon took command. And these leaders represented not the hitherto dominant upper and middle-class values but radical ideologies.

III

In the light of the above analysis, the shift in Arab ideologies becomes quite intelligible. For a long time, until the 1920s or '30s, the dominant ideas were those of moderate nationalism, constitutionalism and political and economic liberalism.[5] The reasons for this are obvious. First, these were the dominant ideologies of the leading powers—Britain, France and the United States—and to them was given full credit for the prosperity of these countries and their victory in the First World War. Second, Arab cultural contacts were almost entirely restricted to these three countries. Third, liberalism and constitutionalism suited the Arab upper and middle classes, since they controlled parliaments, parties and the press. And economic liberalism, in addition to being fashionable, was the only policy open to governments whose hands were tied

[5] Even as late as the mid 1940s, the two heroes of my students at the American University in Beirut were Mazzini and Friedrich List.

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by the Capitulations, Commercial Conventions and other bonds. But, given the Arab social structure, these ideas made practically no impact on the masses.

During the 1930s and '40s Arab society passed through an acute crisis, caused by such factors as the drastic fall in agricultural prices during the Depression; the presence of hundreds of thousands of Allied troops during the war and the consequent sharp inflation; the growth of unemployment among both unskilled workers and high-school and college graduates; and the unending struggles against foreign occupation. But at the same time the world climate was changing, with the emergence of the Soviet Union and, subsequently, China as major powers and with the rapid growth in the "developing" nations of the belief in socialist planning and one-party dictatorship. The result was the collapse of the fragile Arab parliamentary systems and the replacement of the landowner and bourgeois élite by one of army officers, bureaucrats and technicians drawn from lower strata.

And now, as in so many other underdeveloped countries, an attempt is being made to reconstruct society on the twin bases of nationalism and socialism.

The nationalism consists of an attempt at self-affirmation, primarily against the Western countries which formerly ruled the area and still dominate its economy. But the question immediately arose as to whether that nationalism was to be based on Islam or Arabism. Islam, the religion of 90 percent of the Arabs, had been for centuries the traditional, and is probably still the strongest, bond holding them together. This fact was clearly seen by the Muslim Brotherhood who, in the 1940s and early '50s, achieved great success by appealing to the sense of Muslim solidarity of the masses and by promising radical changes which would bring down the rich and improve the lot of the poor. But such an approach was open to serious objections. First and foremost, the greater part of the educated classes realizes that the ideology and organization of the Brotherhood cannot cope with the complex modernization required by Arab society. Second, the Brotherhood's approach presupposes an essential identity of interests between the Arabs and their Muslim neighbors—the Turks, Iranians and Pakistanis; but in fact there has been considerable tension between them because of conflicting territorial claims (Alexandretta, Bahrain and Khuzistan) and opposed international alignments. Third, in the mid-twentieth century it is no longer fashion-

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able to proclaim religion as the official basis of society. Lastly, it created unnecessary difficulties with the Christian minorities, which had played an important part in the development of Arab nationalism and still have a minor contribution to make to Arab society.

Instead, the army groups that crushed the Muslim Brotherhood worked out an alternative, Arab Socialism. Like the socialist nationalism which is sweeping so many underdeveloped countries, it is an amalgam of intense nationalism (with a strong Muslim component), militarism, state ownership and egalitarianism. In other words, the essential ingredients were the same as those of the Brotherhood but the doses different. The nationalist aims of this movement are the achievement of full independence, which implies the elimination of all foreign military, political and economic positions in the area; cultural independence, which is deemed to require close regulation of the entry of outside influences and the suppression or strict control of foreign schools and other institutions; and Arab unity. Its socialist aims consist essentially of the desire for greater equality and rapid industrialization, since industry is regarded as the main hope for economic development and military and political power. In view of the failure of the native bourgeoisie to carry out sufficiently rapid industrialization, this is to be brought about by state ownership of the principal means of production and by socialist planning. This, it is rightly believed, should reduce private consumption and increase the amount available for investment, though little thought has been given to the concomitant rise in public consumption and the sharp reduction in the efficiency of capital investment under bureaucratic socialism and increasing militarization. Nationalization and planning are also favored because they are expected to eliminate the influence of all private individual or group interests, foreign or local, and give the new rulers full control over their societies.

For it goes without saying that the socialism in question is an authoritarian or perhaps even a totalitarian one, resting on army rule or one-party dictatorship. It is one that gets much more inspiration from Russia, China or Jugoslavia than from Western Socialism. As for Western political and economic liberalism, its influence and appeal have practically disappeared. It may be added that the new socialist ideas have been spread by, and the new leadership has been recruited from, not the working classes but mainly the lower middle class. In the words of Hisham

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Sharabi: "It is significant that just as parliamentary democracy had been established without a middle class, revolutionary socialism under army control is now instituted without the firm base of a working class or proletariat."

Of course, the ideological shift described above has not taken place everywhere. Lebanon is still committed to parliamentary democracy and economic liberalism. Morocco, Syria and Tunisia are struggling hard to find their way. In all four countries a native bourgeoisie had the time to develop, and is not inclined to give up its power without a struggle. Several Arab countries have not yet reached the stage where either liberal or socialist ideologies are meaningful. But all this is less important than the fact that both Egypt and Algeria are engaged in revolutions to implement their slightly differing versions of Arab Socialism; with the nationalization laws of July 1964, Iraq also seems to have chosen the Arab Socialist way. For well over a hundred years Egypt and Algeria have been the seed beds of change in the eastern and western halves of the Arab world. Because of the reforms started by Muhammad Ali in Egypt and the activity created by the inflow of French capital and settlers in Algeria, economic and social developments in these two countries have, in the past, had deep repercussions on their neighbors. It is hard to believe that this will not also hold in the immediate future.

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SEA-LEVEL CANAL: HOW AND WHERE

By James H. Stratton

PRESIDENT Johnson's announcement on December 18, 1964, that the United States is prepared to renegotiate the 1903 Panama Canal Treaty apparently has given encouragement to the efforts of the new Panama Government to find a basis for reconciling the differences between the two countries and has stiffened its determination to control the dissidents who have been planning further demonstrations of the kind that led to the flag-raising incident and riots of January 1964. The warmth with which the President's statement was first received has since then somewhat cooled, but the fact that he expressed the intention to meet Panama at least halfway has diminished the tensions which had been mounting steadily because of the apparent lack of progress in the discussions begun last spring.

The President's expressed interest in sea-level canal routes in Colombia and in Costa Rica-Nicaragua, as well as in two possible routes in Panama, conveys the impression that they are fully competitive. Actually, Panama enjoys a double advantage in the fact that the two best routes are both within her borders. Preliminary studies have favored a sea-level canal excavated by the use of nuclear explosives in eastern Panama close to the Colombian border. If nuclear explosives cannot be used in the construction, then the conversion of the existing lock canal to sea level is for many reasons the best solution. Indeed, it is preferable in any case.

Since the first indication some months ago that the United States was interested in several possible routes in the general area extending from Mexico to Colombia, a suspicion has developed that we would not be above playing the several countries against one another. This assumes that treaty concessions relating to the construction and operation of a sea-level canal would be the prime factor in the negotiations. Yet there is no evidence that any of the isthmian countries would yield such "rights, power and authority" as we now possess in the 1903 Panama Canal Treaty; moreover, the President's statement neither demands nor appears to expect a similar treaty arrangement for a new sea-level canal. Thus, the bargaining, if it should come to that, would seem to revolve around the factors of construction

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cost, the sharing of toll receipts and the managerial and administrative arrangements for the control of the canal and its operation. Other problems that must be resolved are the question of defense and the right of unrestricted passage of United States military forces through the new canal at all times; on these points we might call on the Organization of American States to assist in devising acceptable formulas.

II

One of the basic decisions to be made is whether the new canal is to be dug by nuclear or conventional methods. Advocates of nuclear explosives claim that great savings can be made in the total cost. The estimates for a canal on the site in eastern Panama range from $500 million to $700 million, of which about two-thirds would be for the excavation and the balance for the infrastructure and other features necessary for the canal's operation. The $2.3 billion estimate for the conversion of the existing lock canal to sea level by conventional methods provides approximately $1.1 billion for the control of tidal currents, the control of flood flows from streams emptying into the canal, new highways, a vehicular tunnel crossing under the canal, power and other utilities, sanitation, relocations, housing for construction workers over the ten-year construction period, and other miscellaneous items.

Many, if not most, of these elements would also be required in the construction of any sea-level canal in a remote area—and remote it must be if nuclear explosives are to be used. New towns would be required in addition, with housing for the permanent staff, with roads, streets, water supply, sewage disposal, power generation facilities, schools, etc., as well as one or more high-level vehicular bridges or tunnels crossing the new canal. The cost of such a bridge or tunnel would be significantly increased because powerful nuclear explosives would disturb the foundation formations. Additional associated costs would be for marine salvage equipment, tugs and other craft to assist ships which become disabled during transit; a dry dock for ship and craft repair; and suitable harbors, piers and warehouses for unloading of imports for the needs of the populace. Either a military or a police complement would be needed for security reasons; housing, utilities, air fields and other facilities for the security contingent would be required.

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At the hearings before the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Dr. Glenn T. Seaborg, estimated that "at the optimum" it would take five years to develop the devices and the nuclear excavation technology for a canal project and that the cost of such a program would be of the order of $250 million. At least part of this cost should be considered a charge against a sea-level canal excavated with nuclear explosives.

The novelty of the idea of using nuclear explosives to excavate a canal has a certain appeal. An adverse factor, however, is that radioactive fallout cannot as yet be discounted; there are still serious differences of opinion on this subject. Nations throughout the world are reluctant to accept further risk of fallout. However, a waiver by the signatory nations to the test-ban treaty might be secured if the Soviet Union and other powers have projects in view which would use nuclear explosives.

The authorized canal studies will unquestionably provide realistic estimates of the construction costs (including infrastructure and supporting facilities) of a sea-level canal at each of the routes investigated. It may be safely predicted, all things considered, that the total cost of a sea-level canal at any route remote from that of the present site will closely approximate the cost of converting the existing canal to sea level.

Meanwhile, the extensive studies conducted in 1946–48 under Congressional authorization remain relevant. Thirty sea-level routes, from Tehuantepec in Mexico to the Atrato River in Colombia, were evaluated. The recommended route was the site of the present lock canal. The estimated cost of conversion was $2.3 billion, and since then improved technology has offset rising prices so that the figure is still valid. A sea-level canal constructed by conventional methods in any other country would cost twice as much as converting the present Panama Canal.

The merits of the Panama route, which led originally to its selection by the French, far overshadow all others for either a lock-type or a sea-level canal. When the United States acquired the French canal holdings, Philippe Bunau-Varilla, the French engineer who negotiated the sale, urged President Theodore Roosevelt to continue the French plan for a sea-level canal or, failing this, to construct the locks in such manner as to facilitate conversion to a sea-level route, which he envisioned as ultimately necessary. Public pressure to complete the canal at an early date

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led President Theodore Roosevelt and the Congress to reject the 1905 majority report of the Board of Consulting Engineers recommending a sea-level canal. And although the lock canal was constructed without the provisions to facilitate conversion, an effective method for overcoming this lack was proposed in the 1946–48 studies.

The excavation and dredging of more than one billion cubic yards of earth and rock would be undertaken in such a way as not to interfere with the canal traffic. This would be accomplished by leaving water-retaining natural rock dikes in place to maintain canal levels during the excavation; when the excavation was completed, the dikes would progressively be demolished by blasting them into adjacent deep pits excavated in advance. The lowering of the lock canal water to sea level would take place over a period of seven days; this would be the only time in the ten-year construction period that canal traffic would be disrupted.

III

Far more important than the engineering factors entering into the choice of route and the dubious savings that might be made by using nuclear explosives are the political considerations involved in deciding whether to build the new canal on the present site, elsewhere in Panama or in another country. The President's statement set forth the concept of a changing relationship between the United States and Panama, in which the first step would be a new treaty to replace the treaty of 1903. Under the arrangement proposed, the United States would retain the rights necessary for the effective operation of the canal and the administration of the areas required for these purposes. The new treaty would recognize the sovereignty of Panama, provide for the effective discharge of common responsibilities for hemispheric defense and provide for its own termination when a sea-level canal comes into operation. The statement gave no inkling of the terms to be asked by the United States in entering into an arrangement for a sea-level canal and presumably these are left for eventual negotiation. Possibilities are joint participation in the operation, management by a Users' Association, or even hemispheric participation in the financing, construction and operation.

In preparation for the route surveys authorized by Congress, the United States is asking for the coöperation of the governments concerned, without precondition or precommitment by

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either side. However, the action of the Nicaraguan Congress in mid-1964 in repudiating the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty, giving the United States canal rights in that country in perpetuity, would, if adopted by other countries, limit if not preclude the studies. It is seriously to be questioned whether the proposed studies are essential. If so, it might be assumed that the action of the Nicaraguan Congress was intended to stake out a strong negotiating position.

The need for a canal invulnerable to attack and of sufficient capacity to meet the growing needs of commerce is becoming increasingly acute. A single sea-level canal could handle all traffic in the foreseeable future, and it would be needlessly expensive to keep the existing canal in service if a sea-level canal is constructed elsewhere. But to abandon the existing canal would seriously disrupt the large sector of the Panamanian economy which depends on the present Canal Zone. The Canal is Panama's largest industry and its largest employer. As has often been noted, the withdrawal of the United States would be a catastrophe for the Panamanians. This would be true whether it was preliminary to opening a new canal in another Latin American country or building a new canal elsewhere in Panama.

The burden of redress for the disruption, if not ruination, of the economy of the affected area in Panama by the closing of the present Canal, or by placing it on stand-by status, would unquestionably fall on the United States. Until such time as our presence in the Canal Zone becomes untenable, one must view the 1903 Treaty not only as a grant of rights and privileges but also as an acceptance by the United States of an obligation, moral if not legal, to sustain, or at least not deliberately to cripple, that part of the Panamanian economy which the Canal brought into being. Compensation payments by the United States would seem inescapable and would be measured in the hundreds of millions of dollars. This would be a part of the price that would have to be paid for the abandonment of the existing canal route.

Even if a sea-level canal is constructed on the present site, the economy of Panama will suffer as the result of a significant reduction in the labor needed to operate the canal and in the businesses and services required by civilian and military complements stationed in the Canal Zone. In recent years Panama has stepped up its industrial and agricultural economy and this trend, if properly nourished in the ten-year period during which the new canal is

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being built, should materially reduce the impact of the change-over. There is little doubt that the United States would act energetically to ease the economic stress that would result from the displacement of the large labor force now dependent directly or indirectly on the lock canal.

Panama has been and is still fully aware of the many advantages to the United States in maintaining the existing canal route and of the significant political and economic factors which weigh in her favor. On the other hand, the United States is not without alternatives, and intransigence on Panama's part could bring about her ruin. The pressure to avoid a prolonged diplomatic stalemate is heavier on Panama than on the United States and should in the end lend reasonableness to her demands.

If an accommodation with Panama cannot be worked out, then the alternative would be for the United States to exercise sovereignty over the Canal Zone as a foreign enclave within the borders of Panama. In effect, this is the arrangement which developed in the interval immediately following the suspension of diplomatic relations after the January flag-raising incident. A complete impasse between the United States and Panama would not necessarily force the United States to seek a sea-level route elsewhere, although this is the impression conveyed by our show of interest in alternative routes in other countries. The 1903 Treaty does not prevent the United States from proceeding unilaterally to convert the present lock canal to one at sea level, though naturally it would not undertake this until all efforts to reach an accommodation with Panama had been exhausted. But the threat of such a possibility is there.

Since cost of construction does not weigh heavily, if at all, in making the choice of route, and since the United States is unlikely to obtain from any other country more favorable treaty arrangements than it can from Panama, the question must be asked: What purpose will be accomplished by the extensive route studies now proposed? Is there not the possibility that we will be accused of playing one country against the other and that we will thereby alienate many of our Latin American friends? We can well afford to be generous with Panama, as the President has indicated we are prepared to be. It will then be up to Panama to accept the President's offer in the spirit in which it was tendered. The conversion of the existing canal is the best possible solution, and there can be no excuse for failure to achieve it.

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SPAIN'S DISCREET DECOLONIZATION

By René Pélissier

MANY reasons may be advanced to explain the differences between Spanish and Portuguese policies in Africa. The most obvious may be that while Portugal's African provinces are together 22 times the size of the mother country, Spanish Africa, totaling 115,000 square miles but with only 472,000 inhabitants, is of very little importance to present-day Spain. It nevertheless is striking that at a time when the whole of Africa has either freed itself from colonial control or is in turbulence, the Spanish flag continues to fly quietly over a series of outposts from the Mediterranean to the Gulf of Guinea. While other European possessions disappear one after the other, Ceuta, Melilla, Ifni, Sahara, Fernando Poo and Rio Muni remain outwardly oblivious to the "wind of change."

Perhaps because Spain has been anxious to avoid drawing world attention to its own domestic sphere, it has adopted a comparatively liberal policy toward its African territories. What is remarkable is that the policy is being carried out by a nationalistic and conservative military establishment, which is gradually accepting a partial withdrawal from Africa. To carry out this policy, the Spanish régime has chosen a subtle combination of economic generosity, deep-rooted paternalism and strict political vigilance, presented in a Catholic context and with historical references to suit the occasion. As it wishes to remain strong and be free to make its own decisions, it has been careful to avoid putting itself in a position where concessions might be wrung from it. It has succeeded in retaining the initiative; there will be no "Götterdämmerung" like that of 1898. The diplomacy which has been guiding the course of Spain's African policy for the past three years is characterized by pragmatism, flexibility and temporization. On the issue of decolonization, then, there are no parallels between the attitudes of Lisbon and Madrid. As the Spanish Ambassador in Paris stated unequivocally: "Spain does not endorse Portuguese policy in Africa."

In considering the various aspects of decolonization as it proceeds in Spanish Africa, and the tortuous course it sometimes follows, we must distinguish between the "Places of Sovereignty" and the four "provinces" existing at present.

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In the former category are Ceuta (73,000 inhabitants, 7.3 sq. mi.) and Melilla (79,000 inhabitants, 4.6 sq. mi.). They are African in the geographical sense only, and exist solely for and by means of metropolitan Spain. Psychologically and physically they are garrison towns on Spain's southern frontier, with all that implies in the way of super-patriotism and ultranationalism—exacerbated because threatened—and hemmed in by independent and Moslem Morocco. Three factors account for the importance attached by Spain to these two "Gibraltars." In the first place, Ceuta has been European for 550 years (it was occupied by the Portuguese in 1415 and taken by Spain in 1580), and Melilla has been Spanish since 1497; both towns have never ceased to be the two southernmost lookouts of the medieval Reconquista. In a country so strongly attached to its history, which it embellishes or exaggerates with each successive generation, the loss of these two towns of minor economic importance would be tantamount to a disavowal of the "Siglo de Oro"—Spain's Golden Age.

Second, they are fortresses commanded by the same elements which in 1936 installed the present régime in Madrid. The High Command of the Army of Africa would not resign itself easily to crossing the Straits for the last time, leaving behind its relics, its myths and those who yearly celebrate "el Paso del Convoy de la Victoria." It was from Ceuta, on August 5, 1936, that General Franco watched his "Crusaders," his Foreign Legion troops and his Moors set out to conquer for him the reins of power which he still holds 29 years later.

Finally, the overwhelming majority of the population of the two towns are Catholics of Spanish stock and intend to remain so (Moslems and Jews of Spanish nationality probably account for less than 10 percent of the total). Both were effectively Moslem in the distant past, but their present ethnic composition leaves no doubt as to the outcome of a possible referendum.

Morocco lays claim to both cities. It is certain, however, that though Madrid is prepared to make concessions to Morocco elsewhere in Africa it will be resolute in retaining these two bridgeheads, and more especially Ceuta, watchdog of the Straits and one of the holy places of Francoism. Madrid looks upon both towns as integral parts of metropolitan Spain.

The situation is completely different in the provinces of Ifni and the Sahara, which also are claimed by Morocco. Here again, the

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Spanish attitude is tempered by history. In spite of a transitory occupation by adventurers from the Canary Islands, Spain left no sign of her presence on the mainland coast for three centuries, and only the scramble for Africa and the tenacity of a handful of traders and idealistic nationalists enabled her to establish a precarious hold there. Between the foundation of Villa Cisneros in 1884 and Ifni in 1934, Spain took 50 years to build her seaboard fortresses. Last on the scene when Africa was being carved up, Spain had to be content with these morsels of desert.

The hinterland was not occupied until 1934, which means that Spain has had only 30 years in which to install herself behind the coast. Like the Places of Sovereignty, the provinces of Ifni and the Sahara exist only through the Army and are kept going by means of subsidies. At the most, therefore, it is a question of occupation and certainly not of exploitation or settlement. Even the term occupation is rather strong in view of the size of the territory and the dispersion of the population. Sahara is about the size of Colorado with a population of 23,793 plus an uncertain number of nomads; Ifni, further reduced in size in 1958, is now smaller than Manhattan Island and has a population of less than 50,000. Spain has put forth a serious financial effort and some progress is evident; but it remains true that this embryonic "colonization" has no real roots, has no sound economic basis and is completely cut off from the closed nomadic society upon which it has been artificially imposed. The military authorities have never attempted to convert or assimilate the nomads and semi-nomads, but have been content to enlist them as auxiliaries. Contrary to the claims made in some Spanish circles, the inhabitants of Ifni and the Sahara are not, and do not feel themselves to be, Spaniards. No colonial venture has ever succeeded in absorbing a people culturally and morally in the space of 30 years, and even less so a scattering of Moorish and R'guibat camel drivers.

The régime has, moreover, adopted a fluctuating policy with regard to these two territories, which actually are of value only as possible bargaining counters. In 1957–58 the Moroccan Army of Liberation, supported by certain elements of the Ait Ba Amran (Ifni) and the Teknas and R'guibats (Sahara), launched an attack and completely occupied the interior region. Several thousand troops were sent to reinforce the Spanish Foreign Legion holding the coastal forts, and with French collaboration they succeeded in reoccupying the area. In the negotiated settlement

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which proved necessary, the Moroccan Government obtained the return of Southern Morocco (Tarfaya) and the evacuation of the hinterland of Ifni which was then practically reduced to its urban limits. In 1958, Spain independently merged Saguiet el Hamra and the Rio de Oro into a single province distinct from Ifni, which also was raised to the status of a province.

Each of the two provinces is under the authority of a general, and the administration is entirely under military control. The Army holds the towns, the forts and airfields; and these three features are all there is to the Spanish Sahara. Given the barren nature of the territories, some Spaniards believe that the most realistic course would be to beat a retreat as speedily as possible. But withdrawal is complicated by the fact that two countries—Morocco and Mauritania, enemies until recently—dispute the right to succeed Spain.

By means of a skillful policy of rapprochement and stop-start diplomacy the Spanish Government over the past two years has achieved better relations with Rabat. Since July 1963 when King Hassan II and Generalissimo Franco held a cordial meeting at Barajas Airport, the "Barajas spirit" has continued to prevail. General Franco, in spite of opposition from some of his military men, appears to be ready to make concessions in the desert in exchange for a recognition of the status quo in the northern Places of Sovereignty. Haste being completely foreign to the Spanish nature, it was not until June and July 1964 that the Moroccan and Spanish Foreign Ministers exchanged visits. However, these meetings led to no firm decisions on the territorial dispute. Nor, apparently, did the meeting of Franco and Hassan in February of this year. While continuing to declare her friendship for Morocco, Spain is biding her time and lending a receptive ear to Mauritania, which is also interested in Spanish Sahara.

It is an arid region, but its potential resources (iron and phosphate), its long coastline which would open northern Mauritania to the sea, and the undoubted existence of ethnic ties make it impossible for Mauritania to remain indifferent to its future. Moreover, if a possibly hostile Morocco were installed there, it would endanger the railway which carries Mauritania's iron ore from Fort-Gouraud to Port-Etienne. Therefore, in order to build pressure against the Moroccan demands, Spain has been cultivating a policy of friendship and technical and economic coöperation with the government at Nouakchott.

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Algeria, which shares a common frontier with the Spanish Sahara for a few kilometers, is in a less good position—geographically or historically—to harbor territorial ambitions. However, she is led to take an interest in what goes on west of Tindouf by the attractive idea of having an outlet on the Atlantic and by the political dislike which a Socialist government naturally feels for the Franco régime. The Spanish Sahara is therefore a case, almost unique in Africa, where the problem of decolonization involves a transfer of power to one or more neighboring countries—a course to which Spain is practically resigned.

While awaiting a negotiated settlement in the Spanish Sahara, Spain continues to grant it representation in the Spanish legislature. In the first elections, held in May 1963, two of the three representatives elected to the Cortes were Moslem tribal chieftains. It is difficult to say what value may be attached to this poll (from which Ifni was excluded). Spain is perhaps seeking accredited representatives with the object of setting up an independent or autonomous Sahara, thus outmanœuvring her neighbors. However, this hardly seems a feasible alternative.

The future of Ifni is practically settled; ultimately it will be Moroccan. But if the present deadlock over the Sahara should continue much longer, it seems possible that a division along artificial lines may provide a solution, putting an end to an uncomfortable situation.

The problem is of a totally different nature in Equatorial Guinea, Spain's only point of contact with black Africa. Guinea, consisting of the islands of Fernando Poo and the enclave of Rio Muni, differs from Spain's other possessions in many respects. In the first place, although the fact is not widely known, economic development is relatively advanced and the population (245,989 inhabitants) is not insignificant. Second, Hispanic culture has a strong hold on the younger generations; the moderate nationalist movement has succeeded in obtaining recognition by Spain; and Guinea is moving gradually toward independence. Third, Spain is not inclined to make concessions to Guinea's neighbors.

The unity existing between the archipelago of Fernando Poo and the rectangle of jungle which makes up Rio Muni is primarily historical, cultural and religious. For centuries Spain's only contact with black Africa was through the slaves she bought there. She did not actually take over Fernando Poo until 1858 and only finally occupied the whole of Rio Muni between 1926 and

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1927. Her vigorous exploitation of them dates only from the end of the Second World War. In 1960, exports totaled more than $33,000,000, the highest level of exports per capita in Africa ($135). However, this prosperity is somewhat artificial, since Spain buys Rio Munian coffee and Fernandian cocoa at prices much above the world market. As a result of this policy of inflated prices, the average per capita income of the Guineans is high for Africa ($132), indeed higher than that in many Spanish metropolitan provinces.

The ethnic composition is heterogeneous and its complexity has serious political implications. Hispano-Guineans are in the majority in Rio Muni but in the minority in Fernando Poo, which includes a colony of Nigerian field workers who are essential for the cultivation of the European latifundia, and whose lingua franca is pidgin English.

More than 90 percent of all children of school-going age in Guinea actually attend school and nowhere else does one find governmental services and the Catholic Church working in such close liaison. Native cults and aboriginal beliefs are harried with all the vigor of the sixteenth century. African customs are suspect and are harnessed or suppressed altogether in favor of the only true values of triumphant Hispanism: love of the Spanish mother country, the Caudillo and the Church. The new urban centers built since the end of the war therefore bear such names as San Fernando, Mongomo de Guadalupe, Sevilla de Niefang and Valladolid de los Bímbiles. Schools, chapels, hospitals are built alongside "plazas de toros." In other words, an attempt is being made to bring about a thoroughgoing cultural and political assimilation before it is too late.

Within the limits of her slender resources, Spain had succeeded, prior to 1959, in creating in Guinea the makings of a "model colony" in which the African was watched over and tutored in the school of Spanish civilization, which is still presented to him as not only superior to his own but perhaps the best that history has ever produced. Until recently, the Africans were divided into two classes: the emancipated and the non-emancipated. The first were infinitesimal in number but were considered legally as fully-fledged Spaniards, while the second were judicially minors, directed and controlled by the "Patronato de Indígenas" and a few coöperatives. Anxious as they might be to isolate Guinea, the authorities realized that an attempt to perpetuate such a régime

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in an Africa in the throes of "liberation" would be to court disaster. In order to forestall accusations by neighboring states, Madrid did away with this system of inequality in 1959.

At the same time, Spain transformed the colony into two provinces based on the metropolitan pattern, abolished the Patronato and recognized equal rights for all Hispano-Guineans, who became Spanish citizens overnight. From the Bay of Biscay to the Gulf of Guinea, Spain was one and indivisible. Elections were held in 1960 in accordance with the principles of "organic democracy." Six representatives, three of them African, were elected to the Cortes. By establishing closer constitutional ties with Madrid, the authorities hoped to cut the ground from under the feet of the Guinean nationalists and to neutralize the ambitions of neighboring states.

The Guinean nationalists have suffered from the ills common to all African movements: tribalism, lack of experience, personal rivalry, a dearth of leaders and means. Furthermore, they have had to contend with police supervision made all the more effective because of the small area of the territory; in practice, the five groups which more or less consistently have demanded the "liberation" of Guinea have been obliged to operate from abroad. They also have had to contend with a general lack of interest by the population, which is comparatively prosperous, and with the presence of a large number of Nigerians who are impervious to their propaganda. While they were powerless to set off an armed rising, their threats at the United Nations and in African capitals contributed to bringing about a change in the policy of incorporating Rio Muni and Fernando Poo as overseas provinces.

Much against its will, the administration was forced to concede that in spite of the official phraseology used to describe these 200,000 newly Hispanized Bantus they were not, after all, genuine chips off the old Spanish block. At the same time, the increasingly open annexationist ambitions of neighboring states threatened to dismember the two provinces of Guinea. Moreover, Spain did not want to forfeit the good will which her flexibility had earned for her at the United Nations and among the recently created African republics. Realism triumphed and the policy of incorporating Guinea as part of Spain was abandoned. In late 1963 a bill to introduce autonomy was approved by referendum. The apparent freedom with which it was conducted was a credit to Spain. The nationalists were allowed to return and to campaign

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for or against autonomy. But their lack of unity favored Spain, and the moderate elements led by Bonifacio Ondo Edu carried the day against the supporters of union with the Cameroun.

Although it is not officially admitted, this autonomy represents a major step on the road to eventual independence. The autonomous government is headed by a cabinet composed of eight African counselors, under the chairmanship of Bonifacio Ondo Edu, elected by a legislative body representing both Rio Muni and Fernando Poo. Spain is represented by a High Commissioner, while six Hispano-Guineans sit in the Cortes in Madrid. Defense, budget and foreign affairs remain in the hands of the metropolitan government, which sees to it that the neighboring states do not descend upon this tempting prey.

Nigeria's powerful colony of expatriate workers in Fernando Poo puts her in the strongest position to lay claim to the main island. The youth movements which constitute the spearhead of the Nigerian expansionists could organize a fifth column without too much difficulty and—provided their lead were followed—could bring all economic activity to a standstill. Officially, however, relations between Madrid and Lagos are good, for they both have an interest in retaining a system which provides Fernando Poo with essential labor and Nigeria with an outlet for her oversized labor force.

A second neighbor, the Cameroun Republic, feels that Nigeria has already bested it once when Nigeria absorbed the northern part of the former British Cameroons. It therefore would not take kindly to a Nigerian occupation of Fernando Poo, which lies only a few miles off the Cameroun Republic's principal port, Douala. Tribal kinship with Rio Muni is also a powerful factor. For some time, therefore, the authorities in Yaoundé supported those Guinean nationalists who advocated the merger of Rio Muni with Cameroun.

The Republic of Gabon, for its part, is more than ready to respect the autonomy of Equatorial Guinea, since the Rio Muni enclave, even though it owes allegiance to Spain, constitutes a buffer between Gabon and Cameroun, which is suspected of annexationist aims.

In Guinea, as in the Sahara province, Spain plays the role of shock absorber against the territorial ambitions of African neighbors. But here, far from being prepared to walk off the stage, she is determined to create a Hispano-Guinean state which will bear witness to Spanish language and culture in black Africa.

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KASHMIR, INDIA AND PAKISTAN

By Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah

I SHALL endeavor to recapitulate briefly the genesis of the dispute over the State of Jammu and Kashmir and to indicate what solutions have been considered in the past, apart from the main solution of an over-all plebiscite, that might well furnish a ground for future action in determining its disposition.

When Britain decided to quit the subcontinent of India, the British Parliament enacted the Indian Independence Act of 1947, whereby the two new Dominions of India and Pakistan were carved out and the princely Indian States, numbering 562, were freed from the suzerainty of the British Crown. The result of this was that on the lapse of paramountcy, suzerainty reverted to the princely states, for the British Parliament declined to transfer it to either of the two successor governments. Thus the princely states became completely independent. However, they were advised by the representative of the British Crown, the Viceroy of India, to affiliate with either of the two new Dominions, keeping in view geographical and other relevant considerations, for the very limited purpose of securing their defense, foreign relations and a few other specified matters. By an appointed date almost all the Indian states—the chief exceptions being the State of Jammu and Kashmir and the State of Hyderabad—fell in line with this policy.

The State of Jammu and Kashmir (hereafter referred to as Kashmir) had its peculiar problems. For one thing, its ruler was a Hindu but its population was preponderantly Muslim. Its other problems have been set forth briefly by Mr. N. C. Chatterjee, Member of the Indian Parliament and a member of the Hindu Mahasabha, in a recent article as follows:

> The geographical situation of the State was such that it would be bounded on all sides by the new Dominion of Pakistan. Its only access to the outside world by road lay through the Jhelum Valley road which ran through Pakistan, via Rawalpindi. The only rail line connecting the State with the outside world lay through Sialkot in Pakistan. Its postal and telegraphic services operated through areas that were certain to belong to the Dominion of Pakistan.
>
> The State was dependent for all its imported supplies like salt, sugar, petrol and other necessities of life on their safe and continued transit through areas that would form part of Pakistan.
>
> The tourist transit traffic which was a major source of income and revenue could only come via Rawalpindi. The only route available for the export of its valuable fruit was the Jhelum Valley route. Its timber could mainly be drifted down only in the Jhelum river which ran into Pakistan.

The same authority credits the Maharaja, in view of the difficulties, with a desire to have an independent status for Kashmir, its independence being guaranteed by the two new Dominions. Pending the determination of this question by the Maharaja, he offered to make standstill agreements with both the Dominions providing for the maintenance of the status quo in respect of many essential services necessary to the life of the people of the

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State; and one such agreement was in fact concluded with Pakistan, as a result of which that country continued to operate its postal and telegraphic services in Kashmir. India, however, did not conclude any such standstill agreement.

In the meantime, the tribesmen of Poonch, which was a part of the State, pressed their demand for its accession to Pakistan, and the Maharaja adopted various stringent measures to quell the resulting disturbance. When there followed soon after an armed incursion of the tribesmen, the Maharaja's resistance collapsed. Finding that he could no longer defend Kashmir with his own resources, he asked India for armed assistance to deal with this situation, though without offering to accede to India. The Government of India, however, took the view that it would be the height of folly to send troops into a neutral state and that the accession of Kashmir to India was a prerequisite; but this accession would be conditional on the will of the people, as ascertained through a referendum as soon as law and order were restored. The Maharaja fled the capital of Srinagar and at Jammu renewed his request to India for armed assistance in the following words:

> . . . Geographically my State is contiguous to both the Dominions. It has vital economical and cultural links with both of them. Besides, my State has a common boundary with the Soviet Republic and China. In their external relations the Dominions of India and Pakistan cannot ignore this fact.
>
> I wanted to take time to decide to which Dominion I should accede, or whether it is not in the best interests of both the Dominions and my State to stand independent, of course with friendly and cordial relations with both.
>
> . . . With the conditions obtaining at present in my State and the great emergency of the situation as it exists, I have no option but to ask for help from the Indian Dominion. Naturally they cannot send the help asked for by me without my State acceding to the Dominion of India. I have accordingly decided to do so and I attach the Instrument of Accession for acceptance by your Government.

On behalf of the Government of India, Lord Mountbatten, then Governor General, accepted this accession in the following terms:

> . . . In the special circumstances mentioned by your Highness my Government have decided to accept the accession of Kashmir State to the Dominion of India. In consistence with their policy that in the case of any State where the issue of accession has been the subject of dispute the question of accession should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of the State, it is my Government's wish that as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and her soil cleared of the invader the question of the State's accession should be settled by a reference to the people.
>
> Meanwhile in response to your Highness' appeal for military aid action has been taken today to send troops of the Indian Army to Kashmir to help your own forces to defend your territory and to protect the lives, property and honor of your people.

II

The resulting accession was to be purely provisional and temporary until the will of the people could be ascertained through a referendum. The Government of India consistently upheld the temporary nature of this accession and its commitment to refer the issue to the people of Kashmir. In their White Paper of 1948, the Government of India stated that "we regard this

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accession temporary and provisional till such time as the will of the people can be ascertained." That White Paper also contains a report of a broadcast by Prime Minister Nehru in which he said:

> . . . We decided to accept this accession and to send troops by air, but we made a condition that the accession would have to be considered by the people of Kashmir later when peace and order were established. . . .
>
> And here let me make clear that it has been our policy all along that where there is a dispute about the accession of a State to either Dominion, the decision must be made by the people of that State. It was in accordance with this policy that we added a proviso to the Instrument of Accession of Kashmir.
>
> . . . We have declared that the fate of Kashmir is ultimately to be decided by the people. That pledge we have given, and the Maharaja has supported it, not only to the people of Kashmir but to the world. We will not, and cannot, back out of it. We are prepared when peace and law and order have been established to have a referendum held under international auspices like the United Nations. We want it to be a fair and just reference to the people, and we shall accept their verdict. I can imagine no fairer and juster offer. . . .

In their reference to the United Nations made December 31, 1947, the Government of India stated:

> In order to avoid any possible suggestion that India had taken advantage of the State's immediate peril for her own political advantage, the Dominion Government made it clear that once the soil of the State had been cleared of the invader and normal conditions were restored, the people would be free to decide their future by the recognized democratic method of plebiscite or referendum, which, in order to ensure complete impartiality, may be held under international auspices.

This was also in accordance with Mahatma Gandhi's view, since he had stated that "the Indian Government sent troops by air to Kashmir telling the Maharaja that the accession was provisional upon an impartial plebiscite being taken of Kashmiris irrespective of religion."

Sir Gopalaswami Ayyangar, as leader of the Indian Delegation to the Security Council, stated on behalf of India on January 15, 1948:

> In accepting the accession they refused to take advantage of the immediate peril in which the State found itself and informed the Ruler that the accession should be finally settled by plebiscite as soon as peace has been restored. . . .
>
> The question of the future status of Kashmir vis-à-vis her neighbors and the world at large, and a further question, namely, whether she should withdraw from her accession to India and either accede to Pakistan or remain independent, with a right to claim admission as a member of the United Nations—all this we have recognized to be a matter for unfettered decision by the people of Kashmir after normal life is restored to them.

This same commitment made by India was embodied in the two resolutions adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, dated August 13, 1948, and January 5, 1949. Having arranged a cease-fire between India and Pakistan, the United Nations Commission addressed itself to the task of securing a truce agreement; but differences over it developed between the two countries.

When the four members from Jammu and Kashmir were admitted to the Constituent Assembly of India, Pakistan protested to the Security Council. India replied that:

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Such participation was not intended to, and does not, in fact, alter the Government of India's determination to abide, in matter of accession, by the freely declared will of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. Should that will be against the State continuing to be part of India, if and when it comes to be expressed in a constitutional way under conditions of peace and impartiality, the representation of the State in the Indian Parliament would automatically cease and the provisions of the Constitution of India that govern the relations of the State of Jammu and Kashmir with the Union of India will also cease to operate.

When Article 370, dealing with Kashmir's relationship with the Union of India, came up for enactment in the Indian Constitution, it was again made clear in the Indian Constituent Assembly by Sir Gopalaswami Ayyangar that:

> . . . the Government of India have committed themselves to the people of Kashmir in certain respects. They have committed themselves to the position that an opportunity would be given to the people of the State to decide for themselves whether they will remain with the Republic or wish to go out of it. We are also committed to ascertaining the will of the people by means of a plebiscite provided that peaceful and normal conditions are restored and the impartiality of the plebiscite could be guaranteed.

Therefore, they were only establishing an "interim system."

The matter thereafter came up again before the United Nations, which made efforts through its emissaries to secure an agreement between the parties, but no progress could be made with regard to the demilitarization of Kashmir. In the meanwhile, a Constituent Assembly was convened in Kashmir, but the Security Council, in a resolution passed March 30, 1961, affirmed that the convening of this Assembly and any action that the Assembly might take to determine the future shape and affiliation of the entire State or any part thereof would not be in accordance with principles already agreed upon—namely, that the will of the people was to be expressed through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations.

Sir B. N. Rau, as leader of the Indian delegation to the Security Council, stated in this connection:

> Provision was made in the Indian Constitution for a Constituent Assembly for settling the details of Kashmir's Constitution. Will that Assembly decide the question of accession? My Government's view is that, while the Constituent Assembly may, if it so desires, express an opinion on this question, it can take no decision on it. . . . But this opinion will not bind my Government or prejudice the position of this Council.

On May 29, 1951, Mr. Rajeshwar Dayal gave an assurance to the Security Council on behalf of India in these terms:

> I reaffirm that so far as the Government of India is concerned the Constituent Assembly for Kashmir is not intended to prejudice the issue before the Security Council or come in its way.

All the mediatory efforts of the Security Council through its representative Dr. Frank Graham (who is still in that capacity) also proved abortive.

In August 1953, a joint communiqué was issued by the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan stating *inter alia:*

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It was their firm opinion that this [question of Kashmir] should be settled in accordance with the wishes of the people of that State with a view to promoting their well-being and causing the least disturbance to the life of the people of the State. The most feasible method of ascertaining the wishes of the people was by fair and impartial plebiscite.

It was further decided that a Plebiscite Administrator should be appointed by the end of April 1954.

III

In November 1953 came news about Pakistan's negotiations for a military pact with the United States. In his letter of March 5, 1954, Mr. Nehru wrote:

The decision to give this aid has changed the whole context of the Kashmir issue, and the long talks we have had about this matter have little relation to the new facts which flow from this aid.

Later, in reply to a Pakistani charge of bad faith, Mr. Nehru declared in a public meeting on January 31, 1957, that if he was convinced that he had not honored any international commitment about Kashmir, "I shall honor it or resign from office. I do not want any final decision which is against the interest of the Kashmir people. I do not want to ask for a decision on the legal issue."

Again the matter went to the United Nations, which in a resolution of January 24, 1957, reiterated "that the final disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will be made in accordance with the will of the people expressed through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations."

Addressing a meeting at Allahabad in February 1957, Mr. Nehru denied that India had attempted to back out of any commitments. He said: "Kashmir is not ours but it is of the Kashmiris. We cannot stay in Kashmir for a moment without the consent of the Kashmiris. It is not our property."

In a report submitted to the Security Council on April 29, 1957, Mr. Jarring recalled that both India and Pakistan had accepted the United Nations Commission's resolutions of August 13, 1948, and January 5, 1949, "to which they admitted themselves bound very recently in the Security Council debate." He suggested arbitration on the question whether Part I of the resolution of August 13, 1948, dealing with the cease-fire, had been implemented or not—a resolution which was accepted in principle by Pakistan but rejected by India. That year, the Security Council passed the last of its resolutions dealing with Kashmir (December 2, 1957).

The matter has since then remained deadlocked and no real progress towards its solution has been made, though the leaders of the two countries have met several times to consider the matter. Although Mr. Nehru had previously accepted mediation under the United Nations auspices as the only way out, he later abandoned this stand and expressed the opinion that Kashmir was a domestic matter in which mediation was not acceptable. Pandit Nehru and President Ayub had talks on the Kashmir question during Mr. Nehru's tour of Pakistan in 1960, but no real progress was made.

President Kennedy revealed at a press conference on January 24, 1962, that he had asked Mr. Eugene Black, President of the World Bank, "to see

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if a solution was possible in this most difficult and delicate problem [of Kashmir]. It creates international tensions, of course. We are assisting both the countries. We would like our assistance to be used in a way which is most effective to the people." Mr. Black agreed to undertake this assignment, but it was not accepted by India, as Mr. Nehru stated that India was opposed to mediation on any issue involving any country's sovereignty.

When I was released from jail on April 8, 1964, following the withdrawal of the conspiracy case instituted against me and my associates, I accepted the invitation of Prime Minister Nehru and President Ayub Khan to visit India and Pakistan. In my meetings with them I was struck by the intense desire of them both to settle the much vexed question of Kashmir by mutual discussion and negotiation. I got the impression from these talks that they had realized at long last that it was harmful to the interests of their two countries to keep this issue hanging between them, since it did no good to them or to their friends but provided a situation over which their enemies could gloat. At my instance Pandit Nehru and President Ayub Khan agreed to meet together to settle this long outstanding matter. But these talks could never be held because of Mr. Nehru's sudden death. I renewed my contacts thereafter with Indian government leaders and had hoped that as soon as they and the Pakistani government leaders were freed from some of their internal problems they would be able to meet and come to a settlement about Kashmir. I am still sanguine that such a meeting may materialize, though I must confess that I have been somewhat dismayed by certain recent developments.

IV

The foregoing résumé makes dismal reading indeed. The commitments made by both countries aside, the vital interests of the people of Jammu and Kashmir do not seem to have been heeded sufficiently. Indeed, over these long years they have suffered incalculable harm and pain. The uncertainty to which they have been subjected has eaten into their very vitals, and until it is removed no progress in any sphere—administrative, political or otherwise—can be achieved. When I held the stewardship of the State, my colleagues in the Government and in the National Conference Working Committee were in entire agreement on this point.

As far back as May 1953, the Working Committee appointed a committee consisting of the following to go into this matter: Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, Maulana Masoodi, Mirza M. A. Beg, Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammad, G. M. Sadiq, Sardar Budh Singh, Girdharilal Dogra and Shamlal Saraf. Here is an extract from the minutes of the Committee's final session, held June 9, 1953:

> As a result of the discussions held in the course of various meetings, the following proposals only emerge as possible alternatives for an honorable and peaceful solution of the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan:
>
> a) Over-all plebiscite with conditions as detailed in the minutes of the meeting dated 4th June, 1963 [this apparently was a reference to Maulana Masoodi's suggestion that the choice of independence be offered in the plebiscite].
> b) Independence of the whole State.

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c) Independence of the whole State with joint control of foreign affairs.
d) Dixon plan with independence for the plebiscite area.[1]

Mr. G. M. Sadiq, the present Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir, was of the following opinion:

If an agency consisting of India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Soviet Russia and China could be created to supervise and conduct the plebiscite, I would suggest that we should immediately ask for an over-all plebiscite. Failing this, we may ask for a supervision Commission representing all the Members of the Security Council for ensuring free and fair plebiscite in the State.

Some distinguished leaders of Indian public opinion such as Mr. Rajagopalachari, Mr. Jayaprakash Narayan and Mr. Shiva Rao have been counselling that the dispute be resolved through a negotiated settlement. This might take the shape of independence for Kashmir, with its defense guaranteed by the United Nations; or of its being made a trusteeship of the United Nations for a period of ten years, at the end of which the question of its accession to India or Pakistan or its remaining independent could be decided by a plebiscite held under United Nations auspices; or of a confederation of India and Pakistan with Kashmir one of its constituent units. In each case they have emphasized the human aspects of the problem affecting the well-being of the 5,000,000 people involved, and have rightly called attention to the problems posed by the enforced division of Kashmir.

Some of these suggestions could still be considered in the present context. The important thing, however, is to get the parties concerned—*i.e.* India, Pakistan, and Jammu and Kashmir—together around a table, preferably with the help of a mediator, and to approach the problem with an open mind, consider all these alternatives and by a process of elimination accept a solution which would by and large meet the just and legitimate aspirations of the people of the State, conceding to them the substance of their demand for self-determination, but with honor and fairness to both Pakistan and India. Unfortunately the attempts to bring them together on these lines have not so far succeeded, and the situation has been worsened by some of the utterances of Indian government leaders and by recent moves to extend to Kashmir some constitutional provisions aimed at the eventual erosion of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution.

Whether they succeed in this or not, there has as a result been a demonstrable diminution of the faith which the people of Kashmir had pinned on India. I wish with all my heart that this process of disillusionment and bewilderment may be arrested and steps taken in the direction I have indicated above.

In this connection it is pertinent to recall what Mr. Nehru himself stated as far back as June 26, 1952, with regard to such constitutional expedients:

We have not got a clean slate to write upon; we are limited, inhibited by our commitments to the United Nations, by this, by that. But, nevertheless, the basic fact remains that we have declared—and even if we had not declared the fact would

[1] EDITOR'S NOTE: Sir Owen Dixon, Australian jurist, reported to the U.N. in 1950 that he could suggest no way of organizing an over-all plebiscite acceptable to both sides. He advocated partition, with Hindu areas going to India, Moslem areas to Pakistan, and the future of the Vale of Kashmir to be settled by some means, perhaps a local plebiscite.

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remain—that it is the people of Kashmir who must decide. And I say with all respect to our Constitution that it just does not matter what your Constitution says, if the people of Kashmir do not want it, it will not go there. . . . Let us suppose there was a proper plebiscite there—and the people of Kashmir said, "We do not want to be with India." Well, we are committeed to it, we would accept it. It might pain us but we would not send an army against them; we might accept it, however much hurt we might feel about it, and we should change our Constitution about it.

In another speech in the same vein on August 7, 1952, Mr. Nehru said:

It is an international problem. It would be an international problem anyhow if it concerned any other nation besides India, and it does. It became further an international problem because a large number of other countries also took an interest and gave advice. . . . So while the accession was complete in law and in fact, the other fact which has nothing to do with the law also remains, namely, our pledge to the people of Kashmir—if you like, to the people of the world—that this matter can be reaffirmed or cancelled or cut out by the people of Kashmir if they so wish. We do not want to win people against their will and with the help of armed force, and if the people of Jammu and Kashmir State so wish it, to part company from us, they can go their way and we shall go our way. We want no forced marriages, no forced unions like this. . . .

So, we accept this basic proposition that this question is going to be decided finally by the good will and pleasure of the people of Kashmir, not, I say, by the good will and pleasure of even this Parliament if it so chooses, not because this Parliament may not have the strength to decide it—I do not deny that—but because this Parliament has not only laid down in this particular matter that a certain policy will be pursued in regard to Jammu and Kashmir State but it has been our policy. . . .

But whether it is a pain and a torment, if the people of Kashmir want to go out, let them go because we will not keep them against their will however painful it may be to us. That is the policy that India will pursue and because India will pursue that policy people will not leave her, people will cleave to her and come to her. Because the strongest bonds that bind will not be the bonds of your armies or even of your Constitution to which so much reference has been made, but bonds which are stronger than the Constitution and laws and armies—bonds that bind through love and affection and understanding of various people. . . .

These words of the great departed leader inspire and fortify me, and I do indeed hope that his successors will rise to the occasion and by a great act of faith seek to resolve this question which has bedeviled the relations between India and Pakistan. The result has been the confrontation of their two armies on the borders of Kashmir, the dissipation of their vast resources which would normally have been available for the amelioration of the condition of their peoples. It has presented the threat of an eventual wider conflagration between them, imperiling the safety and happiness of teeming millions in both the countries, including their minorities. It has also brought great sorrow and distress to their friends, who, it must be said, have not been found wanting in assisting them with material resources in the hope that this would add to their combined strength and would not be wasted on this confrontation between them. But more than they, I repeat, it is the people of Jammu and Kashmir who have suffered in the process. Their anguish knows no bounds. We must hope and pray that wiser counsels will prevail and that the two countries will speedily seek a way out of this impasse.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Henry L. Roberts

with the assistance of William Diebold, Jr., Economics; Fritz Stern, Western Europe; Howard Linton, Asia; Richard H. Nolte, Middle East, North Africa; Joseph A. Ellis, Latin America; Pamela Day, Africa.

General: Political and Legal

THE NEW MEANING OF TREASON. By Rebecca West. New York: Viking, 1964, 374 p. $6.95.

This book, by one of the most brilliant writers of our time, is a revised and expanded version of a work first published in 1947. Centrally a report on some of the most famous treason cases since World War II—William Joyce, Alan Nunn May, Klaus Fuchs, Burgess and Maclean among others—it is also a most provocative and probing discussion of the implications of treason in an age of mass culture and technological explosion.

INTRODUCTION À L'HISTOIRE DES RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES. By Pierre Renouvin and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle. Paris: Colin, 1964, 520 p. Fr. 38.

A leading French historian here undertakes, in collaboration with the Director of the Centre d'Études des Relations Internationales in Paris, a systematic study of the basic forces underlying international affairs and the role of the statesman in dealing with them.

THE QUEST FOR PEACE. Edited by Andrew W. Cordier and Wilder Foote. New York: Columbia University Press, 1965, 390 p. $7.95.

This volume comprises 24 Dag Hammarskjöld Memorial Lectures on a wide variety of themes relating to the search for and maintenance of international peace. Speakers include U Thant, Adlai Stevenson, Dean Rusk, Lester B. Pearson and Muhammad Zafrulla Khan.

MARKINGS. By Dag Hammarskjöld. New York: Knopf, 1964, 221 p. $4.95.

These posthumously published jottings and entries by the late Secretary General of the United Nations contain virtually nothing about his public activities, but a great deal about his inner state of mind—"a sort of *white book* concerning my negotiations with myself—and with God." They are of considerable importance to one's picture of the whole man, and yet the bafflement and perplexity of most reviewers suggest the difficulty of interpreting them.

THE COLD WAR. Edited by Evan Luard. New York: Praeger, 1964, 347 p. $8.50.

A symposium of British essays surveying the history of the Cold War and its possible future course. The treatment is chiefly by geographic regions.

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WENN DER WESTEN WILL: PLÄDOYER FÜR EINE MUTIGE POLITIK. By Karl Theodor Freiherr zu Guttenberg. Stuttgart: Seewald, 1964, 238 p. DM. 16.80.

A leading German politician of conservative tendencies presents a serious argument for a tougher policy toward Communism as a means of strengthening the West and reunifying Germany. His demand for "a new policy," widely echoed in Germany, envisions particularly close Franco-German relations but hopefully not at the cost of American support.

CHINE—URSS: LA FIN D'UNE HÉGÉMONIE. I: LES ORIGINES DU GRAND SCHISME COMMUNISTE, 1950–1957. By François Fejtö. Paris: Plon, 1964, 360 p. Fr. 18.50.

A Hungarian-born commentator on East European affairs traces the origins of the Sino-Soviet rift from 1950 to 1957. Extensive documentary annex. A second volume is to follow.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED NATIONS. Edited by Franz B. Gross. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1964, 356 p. $6.95.

Essays prepared under the auspices of the Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania and dealing from a wide range of perspectives with the impact of the U.N. on American policy.

THE DIMENSIONS OF DIPLOMACY. Edited by E. A. J. Johnson. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1964, 135 p. $3.95.

Six lectures on various facets of diplomacy, power and foreign policy by McGeorge Bundy, Henry A. Kissinger, W. W. Rostow, James R. Killian, Jr., Adolf A. Berle and Livingston Merchant.

THE STRATEGY OF SUBVERSION: MANIPULATING THE POLITICS OF OTHER NATIONS. By Paul W. Blackstock. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964, 351 p. $7.50.

A general discussion of "covert political operations" as practiced by various powers in recent years. The author thinks that their value, as against their untoward effects, has been greatly overestimated. The C.I.A. receives a good deal of attention.

THE DEMOCRATIC CIVILIZATION. By Leslie Lipson. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964, 614 p. $10.00.

An ambitious study in comparative government, by a professor of political science at the University of California, Berkeley, concerned centrally with the democratic forms of government and a possible theory of the political process.

THE PROSPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION. By C. Wilfred Jenks. Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, 1964, 805 p. $17.50.

A massive exploration of the prospects for further advances in international adjudication, especially with respect to increasing the effectiveness of the International Court as an instrument for the rule of law.

THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. By Wolfgang Friedmann. New York: Columbia University Press, 1964, 410 p. $8.75.

An important, wide-ranging analysis of the many significant revisions injected into traditional international law as a result of rapid changes in international society and international groupings.

IN PURSUIT OF WORLD ORDER. By Richard N. Gardner. New York: Praeger, 1964, 263 p. $4.95.

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An informed appraisal, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, of the positive contribution of international organizations in conjunction with American objectives and purposes.

WHO HELPED HITLER? By Ivan Maisky. London: Hutchinson, 1964, 216 p. 25/.

The former Soviet Ambassador to London details his efforts to forge an anti-German alliance between Britain, France and the U.S.S.R. before World War II, and blames the failure of this policy on the anti-Soviet appeasement policy of Chamberlain's government. His indictment, characterized more by polemics than by completeness of evidence, is nevertheless an interesting source. Some of his contentions have long been accepted by Western historians.

HOSTILE ALLIES: FDR AND CHARLES DE GAULLE. By Milton Viorst. New York: Macmillan, 1965, 280 p. $6.95.

A spirited study of the conflict between the two leaders from 1940 to 1945, with little sympathy for F.D.R.'s "courtship of the dishonorable" (Vichy) and with admiration for the difficult but determined de Gaulle. The author's contention that our present difficulties with France are rooted in that conflict is neither novel nor entirely persuasive.

SEEDS OF DISCORD: DE GAULLE, FREE FRANCE AND THE ALLIES. By Dorothy Shipley White. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1964, 471 p. $7.50.

A thorough reconstruction of the first disputes between de Gaulle and England and America from June 1940 to the Allied landing in North Africa in 1942.

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE 1919. By Paul Mantoux. Geneva: Droz, 1964, 227 p. Swiss Fr. 18.

This is a translation of the first part (March 24–April 18) of Paul Mantoux' important "Notes" on the sessions of the Council of Four. The French edition was published in 1955.

GESCHICHTE DER INTERNATIONALE. BAND 2. By Julius Braunthal. Hanover: Dietz, 1963, 617 p. DM. 58.

This second volume in this massive history of the Marxist Internationals (Volume I noted here January 1963) covers the period from the outbreak of the First World War to the disintegration of both the Socialist and the Communist Internationals in the Second World War.

BEGEGNUNGEN MIT KENNEDY. By Willy Brandt. Munich: Kindler, 1964, 242 p. DM. 16.80.

A tribute to the late President by the Mayor of Berlin.

L'ANNÉE DANS LE MONDE. Grenoble: Arthaud, 1964, 480 p. Fr. 27.

This annual French review of world affairs includes discussion of political developments in the West, the Communist bloc and the "tiers monde" together with sections on science, culture and sports.

POLITICAL HANDBOOK AND ATLAS OF THE WORLD, 1965. By Walter H. Mallory. New York: Harper and Row (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1965, 356 p. $7.50 (Paper, $3.95).

Brought up to date as of January 1, 1965, this standard annual reference work gives the composition of governments; sums up party programs and lists their

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leaders; lists newspapers, indicating their political affiliations and editors; and includes facts on the United Nations and associated international agencies. Includes a 32-page supplement of political maps.

General: Military, Technical and Scientific

THE GREAT DEBATE: THEORIES OF NUCLEAR STRATEGY. By Raymond Aron. Garden City: Doubleday, 1965, 265 p. $4.95.

In this book—based on lectures for a French audience—M. Aron reviews, with his customary lucidity, the recent developments of strategic theory, the European reaction to the McNamara doctrine, the pros and cons of an independent French deterrent and the future of the Atlantic Alliance.

STRATEGY AND CONSCIENCE. By Anatol Rapoport. New York: Harper and Row, 1964, 323 p. $6.95.

An important critique of much contemporary strategic thinking and its premises, certainly debatable in many of its own conclusions and recommendations but helpful in pointing up some important issues.

COUNTERINSURGENCY WARFARE: THEORY AND PRACTICE. By David Galula. New York: Praeger, 1964, 143 p. $4.50.

An effort "to define the laws of counterrevolutionary warfare, to deduce from them its principles, and to outline the corresponding strategy and tactics"—a sort of anti-Mao.

LIMITED WAR AND AMERICAN DEFENSE POLICY. By Seymour J. Deitchman. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1964, 273 p. $10.00.

An extensive study of "problems of military function and systems, and the application of the systems to tactics and strategy" within the framework of limited warfare.

AMERICAN DEFENSE POLICY. By Wesley W. Posvar and Others. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1965, 471 p. $9.50.

A very useful collection of articles, by many specialists, on various aspects of U.S. defense policy and strategy.

KRIEGSTAGEBUCH. BAND III: DER RUSSLANDFELDZUG BIS ZUM MARSCH AUF STALINGRAD (22.6.1941–24.9.1942). By Generaloberst Halder. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1964, 589 p. DM. 78.

This third volume of General Halder's important war diary covers the Russian campaign up to the attack on Stalingrad.

THE HISTORY OF ROCKET TECHNOLOGY. Edited by Eugene M. Emme. Detroit: Wayne State University Press (in coöperation with the Society for the History of Technology), 1964, 320 p. $8.50.

A useful and not unduly technical series of knowledgeable articles on the development of rocketry, U.S. rocket programs and manned flight. Helpful bibliographical note.

THE SCIENTIFIC AGE. By L. V. Berkner. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964, 137 p. $4.00.

In these lectures a leading physical scientist discusses the interaction of science and society, especially in the fields of education, government and the liberal arts.

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General: Economic and Social

ECONOMIC POLICY IN OUR TIME. By E. S. Kirschen and Others. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., 1964, 3 v. (Chicago: Rand McNally, distributor, $31.00.)

Nine economists from the Common Market, Britain, Norway and the United States make a comparative study of national economic policies from 1949 to 1961. Inevitably a good bit of space is given to definition and the establishment of comparable terms, but this pays off in the discussion of objectives and instruments of policy and the summary of actual performance. The dynamics of decision-making prove more elusive, but there are interesting comparisons and suggestions. Volume 1 is devoted to general theory; Volumes 2 and 3 comprise country studies.

ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN PEKING AND MOSCOW: 1949–63. By Chu-yuan Cheng. New York: Praeger (for the Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies, George Washington University), 1964, 119 p. $7.50.

A well documented study of Soviet economic pressure on Communist China since the de-Stalinization issue of 1956.

HUNGRY NATIONS. By William and Paul Paddock. Boston: Little, Brown, 1964, 344 p. $6.50.

An agricultural expert and his brother, formerly in the Foreign Service, pool their experiences to say what is wrong about economic development and how to put it right: more stress on agriculture, more research to find what is best suited to each place, fewer dreams of industry and less emphasis on political prestige.

ESSAYS IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. By V.K.R.V. Rao. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1964, 333 p. (New York: Taplinger, distributor, $9.50.)

A dozen major papers by a leading Indian economist. Theory largely takes second place to application and the discussion of policy.

COMMONWEALTH COMMON MARKET: A PROPOSAL. By K. Venkatagiri Gowda. Mysore: Rao and Raghavan, 1964, 189 p. Rs. 16.75.

"Written under the spell of the collapse" of the negotiations for British entry into the European Common Market, this book proposes a Commonwealth alternative based on accepting comparative costs while protecting infant industries.

ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF TRADE DISCRIMINATION. By Just Faaland. Bergen: Grieg (for Chr. Michelsens Institutt), 1964, 213 p.

Neglected points, new statements, some quantification and a conclusion in which "The Pilgrim's Progress" is introduced into economic literature as effectively as "Alice in Wonderland" was a generation ago.

GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM OF INTERNATIONAL DISCRIMINATION: THE CASE OF CUSTOMS UNIONS. By Jaroslav Vanek. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965, 234 p. $5.50.

Viner's "trade creation" and "trade diversion" remain central to the analysis of customs unions, but Vanek's elaborations and refinements carry the study to new ground.

INTERNATIONAL LIQUIDITY: A STUDY IN THE ECONOMIC FUNCTIONS OF GOLD. By Ian Shannon. Melbourne: Cheshire, 1964, 143 p. 21/.

Convinced that more international liquidity is needed, the manager of the Australian part of the Economist Intelligence Unit concludes that raising the price of gold is the best way to get it.

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THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND: LEGAL BASES, STRUCTURE, FUNCTIONS. By Hans Aufricht. New York: Praeger (for the London Institute of World Affairs), 1964, 126 p. $6.00.

The Fund's Counsellor sets forth its law and practice.

THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT. By Shigeo Horie. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964, 208 p. $6.00.

The President of the Bank of Tokyo discusses not only the past and present of the Fund but the future of the international monetary system.

INTERNATIONAL CURRENCY PLANS AND EXPANSION OF WORLD TRADE. By K. Venkatagiri Gowda. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1964, 216 p. (New York: Taplinger, distributor, $7.75.)

Lucid discussion of the Triffin Plan and its rivals.

The United States

FAREWELL TO FOGGY BOTTOM. By Ellis O. Briggs. New York: McKay, 1964, 306 p. $4.95.

Unusually lively, humorous and often caustic diplomatic memoirs by a former U.S. Foreign Service Officer and Ambassador whose stations included much of Latin America, Czechoslovakia and Korea.

WILSON: CONFUSIONS AND CRISES, 1915–1916. By Arthur S. Link. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964, 386 p. $8.50.

This fourth volume in Mr. Link's authoritative biography of Woodrow Wilson deals with the exceptionally confused period from the late autumn of 1915 to late spring of 1916, a period of wracking and unresolved foreign crises.

THE OFFICIAL WARREN COMMISSION REPORT ON THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY. Garden City: Doubleday, 1964, 888 p. $4.95.

This edition of the report includes a brief analysis and commentary by Louis Nizer. The body of the text is a full reproduction of the official U.S. Government edition.

THE STRANGE TACTICS OF EXTREMISM. By Harry and Bonaro Overstreet. New York: Norton, 1964, 315 p. $4.50.

The authors of popular but useful studies on contemporary Communism here turn their attention to the American radical right, including a lengthy section on the John Birch Society.

THE PRESSURE ON THE DOLLAR: PROPOSAL FOR A LONG TERM SOLUTION. By Maria Negreponti-Delivanis. Leyden: Sijthoff, 1964, 156 p. Gldrs. 18.25.

To overcome its balance of payments problems the United States must increase its rate of economic growth and the best place to do that is in the Far West.

THE NATION'S ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES. Edited by Edgar O. Edwards. Chicago: University of Chicago Press (for William Marsh Rice University), 1964, 167 p. $4.95.

Broad topics by good authors, some of them eloquent.

PATTON: ORDEAL AND TRIUMPH. By Ladislas Farago. New York: Obolensky, 1964, 885 p. $9.95.

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An ambitious, lively, though somewhat overwritten and occasionally inaccurate biography of the late General Patton. Debate over his career will not end with this study.

The Western Hemisphere

THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA. Edited by John Sloan Dickey. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964, 184 p. $3.95 (Paper, $1.95).

An appraisal by seven contributors, prepared under the auspices of the American Assembly, of various aspects of Canadian-U.S. relations.

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN LATIN AMERICA. Edited by John J. Johnson. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964, 282 p. $6.75.

These papers, presented in January 1963 at a conference sponsored by the Joint Committee on Latin American Studies, examine recent changes in the status and behavior of various social groups in contemporary Latin America. The emphasis is upon change rather than continuity, "because more people in Latin America are concerned with the future than with the past." The contributors, representing a crosscut of academic disciplines, include: Charles Wagley, Richard N. Adams, K. H. Silvert, Lyle N. McAlister, Frank Bonilla, Fred P. Ellison and W. Paul Strassmann.

GENERALS VS. PRESIDENTS: NEOMILITARISM IN LATIN AMERICA. By Edwin Lieuwen. New York: Praeger, 1964, 160 p. $4.50.

Continuing his studies on the role of the armed forces in contemporary Latin America, Professor Lieuwen in this volume deals with the present resurgence of the military in politics and its ominous implications for both Latin America and the United States. He is particularly concerned with the shortcomings resulting from institutional structures incapable of providing solutions to the existing social crises.

RELIGION, REVOLUTION, AND REFORM: NEW FORCES FOR CHANGE IN LATIN AMERICA. Edited by William V. D'Antonio and Fredrick B. Pike. New York: Praeger, 1964, 276 p. $5.95.

These thoughtful essays, dealing with the Church and contemporary social change in Latin America, stem from a conference held at the University of Notre Dame in 1963 which was attended by churchmen, political leaders and political and social scientists from both Latin America and the United States. The general theme of the papers reflects the belief that only "if the Church in Latin America commits itself clearly, unequivocally, and immediately to the attainment of social pluralism, then religion has some chance of being a factor in social change."

DEMAIN, L'AMÉRIQUE LATINE. By Gilles Gozard. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1964, 249 p. Fr. 16.

A survey in which the author views, with subdued optimism, Latin America's present state and potential economic developments, particularly those of interest to Europe and France.

PROBLEMAS DE PAGOS EN AMÉRICA LATINA. Mexico City: Centro de Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos, 1964, 298 p. Pesos 37.50.

These papers, delivered at a meeting held by the Bancos Centrales del Continente Americano in Rio de Janeiro in October 1963, explore the question of bank payments and examine the means by which international financial coördination can be achieved.

POET IN THE FORTRESS: THE STORY OF LUIS MUÑOZ MARÍN. By Thomas Aitken, Jr. New York: New American Library, 1964, 241 p. $6.50.

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A biographical eulogy of Luis Muñoz Marín, the person most responsible for Puerto Rico's new-found dignity and prosperity. Though the author leaves many questions unanswered concerning the man and the island, the sympathetic appreciation of the "experiment" makes this book worthwhile.

INSIDE THE CUBAN REVOLUTION. By Adolfo Gilly. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1964, 88 p. $2.50.

This is a Marxist assessment of the Cuban Revolution and its contradictions, based on the author's experiences in Cuba during 1962 and 1963. The author, an Argentine journalist, thinks that the most important problem for the revolution is no longer the question of survival but the internal struggle between the forces advocating peaceful coexistence and those in favor of advancing world revolution.

JAMAICAN LEADERS: POLITICAL ATTITUDES IN A NEW NATION. By Wendell Bell. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964, 229 p. $6.00.

A sociological study of Jamaican nationalism, based on interviews and questionnaires. The author expresses cautious optimism that Jamaican leaders will avoid the cynicism toward political democracy so damaging to the new nations.

EL PUEBLO Y SU TIERRA: MITO Y REALIDAD DE LA REFORMA AGRARIA EN MEXICO. By Moisés T. de la Peña. Mexico City: Cuadernos Americanos, 1964, 895 p. Pesos 60.

A noted Mexican economist examines in detail the problem of land and its distribution in Mexico. A valuable study.

COLOMBIA TODAY—AND TOMORROW. By Pat M. Holt. New York: Praeger, 1964, 209 p. $5.50.

A brief survey of contemporary Colombia, touching upon, among other things, the politics of the National Front, the Peace Corps, coffee, and the "conservative" Church. The author, a staff member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, leaves unanswered the question "whether the bursting, shifting population of Colombia, now awakening after centuries of slumber," can evolve peacefully.

DÉLIRANT BRÉSIL? By Pierre Rondière. Paris: Hachette, 1964, 336 p. Fr. 15.

Vividly sketched images of Brazil's past and present, based on a traveler's experiences from Rio to the Amazon.

POLITICA EXTERIOR ARGENTINA, 1930–1962. By Alberto Conil Paz and Gustavo Ferrari. Buenos Aires: Editorial Huemul, 1964, 277 p.

Two Argentinian professors outline Argentina's international position and note that much of its decline has resulted from Frondizi's indecisive policies.

Western Europe

BRITAIN, EUROPE AND BEYOND. By Uwe Kitzinger. Leyden: Sithoff, 1964, 222 p. Gldrs. 24.90.

A series of informative, thoughtful and urbane essays and broadcasts on various aspects of European politics, ranging from comparative studies of electoral systems in five continental countries to brief reports about the Profumo case and German Social Democracy. A long appendix of postwar electoral statistics completes this valuable commentary by one of Britain's leading political scientists.

THE AMERICANIZATION OF EUROPE: THE IMPACT OF AMERICANS AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ON THE UNCOMMON MARKET. By Edward A. McCreary. Garden City: Doubleday, 1964, 295 p. $5.50.

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Packed with facts, statistics and observations, this impressionistic volume is more interesting than efforts to spin fuller explanations out of fewer data. The title covers both the activities of American businessmen in Europe and the development there of practices and attitudes in production, consumption and distribution that have been thought of as especially American.

THE COMMON MARKET AND AMERICAN BUSINESS. By Max J. Wasserman and Others. New York: Simmons-Boardman, 1964, 300 p. $7.50.

Clear-cut presentation of basic data and broad analysis to help the businessman trade or invest in the new Europe.

LE PROBLÈME AGRICOLE DANS L'INTÉGRATION EUROPÉENNE. By Jacques Bourrinet. Paris: Cujas, 1964, 337 p. Fr. 30.

Fairly detailed consideration of national policies, the provisions of the Treaty of Rome and the measures taken by the European Community up to the end of 1963, including a number of programs of adjustment and amelioration that tend to be overlooked in more general accounts.

CHANGING PERSPECTIVES IN BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY. By Kenneth Younger. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1964, 139 p. $1.55 (Paper).

An admirable, realistic appraisal of Britain's need for new directions in foreign policy after de Gaulle's veto of her long-delayed entry into Europe, by a former British minister and present director of Chatham House.

GREAT BRITAIN OR LITTLE ENGLAND? By John Mander. Boston: Houghton, 1964, 206 p. $3.75.

Starting with England's at first hostile response to President Kennedy's conduct of the second Cuban crisis, the author critically examines his countrymen's views on foreign policy.

THE UNCOMMON COMMONER: A STUDY OF SIR ALEC DOUGLAS-HOME. By John Dickie. New York: Praeger, 1964, 224 p. $4.95.

A rather slight account of Sir Alec's career before his appointment as Prime Minister.

THE BRITISH LABOUR PARTY: A SHORT HISTORY. By Carl F. Brand. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964, 340 p. $7.50.

A useful summary of the Labor Party after 1914, written by a scholar in the field and designed for the general reader.

MOI, GÉNÉRAL DE GAULLE. By Eugène Mannoni. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1964, 154 p. Fr. 8.50.

A rather breezy yet intelligent and revealing analysis of the inscrutable de Gaulle and particularly of his rhetoric, by a veteran French journalist.

LA CRISE MILITAIRE FRANÇAISE, 1945–1962: ASPECTS SOCIOLOGIQUES ET IDÉOLOGIQUES. By Raoul Girardet and Others. Paris: Colin, 1964, 235 p. Fr. 25.

An exemplary study of the recruitment, way of life, and intellectual and political outlook of the French Army in its period of great social and moral crisis from the end of the Second World War to the end of the Algerian war. The authors, aided by close contacts with French officers, illuminate their statistical and sociological material with a subtle and persuasive analysis.

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LA GAUCHE: MYTHES ET RÉALITÉS. By André Philip. Paris: Aubier, 1964, 228 p. Fr. 15.

A collection of essays on contemporary political, social and economic issues, by one of the leading figures of the Fourth Republic, and intended as a contribution for the coming presidential campaign against de Gaulle.

THE FRENCH RADICAL PARTY IN THE 1930'S. By Peter J. Larmour. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964, 327 p. $8.50.

A useful, scholarly study of the leading French party of the 1930s, with particular attention to its parliamentary manœuvring. It illuminates the author's dubious contention that "the Third Republic was not overthrown by the German invasion; it went under because of peacetime crisis."

LA SUISSE, SA NEUTRALITÉ ET L'EUROPE. By Max Liniger-Goumaz. Geneva: Éditions du Temps, 1964, 102 p.

A Swiss educator wrote this defense of continued Swiss neutrality and independence while teaching at the National Pedagogical Institute in Léopoldville.

L'ALLEMAGNE D'ADENAUER À ERHARD. By Robert d'Harcourt. Paris: Flammarion, 1964, 219 p. Fr. 11.

Clever and well-informed commentary on the West German scene from 1961 to the death of Kennedy. This veteran observer concludes that "the German path of tomorrow is still obscure."

RÜCKBLICK AUF DIE GEGENWART: DIE ENTSTEHUNG DER KANZLERDEMOKRATIE. By Josef Othmar Zöller. Stuttgart: Seewald, 1964, 416 p. DM. 26.

An intelligent commentary on the historical and sociological background of the Bonn Republic, by a well known publicist.

THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF GERMANY: FROM WORKING-CLASS MOVEMENT TO MODERN POLITICAL PARTY. By Douglas A. Chalmers. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964, 258 p. $6.50.

A political scientist provides a useful analysis of the post-1945 changes in the German Social Democratic Party and adds reflections of a theoretical nature about his discipline which may interest other political scientists.

DAS DRITTE REICH: SEINE GESCHICHTE IN TEXTEN, BILDERN UND DOKUMENTEN. Edited by Heinz Huber and Artur Müller. Munich: Desch, 1964, 2 v. DM. 160.

A gripping and comprehensive record of the Third Reich, made up of objective commentary and illuminating pictures, originally prepared for a highly successful German TV series.

NAZI PROPAGANDA. By Z. A. B. Zeman. New York: Oxford University Press (in association with the Wiener Library), 1964, 226 p. $7.00.

A brief but suggestive study of the techniques and successes of Nazi propaganda in Germany and abroad.

HINDENBURG AND THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC. By Andreas Dorpalen. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964, 506 p. $12.00.

A scholarly biography of Hindenburg's unhappy career as German president. The author draws on some new material and his narrative illuminates some aspects of Weimar's decline.

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L'ITALIE DE MUSSOLINI: VINGT ANS D'ÈRE FASCISTE. By Max Gallo. Paris: Perrin, 1964, 555 p. Fr. 20.

A young French historian retells the political history of Italian Fascism.

THE HONORED SOCIETY. By Norman Lewis. New York: Putnam, 1964, 318 p. $5.00.

A breezy yet informative account of the history and contemporary role of the Mafia, by a contributor to *The New Yorker*.

PIE XII ET LE IIIe REICH: DOCUMENTS. By Saul Friedlander. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1964, 235 p. Fr. 12.

An important contribution to the present controversy about Pope Pius XII's views and policies toward the Third Reich. The author, a young historian, presents new documents, chiefly drawn from the Nazi Foreign Office records and indicating that the Germans at least believed the Pope had understanding and even sympathy for their cause. The author is aware of the limitations of his evidence.

"LE VICAIRE" ET L'HISTOIRE. By Jacques Nobécourt. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1964, 381 p. Fr. 19.50.

An editor of *Le Monde* summarizes the international debate occasioned by the appearance of Hochhuth's "Deputy" and gives his own trenchant interpretation of Pope Pius XII's views and policies toward the Nazis. The author suggests that Hochhuth slighted the moral indifference of almost all men during those trying years of war and fear. Nobécourt is sympathetic to Hochhuth, but not uncritical, and acknowledges the incomplete character of his own book.

THE PRESENCE OF SPAIN. By James Morris. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964, 119 p. $15.00.

A pleasant and intelligent text and superb pictures make this a valuable introduction to the beauties and mysteries of Spain.

Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

SOVIET STRATEGY AT THE CROSSROADS. By Thomas W. Wolfe. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964, 342 p. $5.95.

An able, informed and well balanced discussion, by a staff member of the RAND Corporation, of developments and debates in Soviet military policy and strategy, chiefly since the 1962 Cuban crisis.

THE ECONOMICS OF SOVIET PLANNING. By Abram Bergson. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964, 394 p. $7.50 (Paper, $2.45).

In this volume—one in a series of studies in comparative economics—a leading authority on the Soviet economy deals centrally with the actual operation of the system, how it is organized, how it handles questions of management and incentive in industry and agriculture and how efficiently it promotes the aims of the régime.

SOVIET STRATEGY FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH. By Nicolas Spulber. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964, 175 p. $4.50.

FOUNDATIONS OF SOVIET STRATEGY FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH. Edited by Nicolas Spulber. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964, 530 p. $12.50.

In the first book Professor Spulber discusses the Soviet debate in the 1920s on the goals and means of economic planning and development. The companion volume pre-

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sents a substantial selection of Soviet essays from that period by such men as Leontief, Preobrazhensky and Groman.

WHY LENIN? WHY STALIN? A REAPPRAISAL OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION, 1900–1930. By Theodore H. Von Laue. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1964, 242 p. $3.95.

An interesting, original and in places debatable essay in explanation of the circumstances conducive to the appearance of such figures as Lenin and Stalin in the seats of power.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE USSR: AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS. Edited by Donald W. Treadgold. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964, 399 p. $6.50 (Paper, $2.95).

A series of discussions on a wide range of Russian and Soviet topics, originally appearing in the *Slavic Review*.

RUSSIA IN THE THAW. By Alberto Ronchey. New York: Norton, 1964, 249 p. $5.00.

An Italian journalist's perceptive account of the Soviet scene in 1959–1961.

THE SECOND SOVIET REPUBLIC: THE UKRAINE AFTER WORLD WAR II. By Yaroslav Bilinsky. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1964, 539 p. $12.50.

An excellent study of political, economic and cultural developments in the Ukraine since 1945. Extensive bibliography.

IMPRESSIONS OF LENIN. By Angelica Balabanoff. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1964, 152 p. $5.00.

Quite revealing personal memoirs of Lenin by a onetime secretary of the Comintern who early broke with the movement.

THE RUSSIAN JEW UNDER TSARS AND SOVIETS. By Salo W. Baron. New York: Macmillan, 1964, 427 p. $7.50.

A general history of Russian Jewry, from the earliest settlements to the present, by an outstanding student of Jewish history.

BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN. By Joseph S. Roucek and Kenneth V. Lottich. Caldwell (Idaho): Caxton Printers, 1964, 631 p. $8.95.

Chiefly chapters on education and cultural indoctrination in the Communist countries of Eastern Europe, with a section on Mainland China by Theodore H. E. Chen.

POLITICS OF SOCIALIST AGRICULTURE IN POLAND: 1945–1960. By Andrzej Korbonski. New York: Columbia University Press, 1965, 330 p. $7.50.

A scholarly inquiry into the interplay of politics and economics in Poland's postwar agriculture, with particular attention to the collapse of collectivization after October 1956.

UNGARN ZWISCHEN ROT UND ROT. By Georg Graf Széchényi. Munich: Biederstein, 1963, 183 p. DM. 9.80.

A Hungarian aristocrat's account of his country's tribulations between the end of the war and the 1956 revolution. Imre Nagy turns out to be the hero of the piece.

YUGOSLAVIA: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF DEVELOPMENT PLANNING. By George Macesich. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1964, 227 p. $5.50.

A survey, by a professor of economics at Florida State University, of the various facets of the contemporary Jugoslav economy, with particular attention paid to

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problems of economic development and planning. The work is based in part on several recent visits to the country.

The Middle East

THE DYNAMICS OF NEUTRALISM IN THE ARAB WORLD: A SYMPOSIUM. EDITED BY FAYEZ A. SAYEGH. San Francisco: Chandler (for the Council on International Perspectives), 1964, 275 p. $3.00 (Paper).

The editor and eight Arab scholars, diplomats and political figures contribute essays toward a definition and rationale of neutralism as a cold war phenomenon.

A MODERN APPROACH TO ISLAM. BY ASAF A. A. FYZEE. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1964, 127 p. (New York: Taplinger, distributor, $7.00.)

Four essays on the theme that the creed of Islam today needs reinterpretation. An Indian Muslim, Professor Fyzee has had an impressive career as public servant and scholar.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SECULARISM IN TURKEY. BY NIYAZI BERKES. Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964, 537 p. $12.50.

"The transformation of Turkey from a traditional to a secular state illustrates the complex relations between economic and technical changes and political and religious changes. For this reason it presents a valuable case history." This is the theme, and Professor Berkes' handsomely produced study of the process is impressive in scope and authority.

THE KURDISH WAR. BY DAVID ADAMSON. London: Allen and Unwin, 1964, 215 p. 30/.

A lively and balanced account by a British journalist based on his travels in rebel Kurdistan in 1962.

ISRAEL AND AFRICA: A STUDY IN TECHNICAL COOPERATION. BY MORDECHAI E. KREININ. New York: Praeger, 1964, 206 p. $12.50.

With its own development experience as a model and a "surplus of brains" to draw on, Israel has had notable success with its technical assistance programs in Africa. Professor Kreinin's study, based on interviews in Africa and Israel, is a useful exploration of the subject.

ISRAEL—DIE ZWEITE GENERATION. BY CHRISTOPH VON IMHOFF. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1964, 291 p. DM. 14.80.

A perceptive examination of present day Israel, its people and institutions, and its problems, internal and external.

SUEZ: THE SEVEN DAY WAR. BY A. J. BARKER. New York: Praeger, 1965, 223 p. $5.95.

A British officer's authoritative review of operation "Musketeer," the abortive Anglo-French invasion of Suez in 1956, made with an eye to the military shortcomings thus revealed and the implications for Britain's future strategic planning.

CRISIS: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE SUEZ CONSPIRACY. BY TERENCE ROBERTSON. New York: Atheneum, 1965, 349 p. $6.95.

A Canadian writer's vigorous addition to the growing literature on the 1956 Suez crisis, with a useful stress on the Canadian role in helping to resolve it. Interviews with high level persons provide new information.

THE VIEW FROM STEAMER POINT. BY CHARLES HEPBURN JOHNSTON. New York: Praeger, 1964, 224 p. $5.95. (London: Collins, 25/).

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The Governor and then High Commissioner of Aden from 1960 to 1963 describes the urgent and delicate work of merging Aden with the newly created Federation of South Arabia as a device for maintaining the British base against the forces of Arab nationalism. Sir Charles' personal and highly readable account of the merger is a success story—but by so close and chancy a margin as to leave the future in doubt.

CYPERN: INSEL AM KREUZWEG DER GESCHICHTE. By Franz Georg Maier. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1964, 189 p. DM. 4.80.

A young German scholar's compressed history of Cyprus from the earliest times up to independence in 1960.

South and Southeast Asia

THE CHALLENGE OF MODERNISATION: THE WEST'S IMPACT ON THE NON-WESTERN WORLD. By I. R. Sinai. New York: Norton, 1964, 256 p. $5.50.

Mr. Sinai, journalist and lecturer at the New School, argues that the non-Western world revolutions, Communist or not, are directed against the values which make up Western societies. The West, he says, is fighting a war of survival to defend those values.

PAKISTAN: YESTERDAY AND TODAY. By Donald N. Wilber. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964, 266 p. $3.95.

A treatise on a new nation building upon the continuity of ancient history and culture but concurrently patterning its political, social and economic institutions after those of the Western world.

PAKISTAN: BIRTH AND GROWTH OF A MUSLIM NATION. By Richard V. Weekes. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1964, 278 p. $5.75.

A former U.S.I.S. information officer in Karachi places emphasis on the religious influence in Pakistan in this sketch of the history, politics and social and cultural traditions of the country.

WAGE DETERMINATION AND ORGANIZED LABOUR IN INDIA. By A. J. Fonseca. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964, 241 p. $2.65.

A study of the origins, strengths and weaknesses of the Indian trade union movement and its adjustment to the process of rapid industrialization.

THE EMERGING ELITE: A STUDY OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN CEYLON. By Marshall R. Singer. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1964, 203 p. $7.50.

An examination of the patterns of leadership in traditional, colonial and contemporary Ceylon in an effort to learn which ingredients are indigenous, which are imported, and how the two blend.

MALAYSIA: A SURVEY. Edited by Wang Gungwu. New York: Praeger, 1964, 466 p. $12.50.

Papers by 27 scholarly contributors, most of them now teaching in Malaysia, on the geography, history, society and culture, economy, politics and government of this new and controversial federation of states.

CONFLICT IN LAOS: THE POLITICS OF NEUTRALIZATION. By Arthur J. Dommen. New York: Praeger, 1964, 338 p. $5.95.

Mr. Dommen, a Press Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in 1963–64 and now with United Press International in the Far East, points to past errors

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in diplomatic policy toward Laos and discusses neutralism as policy and how it might be made to work.

INDONESIA. By J. D. Legge. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964, 184 p. $4.95 (Paper, $1.95).

A succinct treatise useful for understanding Indonesia's struggle for independence and post-colonial history. Focus is on Sukarno and his "guided democracy," a political system which the author, Professor Legge, of Monash (Australia), thinks is based on Indonesian culture and tradition.

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDONESIA, 1951–1963. By Donald Hindley. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964, 380 p. $8.50.

Professor Hindley, of Brandeis University, defines and traces the development of Asia's oldest Communist Party since its control by D. N. Aidit, who has led it from a membership of three or four thousand to two million. Working largely from Indonesian sources, he discusses the leader's strategy, the building of the Party and its mass support, and the Party's interaction with other Indonesian political forces.

The Far East and Pacific Ocean

CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY, 1958–62. By Vidya Prakash Dutt. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1964, 336 p. (New York: Taplinger, distributor, $10.75.)

An Indian specialist in modern Chinese history discusses domestic politics and foreign policy, factors influencing current international relations in general, and then takes up China's relations with the U.S., U.S.S.R., Asia and Africa. An epilogue covers events into 1964, but not including Khrushchev's ouster.

THE ECONOMY OF THE CHINESE MAINLAND: NATIONAL INCOME AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1933–1959. By Ta-chung Liu and Kung-chia Yeh. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965, 771 p. $10.00.

Although recognizing the difficulty—sometimes the impossibility—of collecting, evaluating and analyzing statistical and other data emanating from Communist China, the authors consider their approach ("to estimate national product by industrial origin and national expenditure by end use") the most reliable. Their estimates show an average growth rate well below Communist claims.

THE FOREIGN TRADE OF COMMUNIST CHINA: ITS IMPACT ON THE FREE WORLD. By Pauline Lewin. New York: Praeger, 1964, 128 p. $15.00.

A summary of pre-Communist Chinese foreign trade, the development of the Chinese economy during the last 15 years and postwar foreign trade. Prepared by the Economist Intelligence Unit.

AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT ON TAIWAN SINCE WORLD WAR II. By T. H. Shen. Ithaca: Comstock Publishing Associates, 1964, 399 p. $7.50.

Claiming that Taiwan now ranks next to Japan and Western Germany in postwar rates of over-all economic growth, with agriculture the base, Mr. Shen details the essential features of the technological development and intensive cultivation of Taiwan's natural resources.

TAIWAN—ILHA FORMOSA: A GEOGRAPHY IN PERSPECTIVE. By Chiao-min Hsieh. Washington: Butterworths, 1964, 372 p. $11.50.

Using Chinese, Japanese and Western sources (listed in the excellent bibliography at the back of this well illustrated book), Mr. Hsieh presents not only the physical environment of this strategic island but also its history as set against the variety of

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cultural groups that have occupied it. His last chapters concern current conditions, with emphasis on economic development.

DEFIANCE IN MANCHURIA: THE MAKING OF JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY, 1931–1932. By Sadako N. Ogata. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964, 259 p. $5.00.

Mrs. Ogata effectively reconstructs the military and civil power struggles within Japan to trace the origins of Japan's "expansionist foreign policy that worked to her own destruction." Sources include unpublished official documents and personal memoranda made available to her by former Kwantung Army officers and others, as well as an impressive volume of Japanese-language materials.

THE SANTO TOMAS STORY. By A. V. H. Hartendorp. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964, 446 p. $12.50.

A condensation of a part of the unpublished 4,000-page typewritten record kept by Mr. Hartendorp during his three-year internment in Santo Tomas under the Japanese occupation of the Philippines. He was secretly appointed the official historian of the captivity and his observations were used during the war crimes trial as testimony of the hunger and cruel deprivation suffered by the prisoners.

FROM ENMITY TO ALLIANCE: U.S.-AUSTRALIAN RELATIONS, 1931–1941. By Raymond A. Esthus. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964, 180 p. $6.00.

A scholarly work on diplomacy in the crucial decade preceding Pearl Harbor, beginning with disputes over shipping competition and trade and ending with Australia's involvement in the European war and the reorientation of relations necessitated by the Pacific war. Sources include the unpublished papers of Hull and Moffat.

ASIAN MIGRATION TO AUSTRALIA: THE BACKGROUND TO EXCLUSION, 1896–1923. By A. T. Yarwood. Melbourne University Press; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1964, 210 p. $9.50.

After presenting background material on the Immigration Restriction Act of 1901 and how it was administered, the author devotes chapters to Japanese, Chinese, Indian and Syrian immigrants, indicating domestic and foreign pressures influencing their differing treatment.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF AUSTRALIA. By J. B. Condliffe. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964, 294 p. $9.00.

The results of 22,000 miles of field inspection tours in 1963 to collect and analyze economic, political and scientific data with a view to attracting settlement in Australia's underdeveloped areas.

A COMPLETE HISTORY OF GUAM. By Paul Carano and Pedro C. Sanchez. Rutland: Tuttle, 1964, 452 p. $10.00.

The results of a decade's work of piecing together limited and fragmentary information, secondary source materials for the period from discovery to American possession (1521–1898) and official and unofficial sources thereafter. Loss of Guam's historical records in World War II aggravated the task. The collaborators nevertheless provide a detailed and interesting political, economic, social and cultural history for the general public and for students in Guam schools.

Africa

DE BANDOENG À MOSHI: CONTRIBUTION À L'ÉTUDE DES CONFÉRENCES AFRO-ASIATIQUES (1955–1963). By Paul F. Smets. Brussels:

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Université Libre de Bruxelles, Institut de Sociologie, 1964, 154 p. Belgian Fr. 195.

A detailed and well documented evaluation of the achievements of the conferences of Bandung, Cairo, Conakry, Belgrade and Moshi.

AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT PLANNING. Edited by Ronald Robinson. Cambridge: Cambridge University, Overseas Studies Committee, 1964, 147 p. 10/.

Papers on planning in Africa, presented in the fall of 1963 at the Cambridge Conference on Development Planning at Queens' College, Cambridge.

THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING BLACK. By Frank Moraes. New York: Macmillan, 1965, 436 p. $8.95.

A veteran Indian journalist has written a factual as well as imaginative account of his experiences on the African continent.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FOR AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA. Edited by E. A. G. Robinson. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964, 743 p. $21.00.

A voluminous collection of papers on development problems in Africa, originally presented in 1961 at the Third Regional Conference of the International Economic Association in Addis Ababa.

MOROCCO, ALGERIA, TUNISIA. By Richard M. Brace. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964, 184 p. $4.95 (Paper, $1.95).

A historian's narrative, straightforward and brief, of developments in the Maghreb up to the present time.

THE ECONOMY OF MOROCCO, 1912–1962. By Charles F. Stewart. Cambridge: Harvard University Press (distributed for the Center for Middle Eastern Studies), 1964, 234 p. $4.00.

A quiet but solid and well written economic history.

L'EXPÉRIENCE MAROCAINE D'UNITÉ DE JURIDICTION ET DE SÉPARATION DES CONTENTIEUX. By Olivier Renard-Payen. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1964, 322 p. Fr. 40.90.

An analysis of the system of administrative justice in Morocco, and its importance as a model for other countries of French-speaking Africa.

ALGERIA'S INFRASTRUCTURE: AN ECONOMIC SURVEY OF TRANSPORTATION, COMMUNICATION, AND ENERGY RESOURCES. By John C. Pawera. New York: Praeger, 1964, 234 p. $15.00.

An analysis useful for those interested in the problem of industrialization in less-developed countries.

THE NEW STATES OF WEST AFRICA. By Ken Post. Baltimore: Penguin, 1964, 206 p. $1.25 (Paper).

A well written analysis of factors which affect and will affect internal political changes in West Africa for years to come.

ÉCONOMIE DE L'OUEST AFRICAIN (ZONE FRANC). By Abdoulaye Wade. Paris: Présence Africaine, 1964, 371 p. Fr. 21.

A detailed analysis of the economy of West Africa, by a lecturer at the University of Dakar. Particular attention is paid to the conditions of production, agriculture, industrialization, problems of capital and foreign investment, and the role of international trade in West Africa's development.

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POLITICAL PARTIES IN FRENCH-SPEAKING WEST AFRICA. By Ruth Schachter Morgenthau. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964, 445 p. $8.80.

A survey of the establishment and disintegration of *Afrique Occidentale Française* and a detailed analysis of the political changes in the new states that superseded the federation, particularly in Senegal, Ivory Coast, Guinea and Mali.

A HISTORY OF THE GAMBIA. By Harry A. Gailey. New York: Praeger, 1965, 244 p. $7.50.

A political history of the small West African country that became independent on February 18, 1965.

THE NEW LIBERIA. By Lawrence A. Marinelli. New York: Praeger (for the Africa Service Institute of New York), 1964, 244 p. $5.95.

A general survey of the internal and external affairs of Liberia, with a supplement of documents.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN GHANA. By J. K. Nsarkoh. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964, 309 p. $3.40.

A valuable study of the Ghanaian local government system, including chapters on general background and recent developments.

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN NIGERIA. By Eme O. Awa. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964, 349 p. $8.00.

A senior lecturer in political science at the University of Lagos describes the structure of the federal government and of the regional governments in Nigeria. A useful reference book.

ERZIEHUNG UND POLITIK IN NIGERIA—EDUCATION AND POLITICS IN NIGERIA. Edited by Hans N. Weiler. Freiburg im Breisgau: Rombach, 1964, 294 p.

A collection of papers on education, social change and politics in Nigeria, by English, American and German scholars.

POLITICAL AWAKENING IN THE BELGIAN CONGO. By René Lemarchand. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964, 357 p. $7.95.

A lucid and detailed study of the history of the Congo in the pre-colonial and colonial periods, particularly useful in indicating where to look for the roots of the present Congolese political conflict.

THE NORTHERN RHODESIA GENERAL ELECTION, 1962. By David C. Mulford. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964, 205 p. $2.65 (Paper).

A detailed study of the events leading to the 1962 election in Northern Rhodesia and the election itself.

BRITAIN AND NYASALAND. By Griff Jones. London: Allen and Unwin, 1964, 314 p. 36/.

An impassioned and documented critique of British policy in Nyasaland, now Malawi, by a former administrative officer.

THE AFRIKANER'S INTERPRETATION OF SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY. By F. A. Van Jaarsveld. Cape Town: Simondium Publishers, 1964, 199 p. R. 2.80.

An interesting discussion by a professor at the University of South Africa in Pretoria.

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Donald Wasson

I. DOCUMENTS

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States:* Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington 25, D.C. *Great Britain:* British Information Services, Sales Section, 845 3rd Ave., New York 22. *United Nations, International Court of Justice:* United Nations, Sales Section, N.Y.; *United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Org., Food and Agric. Org.:* Columbia University Press, Int. Documents Service, 2960 Broadway, New York 27. *Int. Labor Office:* 1262 New Hampshire Ave., Washington 6, D.C. *European Coal and Steel Community, Economic Community, Euratom:* 808 Farragut Bldg., Washington 6, D.C. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office, and Congressional documents, unless otherwise noted, are for the 88th Congress, 2nd Sess. London imprints are Her Majesty's Stationery Office, and New York imprints are United Nations, unless otherwise noted.

Africa

Pan-Africanism. London, Central Office of Information, 1964. 53 p. (R.5512/64.)

Agriculture

Research in agricultural economics: institutes and main fields of research. Paris, OECD, 1964. 127 p. (Documentation in Food and Agriculture, 63.) $1.25.

Low incomes in agriculture; problems and policies. Paris, OECD, 1964. 515 p. $7.00.

The World food budget 1970. Washington, Dept. of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, 1964. 105 p. (Foreign Agricultural Economic Report, 19.)

Atomic Power

Nuclear power economics—analysis and comment—1964, by P. Sporn, American Electric Power Co., for the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Washington, 1964. 51 p. (Jt. Com. Print.)

Agreement for cooperation with NATO for mutual defense purposes. Hearings, Subcommittee on Agreements for Cooperation, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Jl. 30–Aug. 18, 1964. Washington, 1964. 82 p.

——. Report, pursuant to sec. 202 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, Sept. 22, 1964. Washington, 1964. 24 p. (S. Rept. 1592.)

Claims

Index-Digest of decisions, 1949–1962. Washington, Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, 1964. 100 p.

Claims of General Dyestuffs Corporation stockholders. Hearings, Subcommittee, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House, on S. 1451, Feb. 25–26, 1964. Washington, 1964. 53 p.

Claims of U.S. nationals against the government of Cuba. Hearings, Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, on H.R. 10327 [and others], Jl. 28–Aug. 4, 1964. Washington, 1964. 176 p.

——. Report, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, to accompany H.R. 12259, Aug. 11, 1964. Washington, 1964. 37 p. (H. Rept. 1759.)

——. Report, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, to accompany H.R. 12259, Sept. 3, 1964. Washington, 1964. 18 p. (S. Rept. 1521.)

Commercial Policy and Trade

The OECD at work. Paris, OECD, 1964. 137 p.

EFTA trade. Geneva, European Free Trade Association, 1964. v.p. Sw.Fr. 10.00.

Annual review of agricultural trade, 1964. Geneva, European Free Trade Association, 1964. 44 p. Sw.Fr. 3.00.

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